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FOREWORD 
The work presented here began in the form of a report that I 
submitted on my return from a period spent as a UN military 
observer in the former Yugoslavia, and eventually grew into a 
final dissertation for the General Staff officers' course. The 
manuscript was published in Finnish by the Department of 
Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence College in 
1999, whereupon Prof. Kalevi Ruhala offered me the opportunity 
early in 2000 of including an abbreviated version of it in the 
English-language journal Finnish Defence Studies. I wish to thank 
the staff of the department, and particularly the supervisors of 
my dissertation work, Lt.-Col. Erkki Pekonen, Lt.-Col. Harri Ohra-
aho and Major Mika Kerttunen, for all the guidance and support 
that I have received. Similarly I would thank the staff of the 
Defence College library for all the help that they have given me. 
Construction of the English version of this work was a 
particularly challenging and inspiring experience as it coincided 
for the most part with my preparations for serving as head of 
intelligence for the Finnish Battlegroup which was part of the 
Multinational Brigade Centre in Kosovo and with my period of 
service in that capacity. Especially warm thanks go to Major Ian 
Miller and Captain Ali Huston of the G2 MNB (C) HQ (7t'' 
Armoured Brigade) for finding the time alongside all their regular 
duties to go into my work in detail and comment on it. I am also 
very grateful to Lt.-Col. H.D.Allfrey, MBE, SCOTC DG, for his 
encouraging advice on the structure of the paper and its language. 
Without the fluent and stylish translation work of Malcolm Hicks, 
however, the ideas contained in this volume would probably 
have never reached the majority of readers and it would have 
remained to gather dust on an obscure shelf. Finally I must 
expressed my heartfelt thanks to my family and close friends 
who have shown such great understanding and have supported 
me at all stages in this endeavour. 
I have been able over the past seven months to observe with 
some pleasure that only a few of the problems and deficiencies 
mentioned in this book have actually come to light. Opinions on 
the KFOR operation may vary, but it is clear that the intelligence 
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sector at the Multinational Brigade Centre is well functioning 
and supporting commanders at every level. I believe that in 
many respects we are now moving into an era when a 
multinational brigade, even one containing representatives of 
non-NATO countries, has a real chance of setting up an 
intelligence system that meets the requirements of both the 
commanders and the operational situation. The learning process 
is still going on, however, and there are still challenges to be met 
in terms of the passage of information, technology and working 
procedures. This is a rolling stone that will certainly never gather 
any moss, and it is to be hoped that it will with time create 
improved opportunities for intelligence services to respond to 
the demands of running a Peace Support Operation. 
Lipljan, Kosovo, Ist September 2000 
Major Pasi Välimäki 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
"....it is our job to make sure that propaganda does not provide the basis 
upon which policy is based. We have to ensure that the international 
community, in particular, understands the reality, not the rhetoric" 
Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, 
Commander UNPROFOR1  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The purpose of the UN's traditional peacekeeping operations 
during the Cold War period was to avoid open confrontation at 
the local level in crisis areas and to prevent such situations 
developing into armed conflicts between the major powers. The 
end of the Cold War led to a rapid and fairly radical alteration in 
the structure of the international system2 , and the reduction in 
tension between the major powers has allowed them to become 
more closely involved in peacekeeping efforts. Thus peace 
support operations that began in the 1990's were of a different 
type, broader-based and more demanding'. The UN responded 
to the new situation with the "Agenda for Peace" drawn up by 
former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1992 and its sequel, 
the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" of 1995.These represent 
the UN's attempt to create a strategy for the non-violent resolution 
of conflicts. Successful implementation of the former Secretary 
General's model calls for wide control over political, economic 
and military information. The strategy has not met with the 
hoped-for success, however, and certain UN member states have 
redefined their own national peacekeeping doctrines in the form 
of peace support programmes that suit their own ends. This 
means that the concepts and types of operations contained in 
these national doctrines differ to some extent from their UN 
counterparts.4 
Major Pasi Välimäki graduated from the general staff course at the Finnish 
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The UN Charter of 1945 allows the Security Council to 
deploy a variety of measures to resolve conflicts. In order to do 
this, it must have in its possession the information necessary for 
carrying out the measures, ranging from identification of the 
conflict to targeting of an armed intervention. Reactions to 
regional conflicts have altered in the course of the last decade, 
moving away from peacekeeping in the conventional sense 
towards armed intervention by multinational troops5 . The UN 
Security Council has issued mandates for both its own 
peacekeeping operations and those of regional security 
organizations such as NATO. Mandates have enabled them 
either to use military force or to threaten to do sob . These 
operations have at the same time served to reveal the weaknesses 
and deficiencies in the UN command structure, which has been 
criticized for being inefficient, slow and uncooperative. The 
requirements placed on the acquisition of intelligence for 
peacekeeping operations have now changed7 . 
The results of an inquiry into the significance of intelligence 
for peacekeeping operations conducted in 19958 do not contain 
any great surprises. Repatriated peacekeepers laid emphasis on 
the key importance of intelligence as an element in both conflicts 
and their control. They regarded intelligence as poorly 
coordinated and highly secretive. The significance of intelligence 
services in support of decision-making can be expected to 
increase, however, as the principles of the information society 
come to be applied to conflict management. 
The shift from the bipolar system to a multipolar 
environment has added to the uncertainties attached to the 
assessment of crisis situations and the prediction of subsequent 
developments9 . The assertion by Kenneth Robertson that secret 
intelligence is essential to a democratic state if that state wishes 
to respond appropriately to external threats has met with 
criticism in virtually all democracies. It gives the impression that 
intelligence is amoral and criminal in nature and is in itself open 
to misuse as a political weapon. According to Robertson, the 
creation of a functional intelligence system calls for clearly 
defined political control and the designation of responsibilities. 
This will mean that the confidentiality of the information 
obtained will also conform to national expediency.10 The 
significance of intelligence in peace support operations has thus 
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increased since the days of the Cold War as the situations have 
become more complex and more unpredictable. In a peace 
enforcement context, this may imply a combination of 
intelligence and fire power as an alternative to traditional 
peacekeeping operations, especially where the use of fire power 
in this way can enable the agreed political goals to be achieved 
without the involvement of ground troops".  
Research into intelligence in a peace support context is not 
especially difficult, even though the official UN view is that no 
gathering of intelligence takes place", but all research into 
intelligence services is naturally something of a challenge. As 
military history will tell us, the nature of intelligence work and 
the manner in which rulers rule have meant that all operational 
matters, plans and intelligence have been implemented in the 
brains of the commanders, or at best in those of their closest 
aides. 
Recently there has been all the more reason for attempting 
this work, on account of the increased participation by the Finnish 
defence forces in international co-operation. Partnership for Peace, 
the notion of a NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)13 and 
the new types of peacekeeping operation such as IFOR and 
SFOR have raised the question of the use of efficient intelligence 
systems as part of the command process. As a consequence we 
are obliged to improve our conceptual and practical knowledge 
of the command and intelligence routines of other participant 
countries in order to be able to join in the command of 
international operations on an equal footing. Intelligence, like 
military peacekeeping itself, is grounded fundamentally in 
national doctrines, military training and interests. The 
examination of intelligence systems connected with peacekeeping 
is therefore tantamount to research into the national intelligence 
processes of individual states and the related organizations, 
products and methods. The principal possessor of operational 
information in the world order as we know it at present and in 
the foreseeable future is the United States. In the operational 
environment that prevailed after the end of the Cold War, armed 
forces were reduced considerably, but at the same time the 
operational environment in which national interests were to be 
safeguarded became more complex than ever. Thus the armed 
forces themselves became more complex and new tasks were 
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entrusted to them. They developed into networks of numerous 
specialized branches, so that more attention had to be paid to the 
planning, command and co-ordination of control over the 
functioning of these networks. Control over a network necessitates 
a command system, and the major problem that has now emerged 
is the burgeoning growth of this technical aspect and its 
development into an entity in its own right which is particularly 
difficult to master14 
1.2 PROBLEMS TO BE STUDIED, AIMS AND SCOPE OF 
THE WORK 
The aim here is to describe and analyse possible alterations in 
intelligence practices in connection with peace support operations 
carried out under a UN mandate in response to changes in the 
international operational environment and to assess whether 
intelligence practices observe the principle of neutrality 
advocated by the UN or that of military expediency. Attention 
will be paid to the special status of the UN, its problematic 
attitude towards intelligence, the changes that have taken place 
in peacekeeping environments and national determinants15 . 
Particular emphasis will be placed on the Joint Task Force (JTF) 
level. A peace support operation may be carried out under a UN 
mandate or at the instigation of an individual state or regional 
security organization, and the concept covers such functions as 
traditional peacekeeping operations, crisis prevention, military 
assistance, the implementation of sanctions, such as embargoes, 
and peace enforcement operations. A more precise definition is 
provided in Chapter 2. 
The first premise of this work is that the international political 
situation favours the continued use of the existing command 
structure, which forms the justification for setting out here from 
a NATO-centred viewpoint. The UN will retain its position as a 
key international actor, and operations will take place either 
under its command or with its mandate" . The headquarters for 
future operations are likely to be grafted onto a framework 
provided by the CJTF command structure or onto some other 
structure at the JTF level or possessing its capabilities, as has 
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happened in the case of some of the operations commenced since 
1992. A second premise is that peace support operations will be 
initiated in situations in which the operating environment has 
been disrupted or there is a great danger of such a disruption. 
This means that the operating environment must be described 
via a definition of the types of operation involved, in which case 
the present research will be focused on intelligence practices in 
such a context" . At the same time an attempt will be made here 
to extend the study of intelligence services beyond the confines 
of the national perspective and compare it with the political 
programmes lying behind the operations concerned. The third 
premise is that those responsible for the decisions respond and 
act on the basis of subjective interpretation or assessment of the 
situation formed as a product of the command and intelligence 
process and are not simply omnipotent observers located 
externally to the situation. Thus the decisions that are made arise 
from views and images formed by the decision-makers on the 
basis of assessments of the situation, intelligence reports and 
other information concerning the general environment18 . 
The main question to be answered in this work is whether 
the implicitly more or less non-existent intelligence practices of 
the UN should be developed into an explicit system that meets 
the demands of military operations, for the reason that UN 
peacekeeping operations have altered in nature along with their 
operating environments. It is possible to seek a solution to this 
problem by establishing what is the significance of intelligence 
for peace support operations. 
This leads to two subordinate questions: 
1. What is the nature of the interaction between intelligence 
and command? 
2. How is intelligence organized in peace support operations? 
In addition, we will be asking here how the national 
differences in doctrine between Great Britain, France and the 
United States are reflected in the intelligence practices connected 
with peace support operations and what policies in the 
implementation of intelligence work are detectable from the 
source material employed here. 
The focus in terms of time is on peace support operations 
initiated under a UN mandate since 1992. On account of the 
depth of the inquiry, it has been essential to concentrate on 
operations for which sufficient material is available and which 
are typical of their times and represent this new phase of 
development. It can be claimed, of course, that there is no such 
thing as a typical crisis and that each one is unique in some sense. 
The historical approach adopted here, although narrow from the 
historiographical viewpoint, is an effective one as far as the 
analysis of intelligence practices is concerned19 , i.e. the work is 
limited to peace support operations sanctioned by the UN or 
regional organizations and under the command of these, NATO 
or the leading nations involved. No particular stand is taken 
with regard to Finnish peacekeeping operations or the intelligence 
work connected with these, and similarly the decision-making 
processes taking place at various levels of command within the 
UN and corresponding processes within national organizations 
are discussed only to the extent that is necessary for studying the 
intelligence services. The focus will be upon the evolution, 
structure and efficiency of the architecture of these services, but 
not on technical implementation or the technology available to 
them2° . 
1.3 FRAME OF REFERENCE 
In order to look into the problems mentioned above, a theory of 
command and intelligence is developed here, as set out in Chapter 
2. This frame of reference is derived from the section of Joel J. 
Lawson's work "The State Variables of a Command and Control 
System" that deals with the interaction between intelligence and 
command functions21 . The strength of Lawson's theory may be 
said to lie in its clarity and capacity for simplifying the 
complexities attached to the command process. The use of a 
theory developed by the American school for this purpose may 
be justified on the grounds that their research makes use of well-
defined concepts and is of high quality and in keeping with the 
nature of the activity concerned, whereas British research has 
tended to adopt more of a historical viewpoint22 . The scope of 
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the problems involved is reflected well in the fact that the authors 
of the papers have not even managed to reach an understanding 
over the definition of intelligence. Particular attention in the 
formation of the theory of command and intelligence has been 
paid to the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz on the connection 
between political decision-making and power projection and on 
the role of intelligence in the command process. Likewise, a full 
appreciation of the interaction between political and military 
considerations that belongs to peace support operations is 
essential for any examination or understanding of the process of 
commanding such operations. It was this connection that former 
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld was alluding to when 
he said "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only soldiers can 
do it". Peace support operations are by nature political exercises 
and only secondarily military ones, and it is for this reason that 
the political decisions are made before the military ones in the 
UN organization, and before any military action is taken. The 
purpose of intelligence in the decision-making process, as in 
military command processes, is to do what it can to reduce 
"friction"23 under conditions of impending hostilities.21  
The factors affecting intelligence practices (Fig. 1) may be 
classified into three groups: (i) the direction of peace support 
operations and the intelligence requirements of each level in this, 
(ii) requirements imposed by operating environments and 
reflected in the phases of the operations and the types of operation, 
together with the intelligence practices adopted, and finally (iii) 
national determinants such as peacekeeping doctrines, intelligence 
practices and organizations and military training and traditions. 
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INTELLIGENCEPRACTICES 
LEVELS OF THE COMMAND OPERATIONAL 
NATIONAL DETERMINANTS 
PROCESS ENVIRONMEN-IS OF PEACE 
SUPPORT OPERATIONS 	I - national political decisions and 
- national decisions and UN legislation 
Headquarters (Grand o 	Id order end iorwnstimel - national strategy and interests 
StrafegidStrategit lscl) 	 • politics - intelligence practius and 
- national commander-inchiefof - types QfQpemrtDrt orgadveäDds 
added forces (military strategy - peacekeeping doctrines 
II) . 	 ... 	.,.  military training and tmdidon 
- command headquarters of 
operations (operational level, 
CSTF) 
- tactical headquorters (tactical 
losol) 
- technical losol 
Figure 1. Factors supplementing the frame of reference and affecting 
intelligence practices 
1.4 METHODS AND PROCEDURE 
This research takes the form of a cross-disciplinary study of the 
relevant documents based on qualitative methods and analysis. 
It makes use of documentary evidence for the most part, but this 
is also filled out to some extent with experiences of peacekeeping 
operations and interviews with people who have been engaged 
in intelligence work. The procedural diagram (Fig. 2) indicates 
that a comparative analysis is made of three bodies of 
information.25 At the same time as the comparison was taking 
place, evaluations were being made of the applicability of the 
theory, the procedure and the reliability and generalizability of 
the results and the quality of the sources used, for the purpose of 
identifying deficiencies in the theory or procedure and correcting 
these in After-action Reviews. 
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IGO's 	 p0GiBQ.`E5 
RESFARCFiERS 	 EXPERIENCE OF AfI55I0.u'S 
INTELLIGENCE N PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
Figure 2. The procedural diagram. 
The theories of Lawson and Orr which underlie this work 
are used to model the construction of a set of intelligence practices 
that support command functions. The theory employed for this 
is a combination of those of the two authors with ideas advocated 
by other researchers and leading nations regarding the 
organization of intelligence work. The resulting theory of 
intelligence practices covers (1) the linking of intelligence to 
command functions and (2) the principles, (3) processes, (4) 
organization, (5) products, (6) methods and (7) architecture of 
intelligence work. The factors affecting intelligence practices, 
such as the types and purposes of peace support operations and 
the impact of national doctrines on intelligence are defined by 
means of conceptual analysis. The aim of this theory is to provide 
a foundation for a comparative approach to the research.26 
The requirements placed upon intelligence were analysed 
by comparing the ideas of international organizations such as 
the UN and NATO with the theory created here, the results of 
the analysis being presented in the form of a set of intelligence 
requirements for the decision-making process leading to the 
formation of a political policy27 . At the same time an effort is 
made to put forward and take into account the effects of national 
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determinants on intelligence. Experiences of intelligence practices 
in actual operations were compared with the theory developed 
here, and the details introduced by the national determinants 
were compared with the requirements laid down. The outcome 
of the comparison is a set of principles for drawing inductive 
conclusions regarding developments in intelligence practices in 
the context of peace support operations28 . 
1.5 SOURCE MATERIAL 
The original sources for this work consisted of literature 
concerned with intelligence and command functions, codes of 
conduct, published programmes and research reports, chiefly 
dating from the 1990's. These were filled out by means of 
secondary sources and interpretations of the primary ones so as 
to extend the background to the investigation. The research 
reports, inquiries and articles in journals are mostly Anglo-
American in origin. It is obvious that the confidential nature of 
intelligence work places certain restrictions on the acquisition of 
original source material, and it is for this reason that the material 
used here comprises mainly research publications. 
The papers and books published on intelligence services 
tend to adopt one of two approaches: they are either (1) related 
to the political aspect or (2) related to the command process. The 
authors of works of the first type tend to be political scientists or 
strategists, while works of the latter type tend to be written by 
military personnel or people studying military leadership. The 
scientific sources are for the most part reports or books emanating 
from various countries' military academies. On the other hand, 
in order to generate new information by means of research, 
material has been included among the sources which does not 
represent the doctrines held at the present moment or the 
performance capabilities of current systems. The purpose of 
studying the history of military leadership is to gain an insight 
into the topic by explaining how technology and other changes 
in circumstances have affected command systems and leadership 
as such. A number of sources have been explored in detail. Adda 
Bozeman has investigated the impact of statesmanship and 
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cultures on intelligence arrangements, and van Creveld is a 
military historian whose work has focused largely on western 
military skills. Christopher Andrew and Kenneth Robertson are 
of the opinion that sources and original material for the study of 
intelligence services are best available for the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, but warn against placing too much trust in the results 
of American research, as the Americans are inclined to make 
sweeping generalizations. This difficulty is avoided here by 
considering the historical depth and geographical breadth 
affecting each context. 
The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) that met 
in the United States in 1987 defined the requirements to be 
placed on intelligence in the 1990's, which led to the publication 
of a series of articles on the subject in the book "Intelligence 
Requirements for the 1990's" edited by Roy Godson.29 The 
obtaining of information on intelligence practices in Great Britain 
is hampered by the confidentiality of most of the relevant material, 
which Christopher Andrew believes is a consequence of the 
existing legislation and the tendency for government officials to 
over-classify documents as top secret. Thus, although customs 
are gradually changing, the organization of intelligence services 
in Britain is classified as a state secret and no official statistics on 
actual intelligence services are released for publication. It has 
been claimed that this makes it difficult for politicians to form 
any idea of what control they really have over the intelligence 
services.30 
The fact that the sources used at the organization level are 
UN publications means that as far as this work is concerned, the 
official UN view of the gathering of intelligence data in the 
context of peacekeeping operations and its instructions for doing 
this are drawn up by UN officials themselves. The UN's published 
programmes do not make any mention of intelligence or the 
organization needed to gather it, nor of any instructions or 
mandates for any such operations, which is why especial weight 
is attached to the presentations and interviews of Franklin van 
Kappen and Colonel Muhammad Khattan31  
The sources used at the national level comprise the 
peacekeeping doctrines, ordinances and instructions of various 
countries, and the interpretations and weightings attached to 
these have been derived from articles written by the commanders 
of peacekeeping operations and interpretations published by 
national analysts. Information has been obtained both directly 
and indirectly on intelligence in connection with operations 
already implemented, the direct sources being articles, reports 
and papers on intelligence work and the indirect ones articles or 
the like in which reference is made to intelligence services or 
accounts are provided of activities or observations that 
presuppose their existence. These sources were used to extend 
the background to the present work, to confirm details or to 
obtain additional details. 
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2 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
"Global turbulence can be defined as a worldwide state of affairs in 
which the interconnections that sustain the primary parameters of 
world politics are marked by extensive complexity and variability" 
James N. Rosenau, 
Turbulence in World Politics32 
2.1 THE WORLD ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 
It is not a straightforward matter to account for the operational 
environment and the changes that are taking place in it. In 
Bozeman's view we are living in a divided world that is riddled 
with conflicts and anarchical by nature. This partly explains 
why international political theories have not been able to serve 
as instruments of global unity or to create norms according to 
which it would be possible to predict the actors on the 
international stage and the statecraft that they are likely to exercise 
in internal and external affairs even as far forward as the next 
day. International actors such as states and global organizations 
together form a system which we call here the "international 
system",33 in which the state remains the principal unit, even 
though James Rosenau maintains in his new international system 
that state-centred actors are giving way to transnational ones. 
Rosenau confirms Kenneth Waltz' view that no actor has yet 
been able to challenge the crucial role of the nation-state in the 
international system.34 
By statecraft, Bozeman refers to the sum of all doctrines, 
political programmes, institutions, processes and operations that 
are aimed at preserving the state as a human grouping moulded 
by elements of control, security and politics.35 She includes 
intelligence within this notion of statecraft in a political sense, in 
that it is devoted to gathering information on other surrounding 
communities as required by the state. Thus intelligence starts out 
from the need to meet information requirements dictated by the 
national interest. The national interest defines certain matters 
that affect the nation's sustained efforts to assure security, welfare 
and development as defined in terms of intellectual and ethical 
values, and is itself determined in each situation separately as a 
consequence of political decisions, being directed towards the 
promotion of national goals. There exists in turn a national 
strategy that sets out how the accepted goals are to be attained. 
As Barnett points out, the sudden changes brought about by the 
outcome of war place a substantial strain on the visionary 
capabilities of political decision-makers in their effort to ensure 
that the strategic goals, scenarios, doctrines and organizations 
that they conceive are in harmony with the latest technology 
available.36 
Indeed, Bozeman stresses that all strategic thinking sets out 
from the assumption that the definitions of foreign policy and 
the national interest are based on possession by the state of a 
good knowledge of its own condition and a realistic view of the 
order prevailing in adjacent areas. In practical politics this does 
not always happen, but instead the national interest of a certain 
state may be manifested by an effort to declare and propagate an 
ideology of its own. The United States, for instance, "has confined 
itself to reiterating its unresearched trust in the universal validity 
of such basically Western values as law, democracy and peace."37 
By an international crisis we mean here a situation in which 
a disturbance occurs in the international system or some part of 
it. In other words, a disturbance results if the foundations of the 
international system undergo a sudden change such as the 
dissolution of an internationally recognized sovereign federal 
state or the collapse of a constellation of major powers. Crises are 
almost without exception both isolated events and in some sense 
unique events,38 and for this reason the operational environment 
is described in the context of this work in terms of both levels 
and types of operation. 
The United Nations was founded to act as a global 
organization for ensuring collective security, and one of its 
principal active bodies was from the outset the Security Council, 
the jurisdiction of which was based on consensus - in that the 
major nations in the world had the power of veto over its 
resolutions. This meant that the states represented on it were 
able to act as was best for their own interests, International 
'Ii 
security is still very much in the hands of the UN, even though 
there are nowadays many other active participants in the field, 
including NATO, the CCSE and the leading world powers, the 
United States, France and Great Britain. These actors exercise 
control over crisis situations through an extensive range of 
measures: diplomacy, economic and political sanctions, the threat 
of military action and in extreme cases military interventions 
such as peace enforcement operations. 
The smaller the coalition that is involved, the faster, more 
efficient and more critical its decision-making capability is. Also, 
once certain states decide on intervention, it is probable that they 
will become parties to the conflict, on account of the fact that 
they are at the same time acting according to their own interests 
and agendas - for it is these that argue either for or against 
participation in the intervention - and are employing their own 
troops to bring the conflict to an end and to shape the outcome.39 
In the words of Clausewitz, "war is nothing more than a 
continuation of politics by other means". In practice, war implies 
organized parties deploying forces against each other. Nowadays 
an alliance or state that implements an international intervention is 
liable to be regarded as a party to the conflict whether it likes it or not. 
Defined in this way, peacekeeping is one of the "other means" 
and the peacekeepers can be regarded as a party to the conflict.40 
In the light of the above, and in the Western view in any 
case, the distinction between war and peace is based on 
international law and is a very fundamental distinction. War is 
viewed as a violent conflict between two or more states, but 
modern-day conflicts or war arenas are more complex than they 
used to be, often involving several armed groups within a state, 
guerrilla warfare, urban warfare or civil war and being initiated 
or perpetuated by influences or ideologies coming from outside. 
In situations like this the legitimation of the use of force becomes 
problematical in the Western view. As Bozeman puts it, the 
trend is towards a degeneration of Western norms and 
institutions, a change which puts Western diplomacy and 
statecraft to a severe test in the effort to maintain control. The 
starting points adopted by the UN and in international law are 
"internationalized" versions of Western culture and institutions 
and fail to function as such for the analysis and control of non-
Western low-level or high-level conflicts.41  
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2.2 PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
In this study the term "peace support operations" is used to 
describe all military operations that employ multinational troops 
funded by the UN. These operations can be divided into three 
levels: peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement» They are primarily political in nature and not 
military endeavours. In the situation prevailing since the end of 
the Cold War it has been possible to give such peace support 
missions stronger and more clearly worded mandates. At the 
same time, however, the complexity of the tasks entrusted to the 
UN has outgrown traditional peacekeeping, 43 so that in addition 
to the conventional roles of monitoring and peacekeeping the 
troops can be expected to supervise ceasefires between 
paramilitary bodies, assist in maintaining law and order, ensure 
the delivery of humanitarian aid, contest the use of air space and 
ensure safe passage for goods or people. The peacekeepers by no 
means always have the support of the local authorities or 
inhabitants in this.44 In an altered situation such as this the 
concepts and content of peacekeeping as we know it may be in 
danger of becoming obsolete. 
The categorization of peacekeeping missions proposed in 
the Watson Institute's Second Generation Multinational 
Operations project has been employed in the British peacekeeping 
doctrine, for example,45 and both Britain and the United States 
have attempted in their own peacekeeping ordinances to 
distinguish the types of mission from one another and to classify 
the military actions that apply to each. The titles used and their 
content nevertheless deviate from the corresponding concepts as 
used by the UN, and this causes difficulties for the commanders, 
troops and UN officials in the field. These are compounded 
further, of course, by the fact that the political decisions and 
actions necessitated by the situation are independent of the 
doctrines or ordinances of any one state. The outcome of all this 
has sometimes been the use of force against parties to the conflict 
in situations that are not a matter of self-defence46 
Under the UN Charter of 1945, the differences between the 
types of operation arise from the article under which the mandate 
is issued, and the mandate itself should include a statement of 
the principle on which the task is to be executed, the areas into 
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which it is to be divided and the planned duration of the operation. 
One essential point as far as the UN and the participating states 
are concerned is whether the mandate is based on Article VI or 
Article VII of the charter, although even here the greatest 
difference lies in the preciseness of the definition rather than its 
content. The need for consent and the nature of this consent are 
reckoned to constitute the critical difference between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. One condition for achieving 
the correct policy with respect to peacekeeping is that this 
difference should also be interpreted doctrinally.47 We shall 
invoke here the three-level categorization proposed by the Watson 
Institute, in which Level One operations consist of supervision 
and monitoring (Table 1). The success of such operations is 
dependent on the UN principle of consent and impartiality, so 
that considerable attention has to be paid to preserving the consent 
that has been achieved, even in tactical activities.48 
TYPE OF 
OPERATION DUTIES/NATURE USE OF FORCE 
Observation - 	supervision and/or monitoring and reponing of compliance - 	no use of force, even 
mission (civilian with an agreement or situation in self-defence 
or military)  issuing of early warnings (unarmed) 
- 	production of up-to-date, impanial information for the UN on 
dangerous movements or develo ments 
Peacekeeping - 	to assist under a UN mandate in preserving or restoring - 	lightly armed 
mission international peace without recourse to peace enforcement  only in self-defence 
Table 1. Level One operations. 
Level Two operations then comprise crisis prevention, 
demobilization, military assistance, humanitarian aid and the 
permission or prevention of movement (Table 2). These operations 
usually arise as a result of internal conflicts within states rather 
than between states, but the main difference between Level One 
and Level Two lies in the level of military performance required 
in terms of both troops and weaponry. Level Two operations 
make up the dynamic area of peacekeeping, an area which is 
constantly increasing in complexity.49 
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TYPE OF 
OPERATION DUTIES/NATURE USE OF FORCE 
Crisis prevention - 	to create a buffer zone between the parties in the potential armed primarily for 
disputed area self-defence purposes, 
- 	does not necessarily require a ceasefire or peace treaty but also to ensure 
completion of mission 
requires consent, at least in principle, from the parties to the where necessary 
conflict 
Demobilization - 	to restore and preserve it at an acceptable level and to ensure - 	only for self-defence 
personal security in internal conflicts 
- 	success requires local support for a solution to the conflict 
- 	liaison between the parties 
- 	supervision of a ceasefire between the parties 
- 	disarmament and cantonment of armed forces 
- 	general disarmament 
- 	appropriation and custody of munitions 
to supervise reorganization of local police and defence forces 
Military - 	to assist the transfer from military activity to peacetime - 	does not usually 
assistance conditions involve use of force 
- 	to help maintain general order and security 
- 	to help in establishing general order and security for the 
holding of elections 
to support the provision of essential services (water, 
electricity etc.) 
- 	to assist in the planning and organizing of defence forces 
- 	to assist in the repatriation and resettlement of displaced 
persons 
- 	to supervise and assistance in the removal of unexploded 
ammunition and mines 
Humanitarian Duties belonging to the military component: - 	armed primarily for 
assistance to set up a base self-defence purposes, 
to guarantee the security of assistance posts in 	the affected 
area 
but also to ensure 
completion of mission 
where necessary 
to ensure the supply of tactical assistance 
Granting/denying - 	to guarantee or prevent the movement of ships, aircraft and - 	may entail coordinated 
of movement vehicles in certain areas on along certain routes use of ships and 
- 	action taken with respect to a given power or state aircraft 
supervision of enforcement measures, closely associated with - 	the operation may 
operations at level three require the use of 
electronic warfare for 
offensive purposes 
Table 2. Level Two operations. 
Level Three operations involve laying down sanctions and 
restoring peace by the threat of force or even its use (Table 3). 
The troops deployed are heavily armed and prepared for military 
action. The principal difference relative to the previous levels is 
the greater likelihood of confrontations between the UN troops 
and the parties to the conflict.50 
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TYPE OF 
OPERATION DUTIES/NATURE USE OF FORCE 
Enforcement - 	denial of access to goods, diplomatic and commercial - 	may entail coordinated 
relations and freedom of movement for the party shown to be use of Navy vessels 
the aggressor, in accordance with the UN Charter and military aircraft 
- 	can reduce the performance capacity of the aggressor, - 	the operation may 
although without directly forcing the cessation or illegalities require the use of 
or military activities electronic warfare for 
- 	enforcement calls for a broad international consensus, offensive purposes 
especially among those occupying the same areas as the 
aggressor or adjacent areas 
High intensity - 	as an extreme measure under the UN Charter, the Security - 	the most efficient 
operations Council can authorize a peace enforcement operation in order force available maybe 
to remove a threat to world peace deployed (land, naval 
one measure may be an extensive military operation against and air forces), but an 
the aggressor state offensive sjustified 
only to the extent 
necessary for 
discharging the 
mandate 
Table 3. Level Three operations. 
It is not always possible to distinguish clearly between the 
above tasks and types of operation, especially in the field, and 
UN troops may find themselves implementing tasks belonging 
to operation types at different levels under a single mandate. 
Likewise the escalation of operations in terms of the use of force 
or of the numbers of troops deployed does not necessarily take 
place in a systematic or stepwise fashion. As noted by Visuri, an 
indeterminately defined task inevitably places armed forces in a 
difficult situation, as they have to act contrary to their traditional 
logic. Activities that fall outside the sphere of actual hostilities, 
such as humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping, eat away at 
the troops' morale and teach them to act contrary to the spirit of 
their basic training, to fight for their country, which remains 
their principal raison d'être. Humanitarian interventions bring 
them face to face with all the conflicts of interest associated with 
intervention and the traditional giving of assistance. A clear 
distinction should be maintained at all times between military 
action and the giving of assistance, as these are opposed to each 
other both in the manner of their execution and in the ideology 
that lies behind them. As we are concerned here with intelligence 
in a peace support context, full-scale war as a conflict management 
method will be excluded from consideration. 
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2.3 NATIONAL DOCTRINES AND DIRECTIVES 
A mandate issued by the UN Security Council confers legitimacy 
on international interventions in the internal conflicts of 
individual states, but in order to ensure adequate information 
on which the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General 
and his secretariat can base their decision, they must have a 
good knowledge of the operating environment that is developing 
and the conflict management instruments at their disposal. This 
knowledge can be demonstrated by means of an up-to-date 
doctrine.51 The UN Charter of 1945 creates the basis for a doctrine 
that applies to the UN, but this has never be extended to form a 
doctrine of peacekeeping. The "Agenda for Peace" produced by 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali represents an attempt to remedy 
this lack, but it still does not provide the detailed clarifications 
desired by the military; it simply explains the terminology 
attached to UN mandates. In the context of national doctrines, 
the term "peacekeeping" no longer serves to describe the 
operations concerned or the tasks included in them in the altered 
operating environments of today, and if this term is retained 
and its content left unchanged this will inevitably give rise to 
political and juridical problems and place the troops in the field 
in extremely difficult situations, possibly life-threatening ones.52 
An ideal doctrine is one that combines theory, practical 
experiences and the present day in a balanced, reasoned whole. 
A doctrine should attempt to explain, delimit and comprehend 
all the factors that make up a military action and the ethical, 
national and other factors that influence it. Although national 
doctrines reflect the military traditions and experiences that a 
state possesses, some movement towards integration of military 
doctrines has been detectable over the last decade, as a 
consequence of technological advances, international co-
operation, economic integration and other coinciding interests 53 
In the best case, doctrines can be expected to develop in the spirit 
of information belonging to the "new age", experiences gained 
from- previous operations and political goals and not merely be 
bound up in earlier doctrines. A military doctrine seeks not only 
to create a common basis on which troops can act in different 
situations, but also to create a certain mentality, while at the 
same time modern military doctrines no longer content 
themselves with defining classic, full-scale warfare but also 
military actions appropriate to conflicts at a lower level than that 
of war.54 
It is essential for operational success that the doctrine to 
which one adheres is compatible with achievement of the strategic 
goals set for the operations. In fact, success at the tactical level in 
particular, or how the objective is accomplished, is of greater 
importance in peacekeeping than in outright war, as 
circumstances and events on the tactical level can have 
repercussions at the strategic level. Many countries renewed 
their doctrines regarding peacekeeping and other operations at a 
lower level than actual war in the early 1990's to correspond to 
the new international situation, the changes being grounded 
both in theoretical research and in "lessons learned".55 It is 
according to these directives that the military leadership lays 
down doctrinal demands for its regional headquarters and the 
commanders of its operations. 
The doctrines existing in the British army are embedded in 
the nature of command and serve to define norms. The doctrine 
of Wider Peacekeeping has proved to be of high applicability 
and has thus met with broad acceptance and incorporates 
contributions from all branches of the Armed Services. Meanwhile 
the new naval doctrine states specifically that national interests 
may be pursued by taking part in peacekeeping operations. The 
British contribution in this field is developing in the direction of 
"robust peacekeeping", as Lieutenant-General Rose puts it.56 
The French army is about to publish a new peacekeeping 
ordinance that is based in part on experiences gained in 
Yugoslavia, and this contains the term "active neutrality", which 
is comparable to the British "robust peacekeeping". The use of 
force implied in "active neutrality" must be in accordance with 
the mandates obtained and the goals set for the operation. The 
French have some reservations about the implementation of this 
"grey area", however, as it is extremely difficult to re-establish 
neutrality and consensus once force has been resorted to. The 
French model of conflict management has its roots in earlier 
interventions in its colonies and in the third world, and the 
French tradition is more humanitarian (medecins sans frontiers, 
medecins sans monde) and more combat-resistant than the American 
equivalent.57 National doctrines regarding intelligence set out 
the general framework and provide instructions on the principles 
for organizing intelligence services in combined operations. These 
directives also apply to multinational operations at a level below 
that of war, since no separate intelligence doctrine for peace 
support missions has yet been drawn up. The doctrines provide 
the framework within which intelligence services should be 
implemented and developed, and at the same time aim to 
guarantee that it meets the qualitative requirements set for it at 
all levels of command.58 
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3 THE THEORY OF COMMAND, 
CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE 
3.1 CONCEPTS 
Command and control 
"Essentially... the communications networks that radiate out from 
and back into central nodes of authority in a system, carrying 
information related to organizational maintenance, external and internal 
activity, plans and goals of central directors" 
Roger Beaumont59 
One of the main aspects of American research into changes 
in warfare has concerned the interaction between information 
and command and the importance of this for success in combat.',, 
The effects of the changes will be felt above all at the operational 
level and may well lead to an integrated command system that 
extends from the tactical to the strategic level, enabling superior 
data management and the handling of combat situations in 
accordance with the principles of command and control warfare. 
Information as an instrument of warfare will create better chances 
of victory with smaller losses on one's own side and lower costs, 
and thus its management will emerge as the crucial factor for the 
centralized deployment of rapidly moving forces on a battlefield 
that is more complex than ever" . This development, referred to 
as information warfare, is not revolutionary in itself; what is 
revolutionary is the range of opportunities for the utilization of 
information afforded by technological progress. This technological 
progress must not become bogged down in a terminological 
wrangle over the definition of command structures: C2, C3, 
C3CM, C31 or C4I. These are primarily abbreviations for 
command system architectures, but a command system is an 
entity in itself that must take account of the complex, 
multidimensional nature of leadership and accept the 
consequences of the various dimensions. We refer here by 
command and control to all the measures by which a commander 
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sets out to accomplish his mission with the minimum loss of 
human life. These functions of command and control are backed 
up by communications and the use of computers and by 
intelligence.62 
Our examination of systems of command and control will 
be divided into three levels in accordance with the proposals of 
Coakley and van Creveld, with each level comprising three 
aspects: organizations, processes and technical equipment. The 
foundation of every system consists of the national command 
and control practices and culture which have arisen through 
experience, common sense or a knowledge of military history 
and theory. The command and control culture forms a common 
knowledge base for the chain of command defining how one 
should act in different situations and creating joint principles of 
warfare for all the commanders.63 
The highest level in the command structure according to the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition is the Grand Strategic level. In a 
peacekeeping context this is the level of the UN General Assembly 
and its executive arm, the members of the Security Council, who 
are committed to preserving peace not only by military action 
but by all means available. Since it is difficult both in theory and 
in practice to make any absolute distinction between the Grand 
Strategy and strategic levels of command, it will be done here 
only when specifically required by the context or some other 
circumstance. Otherwise we shall speak simply of strategic 
command.64 Command and control at the national level seeks to 
promote and defend national objectives and has four functional 
elements at its disposal for doing this: diplomacy, economics, 
data management and military strength. It is this level of decision-
making that is called strategic command and control. In the case 
of peace support missions this strategic level also incorporates 
collective organizations such as the UN, EU and NATO in addition 
to sovereign states. The resolutions of the UN Security Council 
constitute strategic decisions, because these lay down limits and 
duties for the member states with respect to their peacekeeping 
operations, while the states retain their own powers of operational 
command over their national contingents. This swells the number 
of people responsible for the decision and thereby complicates 
and slows down the decision-making processes governing peace 
support missions.' 
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The primary objective of strategic decisions is to prevent a 
crisis from developing into a violent encounter, and the military 
aspect of such decisions involves the use of military resources to 
these ends. The principal problems affecting the operational 
level of command and control in peace support operations are 
conflicts engendered by national interests and the lack of any 
consistent strategic directive. Operational command and control 
can vary from command over a particular theatre of war to 
command over an operation, depending on national practices." 
The regional forces of the United States, for example, are 
responsible for assessing the situation in their area of operation 
and are expected to draw up a set of alternatives for military 
action without any continuous strategic guidance. 
The NATO concept of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), 
by comparison, is a military instrument of the future which is 
capable of commanding peace support operations. This is a 
multinational (combined) task force comprising different branches 
of the armed services (joint) which is formed for a particular 
purpose or operation,67 and is commanded by a headquarters 
staff which can be assembled and deployed quickly. The CJTF 
principle also implies that non-NATO countries can participate 
in such operations, NATO troops can be deployed outside their 
actual area of operation and NATO resources can be made 
available to the WEU, for example. The principle is based on 
NATO permanent directives, modes of operation and standards, 
and the framework of each CJTF headquarters is built up around 
three or four existing NATO headquarters. The IFOR and SFOR 
operations have demonstrated the usefulness of this structure, 
even though they were not set up in strict accordance with CJTF 
principles.61 Tactical command and control is concerned with 
the control of troops, warships and aircraft in combat, i.e. their 
use in a manner compatible with the demands of the operating 
environment and in accordance with the tasks designated by the 
operational command.69 
Command and control can be examined from a theoretical 
viewpoint by modelling in the form of a multiphased reinterative 
cycle known as the command and control process. The purpose 
of the multiphased structure is to incorporate all the essential 
contributory factors in this process. These command process 
models can be criticized for the extreme simplification that they 
entail - e.g. they do not take account of the effects of inessential 
or erroneous information - , their simplicity and their failure to 
take the multidimensional nature of combat situations into 
consideration. Numerous minor variations on descriptions of 
this kind are to be found in handbooks of business practice as 
well as in military manuals.70 In spite of their defects, they 
nevertheless provide a fairly useful theoretical description of the 
command and control process. 
Lawson's model C2 is based on a five-phase command and 
control process that is in interaction with its operating 
environment (Fig. 3). The model arrests the process, as it were, at 
a moment of time X, so that the subsequent phases can be 
explained. In the context of the present research a decision-
making cycle is synonymous with a cycle of the command and 
control process. The operating environment feeds in unanalysed 
External Data, or information on the command and control 
process through the medium of various actors in the Sense phase, 
and the process reacts to this information and forms a description 
of the situation in the Process phase. The intelligence system can 
also feed information into the command and control process at 
this point. In the Compare phase the process compares the 
description of the situation with that of the Desired State produced 
by the command system in the form of either a prediction or an 
operational plan. This comparison then enables conclusions to 
be reached in the Decide phase as to the measures to be executed 
in order to achieve the Desired State. The Act phase is that in 
which the measures are applied in order to exert influence on the 
Environment. We assume here that all the command and control 
processes occur simultaneously and continuously at all levels of 
command.71  
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Figure 3. Lawson's C2 Process Model.72 
In order to place the C31 command architecture within a 
scheme which entails various levels of command, we end up 
with the Combat Operations Process Model of Orr (Fig.4), which 
represents an adaptation of the models of Boyd and Lawson 
with Higher and Lower levels of command added. Since the 
passage of the information and intelligence generated by these 
levels of command is not specifically defined in the model, it 
may be used to describe C31 processes at any level of command 
and control, although the impact of the Intelligence Analysis 
part is different at the tactical level and below from that at the 
operational and strategic levels. At the latter levels the process 
begins to function in the manner of Lawson's C31 model, 
whereupon the functions of the Act phase consist of transfers of 
information rather than physical actions.73 As the speed of the 
decision-making process depends on that of the processes at the 
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other levels of command, the commanders are obliged to 
concentrate on acquiring relevant information and transmitting 
this horizontally in order to accelerate the whole process. 
The task of intelligence is to acquire the necessary 
information for proper control of the existing state of affairs so 
that the commander can make his decisions on a firm basis,74 
where the state of affairs refers to the multidimensional physical 
and intellectual picture that is required so that the commander 
can achieve domination over his adversary and safeguard his 
own troops. The physical aspect concerns the terrain, weather 
conditions and "fixed structures", while the intellectual aspect 
covers personnel, armies, the parties to the conflict, nation-states 
and the human factor. The current view is that a transition is 
taking place from monitoring of the state of affairs to control 
over it, i.e. from a reactive to a proactive approach. The state of 
affairs also includes the area covered by the peace support mission 
and its immediate surroundings. Control over the state of affairs 
can be supported by information contributed by the intelligence 
process that fills out the picture gained thus far and intelligence 
products that support decision-making.75 
Figure 4. The Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model 76 
American command and control practices lay emphasis on 
the need to develop systems, principles and processes intended 
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to produce essential information for the right people at the right 
time. The use of only the essential information as a basis for 
decisions nevertheless forces the commander to tolerate 
inexactitude, because possession of the essential information 
does not imply knowing everything. The commander can then 
do what he can to reduce the inexactitude by making use of 
further knowledge gleaned from his own experience. This is a 
natural step, as military tasks are usually strictly limited in 
scope, there is only a finite time available for making the 
decisions, and these decisions will inevitably be based on 
incomplete information. The command system can assist the 
commander by reducing the uncertainties surrounding the 
decisions, acquiring the necessary essential information and 
processing it as quickly as possible, so as to ensure that the 
commander's decision-making cycle operates more rapidly than 
that of his opposite number" . This is a matter of the situation 
awareness that the commander can achieve with respect to the 
current state of his own army and that of his adversary, the 
latter's intentions and environmental factors of relevance to the 
situation at that moment. The achievement of this awareness is 
crucially influenced by the amount of information needed to 
make the decision, the amount obtainable and the nature of the 
matter to be decided. The optimum moment for making a 
decision may be described my means of a "decision-making 
window"78 , in which the amount of information required for 
making the decision and the time available are scaled to the 
matter to be decided. This ensures that sufficient time is reserved 
for implementing the decision. Mathematical models are often 
used to assist decision-making at the highest level, as this calls 
for precise definition of the operational environment and 
calculated models with respect to the matter to be decided. 
As the environment in which an operation is conducted is 
by nature stochastic79 , the decision-making window is apt to 
shift as the amount of information and the length of time available 
vary in a virtually unpredictable manner. The quest for essential 
information turns into a race between two factors: (1) the 
information needs as expressed by the commander, and (2) the 
ability of the command system to meet these needs in a constantly 
changing environment. Further complications are introduced in 
practical operations by the commander's personal opinions on 
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what is essential information and what amount of it is required 
and his dependence on his own national style of command and 
control. If there is no longer any command system, or if it functions 
only to a certain extent, the scope of the problems becomes 
considerably greater. Survival in such situations calls for 
personnel training in the use of incompletely functioning or even 
totally improvised systems. A command system will thus be 
constantly trying to achieve a balance between the information 
required and the time available for making the decision. The 
solution to this problem suggested by Hermann is that certain 
significant variables should be recognized in crisis control: (1) 
the level of awareness attainable through possession of the 
essential information, (2) the optimum time for making the 
decision achievable by management of the use of time, and (3) 
the threat posed by the crisis itself. By adjusting the balance 
between awareness, time and threat, a commander can take 
control of the situation and create the conditions necessary for 
correctly timed action of the correct kind.S0 The lower the level of 
decision-making, i.e. the more the decisions can be devolved to 
lower levels in the command structure, the more quickly action 
of the correct kind can be taken. This can also mean savings in 
terms of cumbersome and expensive data transmission and 
handling arrangements. The idea behind this is not especially 
new, as it comes close to the task-based Auftragstaktik of Moltke, 
in which the confusions of war and a certain level of uncertainty 
have to be accepted at all levels of command. 
The last command and control problem is the need to 
minimize the time spent in making decisions and initiating their 
execution. This time becomes more protracted as the commands 
travel from one level in the structure to another. One requirement 
for the technical part of the command and control system is that 
it should be able to transmit information that is essential for 
planning and command purposes with as short a delay as possible. 
This means that particular emphasis in the architecture has to be 
placed on centralization or dispersion of decision-making 
functions, for instance, or on the standards of technology achieved 
in weapons systems and the principles governing their use. One 
important factor in creating the architecture is the commander's 
information needs.81 In the case of a peace support mission it 
should be possible to link all the troops to one command system, 
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i.e. the system architecture should observe agreed standards. 
This will help to avoid sudden interoperability problems. 
One of the most important properties of a functional 
command system for field use is an ability to reorganize and 
compensate for losses suffered by the organization, e.g. losses of 
command personnel, sensors or communications equipment82 . 
In order to ensure its durability, the technical equipment should 
be constructed of the cheapest and simplest basic elements or 
components, which will mean that the overall system can be 
restored to functional order as quickly and easily as possible.83 
The complexity of integrated systems is well illustrated by 
developments in information technology in America, where three 
data transmission and communications systems are in use and 
five data management systems. This means that even the United 
States has not yet achieved a centralized command and control 
capability at the tactical level because of insufficient redundancy 
in the systems. Given time, technology, social progress and 
integrated C31 systems will inevitably shape our current rigid 
linear military organizations into flexible networks in which 
specially trained personnel will be directed by means of integrated 
command systems.84 In the ideal case, the whole organization 
may have access to the information necessary for completing 
their mission in the form of centrally created and maintained 
databases. Information fed into the command system will be 
worked up into the most suitable form for its users, so as to 
ensure that the taking of decisions or description of situations at 
different levels of command will not be rendered difficult or 
impossible by the quantity of information. 
We are talking now not about the communications system 
of a unified command, brigade or army, but of a centralized 
global command system. The advances that are being made in 
command systems thus apply to all levels and contribute 
significantly to the cohesion of organizations. The necessary 
technology and artificial intelligence has so far not been able to 
eliminate command errors arising from the flood of information 
available, i.e. technology has allowed massive growth in the 
volumes of information but the ability to handle this information 
has not developed at the same pace. The majority of the erroneous 
military decisions made during the last century arose because of 
human errors and not because of inadequate or faulty 
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technology"' . It will be possible in the future to acquire specialized 
systems to help visualize battlefields, providing the user with 
information consistent with his user profile without the need for 
any separate processing. This will mean, of course, that the 
increase in technological performance will lend the information 
an illusion of timelessness, reliability and accuracy in the eyes of 
the decision-makers86 . 
Reality and the comprehension of the situation produced by 
command and control systems will not be one and the same 
thing even in the future, and researchers are quick to warn of the 
sense of excessive self-confidence that can be inspired by highly 
developed command systems. It will be necessary to return to 
questions of the human factor - intuition, experience, professional 
skill, intelligence, character and vision - in order to reduce the 
effects of distorted information and mistaken interpretations.87 
In order to develop our organizations, tactics, doctrines and 
training appropriately, it will be necessary to be aware of the 
technical strengths and weaknesses of command systems. It is 
through technology that armed forces everywhere will attempt 
to compensate for the reductions in manpower and finance - to 
achieve more with less resources"". 
Intelligence 
"The quest for certainty, in other words, will logically end only when 
there is nothing left to be certain about" 
Martin van Creveld, Command in War89 
Strategic intelligence can be defined as activity on the part 
of a state or community by which it aims at gathering, analysing, 
distributing and utilizing information and knowhow to further 
its own ends relative to other states, political groups, military 
powers, movements or individuals. A second purpose is to protect 
the community concerned from corresponding activities 
undertaken by others. The idea behind clandestine activities is 
that they are directed against the actions, behaviour and politics 
of other states or individuals.90 The words Intelligence or Military 
Intelligence Information do not usually form part of the UN 
vocabulary, and intelligence activities as such are commonly 
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referred to simply as the acquisition of military information,91  
although both the words information and intelligence have been 
used in connection with the most recent operations. We shall use 
the term intelligence here to signify military and political intelligence 
and the acquisition of information in connection with peace support 
missions. 
The 19th century military theoretician Carl von Clausewitz 
defines intelligence as the gathering of all essential information 
about an enemy and his state as a basis for one's own plans and 
operations. Its weakness, in Clausewitz' opinion, lay in the fact 
that the political leadership and intelligence organization could 
direct the gathering of information and interpret the products of 
the process according to their own purposes. In his critical 
assessment of information obtained for use as a basis for decision-
making and the methods employed for acquiring it, Clausewitz 
was anxious to point out just how fragmentary and unreliable 
the information was on which decisions were actually based. 
Even so, a commander is expected in a crisis to reach decisions 
that are as correct as possible, and usually to do so quickly. This 
means that he needs information processed as accurately as 
possible by professional officers in order to reduce the effects of 
friction in warfare.92 
Clausewitz' statements fundamentally still hold good. 
Intelligence supported by the future C4I systems will serve to 
dampen the effects of friction and enable decisions to be based 
on broader bodies of information, and presentation systems are 
now available by which leaks of information can be controlled 
and information laid before the commander at the right moment. 
The fundamental task of intelligence is to find out what the other 
side does not want you to know. It is thus a matter of noticing 
efforts to deceive, searching for things that are secret and acquiring 
a dominant advantage over the enemy. In order to achieve this, 
intelligence officers have to be able to understand the values and 
ways of thinking of the other side and appreciate his otherness.93 
The usefulness of intelligence information is also affected by the 
expectations and attitudes of the people taking part in the 
decision-making process, and these will be entirely independent 
of the results of the intelligence as such. 
Intelligence activity can vary in extent from strategic to 
tactical, the main difference between these two lying in the extent 
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and scope of the information obtained. The activity should take 
place within the area of responsibility defined for the level of 
command or the intelligence body concerned, and this area of 
responsibility may either coincide with the area covered by the 
peace support mission or spill over into the surrounding areas or 
states as well if these are likely to influence the mission. 
Intelligence serves the needs of different levels of command by 
means of different organizations, products and methods.94 
The strategic level of command is supported by strategic 
intelligence, and information acquired by national strategic 
intelligence will be intended to serve the purposes of constructing 
a national strategy, political programmes and military plans at 
both the national and international levels95 .Of particular interest 
in this connection are the factors that affect the military 
performance of individual countries, their weaknesses and the 
alternative courses of action open to them in different 
circumstances. Decision-makers at the strategic level should lay 
down clear guidelines for intelligence, since these are often left 
fairly broad and vague. One reason for this is the reluctance of 
politicians to define national or UN interests and the fear of 
political humiliation. In the absence of adequate guidelines, 
however, the intelligence staff themselves have to formulate 
scenarios from which to obtain advance warnings or evaluate 
the course of events.96 When assessing strategic intelligence it 
must be remembered that it is an agent - subject, object and 
instrument - of the national exercise of power. It is through 
intelligence that one can achieve and maintain the cognitive 
initiative over one's adversary that confers freedom of action. It 
is by acquiring information that political decision-makers receive 
feedback on the success or failure of their policies97 . This means 
that the confidentiality of intelligence information is of crucial 
importance for the nation's security,98 and goes part of the way 
towards explaining the equivocal attitude of the UN towards 
intelligence organizations and the information provided by them, 
especially since confidentiality tends to increase the inequality 
between states. 
Strategic intelligence can be divided into four fields according 
to the objectives and activities concerned, these being in constant 
interaction with each other and with the policies that determine 
the guidelines for the intelligence work99 : (1) collection of 
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information and (2) its analysis, which together provide the 
foundations for shaping national security policy, and (3) counter-
intelligence and (4) covert action, which are employed in the 
implementation of this policy. The collection and analysis of 
information will be discussed later in connection with the 
intelligence process. 
Counter-intelligence consists of recognition of the actions 
of other states' intelligence services, neutralization of the threats 
posed by these actions and manipulation of the intelligence 
services concerned in a manner which benefits one's own state. 
To this may be added the recognition and neutralization of threats 
posed by terrorists and other actors not affiliated to states.1°° 
Operations in this field make use of the same instruments for the 
acquisition of information as foreign and military intelligence. 
The operational security and protection of one's own forces is 
based largely on information gathered by counter-intelligence 
regarding objects, performance capabilities and actions of interest 
to the other side. As Merrill Kelly emphasizes, the timely 
observation and distribution of certain pieces of information by 
counter-intelligence can be of considerable significance to the 
tactical command, especially when a particular nationality is 
subject to a distinct external threat'°1  
Covert action, as one aspect of the execution of a politically 
selected programme, is aimed at influencing the political, military, 
economic and/or social life of another state and thereby at 
promoting one's own national interests. Although it can serve at 
the same time as a means of acquiring intelligence information 
on that state'102 it is primarily a user of intelligence information, 
and its location within the intelligence organization is more an 
administrative than an operational matter. In the view of Richard 
Shultz Jr., multinational and national covert action against 
terrorists and radical nations can enable a state to take preventive 
action in advance. With the increase in the numbers of low-level 
conflicts and the probability of these, intelligence services are 
preparing themselves for covert action as one means of conflict 
control.103 The logical conclusion is that in addition to other intelligence 
activity, American political decisions are both preceded and followed by 
covert action in the country concerned. 
The four fields of activity outlined above, the collection and 
analysis of information, counter-intelligence and covert action, 
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are in close interaction one with another, so that if a state alters 
its intelligence policy in some area to a significant degree this 
will affect all four fields.1° The redirection of intelligence resources 
in response of UN requests, for example, will affect the intelligence 
services of the country concerned in their entirety. Also when a 
state redirects its intelligence services in accordance with the 
national interest, it is probable that this will affect elements of all 
four fields. 
Operational intelligence is required as support for control 
and command functions at the operational level. As information 
acquired by national operational intelligence services is intended 
to support the planning and execution of campaigns aimed at 
achieving strategic goals at the theatre of war level, it is important 
that intelligence should create suitable conditions for the success 
of the operation in the field. Objects of interest include factors 
affecting the logistics of operations, regional conditions and the 
nature of the terrain. Operational-level intelligence systems have 
been developed for the purposes of warfare and not of 
peacekeeping. 105  Headquarters command functions at the tactical 
level are backed up by tactical intelligence, the information 
acquired by which is intended to support the planning and 
execution of tactical-level operations. In this case intelligence is 
primarily being placed at the service of the lower command in 
the area of operations, and interest is focused on the parties to 
the conflict as potential threats and on the direct effects of weather 
and the terrain."' Targeting applies to all levels of command, 
and is intended to produce information necessary for the 
appropriate concentration of the effects of the use of weaponry. 
The information concerned is often a part of that generated by 
general intelligence, or else serves to fill out the latter.107 
Intelligence as it applies to peace support missions may be 
divided here into four temporal phases within an operation: 
planning and preparation, concentration in the area of operations, 
action, and post-conflict monitoring and supervision. Each phase 
has its own intelligence requirements. The instructions issued by 
the commander at the planning stage regarding the intelligence 
information that will be needed concern at least the nature of the 
area of operations and the conditions prevailing in it and estimates 
of the threat that exists and of possible developments in the 
situation108 . 
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Attitudes towards intelligence vary according to both 
political practices and the cultural background. Broadly speaking, 
intelligence for the Western countries is a matter of maintaining 
supervision over other states in the event of war. This intelligence 
activity originated from the need to gather comparative data on 
the culture of other states and of target states and on the factors 
influencing their policies, and has typically been performed by 
officials and to some extent in the universities. Intelligence focused 
on other nations is a generally accepted fact in the United States, 
for example, but a wide variety of opinions exist on the methods 
to be used for acquiring the information. The purpose of 
intelligence organizations in a democracy is to serve the national 
interest, and they should therefore be free of political ties109 . One 
problem of principle is the compatibility between intelligence 
and democratic values, as the nature of intelligence is regarded 
as the antithesis of democracy,110  but the results of intelligence 
can be used indirectly to promote democratic values. It is for this 
reason that we are faced with an ambivalent attitude towards 
intelligence, as manifested at the present time in demands for 
greater openness and responsibility. Demands of this kind always 
become more vociferous at times when there is little threat to 
national security."' 
Bozeman, in her study of cultural backgrounds, defines three 
fundamental reasons for the strengths and weaknesses perceived 
in Western intelligence: classical Greek philosophy, Roman 
jurisprudence and Christianity. She sees the sources of political 
intelligence in the Greeks' thirst for knowledge, while Roman 
jurisprudence and the principle of public affairs proved restrictive 
in the sense that they left no room for the use of some instruments 
of political action such as concealment, deception and covert 
action. The final factor is the linking of the Christian concept of 
morality with politics - love and war.112 
3.2 THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
Intelligence is an uninterrupted process that lends support to 
the command and control process, its end product being 
"acquired, compared, combined, analysed, evaluated and 
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interpreted information". The fundamentals of command and 
control warfare reflect the neo-Clausewitzian battle of wills, in 
which rational human beings engaged in making decisions and 
plans base these on a critical analysis of available information, 
including intelligence information113.  The major difference 
between Clausewitz' concept of intelligence and the present-day 
concept lies in the contemporary belief in the ability of modern 
intelligence systems to produce more correct information than 
incorrect."' 
Figure 5. Adaptation of Lawson's C31 Process Model employed as a frame of 
reference for the present work."' 
According to the theories of Lawson and Orr, intelligence 
influences the command and control process in two stages (Figure 5). 
Firstly, significant raw data acquired by the intelligence services 
can be included in the creation of a description of the situation at 
stage 1 - Process, after which the command and control process 
goes on to compare this description and the alternative courses 
of action with the predetermined target situation. It is this 
comparison that forms the basis for deciding on the measures to 
be taken to achieve the target situation. The second point at 
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which the results, analyses and evaluations achieved in the 
intelligence process come to bear on the command and control 
process is at stage 2 - Decide, when the effects of the action are 
evaluated on the basis of the altered description of the situation 
and the products of intelligence operations.116 
The theories of Lawson and Orr can be interpreted as 
implying that the intelligence process produces parts of the 
situation description required for command and control purposes 
and of the information needed to reach decisions at all stages of 
the command process, i.e. command and intelligence are regarded 
as parallel processes throughout, beginning with the planning 
and preparation of the mission and continuing until its 
termination. A five-phase model for the intelligence process can 
be derived from Lawson's theory (Fig. 5), in which the first phase 
is regarded as being implemented by Means such as sensors and 
investigators, having the purpose of acquiring significant facts or 
observations which will be needed in the command and 
intelligence processes. It is essential in this phase to make a 
distinction between raw facts, or information, and intelligences" 
The use made of the Means depends on steering from the 
Environment in which the command process is taking place 
(Intelligence/Analysis in Fig. 5). 
In the second phase of the intelligence process individual 
observations are combined, confirmed and in some cases 
interpreted, after which the significant information is fed into the 
command process to fill out the situation description (1-Process). 
In the third phase of the intelligence process the significant facts 
are combined into a broader entity and compared with the existing 
situation and data received from other sensors. The fourth phase 
is that in which the results of the analysis emerge, representing 
the intelligence products. These provide the command system 
with feedback on the success of the action taken and a prediction 
of the future development of the situation with various alternative 
scenarios. The intelligence products may comprise information 
on the scope for action on the part of a particular party to the 
conflict, an analysis of airborne action in the target area or a 
prediction of future political developments. In the fifth phase the 
intelligence products are disseminated to those who need the 
information. We shall refer to the information distributed at this 
point simply as the products. The recipients may be other parts 
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and levels of the intelligence organization, for instance, or national 
intelligence organizations. In the course of this dissemination the 
information is also fed to the command and control process to 
serve as a basis for decision-making (2-Decide). The process 
comes to an end only when the mission is completed118 
One of the crucial phases as far as the success of the 
intelligence process is concerned is the analysis of the facts 
acquired119  This can be distinguished as a separate phase of its 
own in the case of strategic intelligence, but irrespective of the 
level, it must inevitably consist for the most part of human 
reasoning and be grounded in experience, which naturally means 
that the possibility of human error - misunderstanding of the 
data, misplaced trust in unreliable data or the classification of 
certain items as anomalies - increases as the amount of data 
grows and the time limits become more stringent. 
Rosenau is of the opinion that the principal problem lies in 
distinguishing "normal" changes from undesirable ones. It is indeed 
true of research into world politics as a whole that the detection, 
recognition and analysis of anomalies can be decisive for the 
perception of real changes.120 It is characteristic of intelligence 
organizations that they attempt to acquire a large bulk of 
information out of fear that an essential fact will otherwise be 
missed. The result is nevertheless that the flow of information 
becomes uncontrollable in the search for eventual certainty as a 
basis for decisions and that the essential information will be 
obscured by "noise". It is therefore important that everything 
that is inessential should be filtered out at the analysis stage of 
the intelligence process. The danger as far as the reliability of the 
information is concerned is that the process will begin to jump 
over the Act phase and turn into a four-phase one, frequently as 
a consequence of failure to take the necessary decisions or of 
inadequate familiarity with the intelligence process and the 
performance capabilities of the system.121 An understanding of 
intelligence as a five-phase process can help one to appreciate 
the strengths and weaknesses of intelligence organizations. The 
analyst must remember all the time that the task of intelligence is 
to produce information as a basis for the taking of decisions and 
that it is the politicians' task to ensure that the correct decisions 
are taken. 
It is possible to improve the external steering of the 
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intelligence process by means of scientifically valid analytical 
models. As Robert Mandel maintains, more precise definitions of 
national interests and goals on the part of political decision-
makers can be achieved by improving the flow of information 
between them and the intelligence community, by agreeing on 
common approaches and by training. There are four factors that 
are apt to disturb the intelligence process, and thereby also the 
decision-making process, and which, if they coincide, can add 
considerably to the difficulties. The first factor concerns the 
professional and personal inadequacies of individual officials, as 
manifested in the selection of personnel within an organization, 
overestimation of the accuracy and reliability of data, or 
overreaction because of flaws in personality. The second factor is 
the complexity of the intelligence process employed, which may 
be reflected in difficulties in defining criteria for evaluating the 
information produced, in selecting appropriate means of acquiring 
information or in assigning priorities to intelligence missions. 
Thirdly we have the internal barriers created by the organization's 
bureaucracy, and fourthly deficiencies in political and strategic 
direction, which is an external factor. The barriers raised by the 
organization itself often take the form of compartmentalization, 
internal competition and a high turnover in personnel and 
technology. The original purpose of compartmentalization may 
have been to preserve privacy - to operate on a "need to know" 
principle - but taken too far it can detract from the efficiency of 
intelligence work. Internal competition, a rapid turnover in 
personnel and continuous changes in the organization are all 
highly detrimental to the continuity of intelligence work. These 
internal barriers have always proved most serious at times when 
intelligence has been deployed in covert operations, as these 
create the greatest need for internal collaboration.172 
Reductions in the time available for reaching decisions 
present a major challenge for intelligence processes, especially 
when attempting to explain and evaluate changes that have been 
observed and their impact on existing power structures and 
actors123.  The path from observations via decisions to action 
cannot be allowed to take a matter of days or even hours, given 
the nature of modem command and weapons systems. The 
intelligence process must be able to make its own contribution to 
the situation description within the time limits set by the decision- 
making cycle and support such decisions with its own products. 
This means that it must be aware of the information needs of the 
decision-makers and able to concentrate its attention on satisfying 
these needs within the shortest possible time. The narrowing of 
the decision-making window places more emphasis on 
intelligence and the time allocated to preparing operations. 
3.3 INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS 
Although co-ordination of the intelligence activities of the major 
powers is complicated by their networking relations, internal 
competition and differences in interests,124 intelligence 
organizations at the national level have an obligation to back 
up peace support operations by responding to calls for 
information on the part of their national contingents and placing 
ready-made intelligence products at their disposal. Depending 
on national principles in this matter, the support provided can 
extend to the strategic, operational and tactical levels. That 
obtained from national strategic intelligence may consist not 
only of information but also of the provision of a group of 
liaison officers such as the National Intelligence Support Team 
(NIST) deployed by the United States. Similarly regional 
headquarters at the national level can supply intelligence 
products, command system services or a liaison group such as 
the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE), in addition to which 
an operation may be supported by means of information acquired 
by particular branches of the armed forces.125 
Various barriers to the passage of information can arise in 
organizations such as the UN, including compartmentalization, 
originally conceived of as an instrument for data protection, 
internal divisions and attempts to pursue individual interests. 
When considering the placement of personnel it is important to 
remember that the UN is a political organization which attracts 
people with strong ideological motivation, so that the staff are 
not necessarily able to distinguish between intelligence 
information and the other information that they receive, or may 
even be unfavourably disposed towards intelligence in principle. 
This can reflect upon on the whole organization and can become 
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a problem on occasions.126  The effects of this problem can be 
alleviated by means of high standards of professionalism, good 
personal relations and the creation of both official and unofficial 
internal channels of communication. 
The commander of an operation should organize his troops 
and headquarters in such a way that the delay times in the flow 
of information are suitably short, and the intelligence system and 
practices should be such that they can be altered in response to 
changes occurring at different phases in the operation and the 
requirements set by particular situations. In the best cases the 
intelligence practices employed in an operation - ways of working 
and technical systems - will have been in use in peacetime and 
before the operation began, as in the CJTF scheme, but at all 
events, intelligence must be one aspect of the planning of the 
whole operation that takes place under the commander from the 
time of his appointment.127 
The quality and usability of intelligence products will be 
critically dependent on the analysts processing the information, 
and the training of these people is a long and very exacting 
process which requires practice in real situations. The need for 
larger numbers of these people over recent decades has forced 
the authorities to cut down on their training, however, with the 
consequence that the intelligence products have not come up to 
the standards expected in terms of quality, interpretation, 
linguistic form or content. Analysts trained in the scientific 
community are apt to concentrate on details in their attempts to 
solve problems, as their training has not placed enough emphasis 
on broad entities or perception of how the topic to be studied is 
related to such an entity.128 In addition, intelligence officers must 
be capable of resisting political pressures to produce information 
that lends support to a particular policy. It is their responsibility, 
in fact, to resist politicization, which can very well take the form 
of the use of information for personal ends or to cover up mistakes. 
Anyone engaged in intelligence work, and most particularly an 
analyst, must be capable of understanding the way of thinking, 
set of values and models of behaviour of the target person or 
organization, and this understanding cannot be gained in any 
other way than by engagement in actual intelligence work. It is 
only in this way that he can reliably evaluate the threats that 
exist in a given situation, outline realistic plans for counteraction 
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or predict future developments, and this can only be achieved by 
multidisciplinary study. 
Erroneous conclusions arise when the analyst allows his 
own cultural background to influence the result rather than the 
culture, ideology, society and logic of the country concerned - 
giving rise to the Mirror Image phenomenon. This phenomenon 
exists equally well at the strategic, operational and tactical levels 
and is attributable primarily to a lack of local expertise.129 A 
similar kind of error is the failure to understand "the otherness 
of the enemy", although this is connected more with military 
than political action. One's opponent employs doctrines, tactics 
and weapon systems of his own and is trained for a particular 
kind of warfare. Cohen takes the example of the Vietnam War, at 
the beginning of which United States intelligence reckoned that 
the Chinese People's Army would conduct its operations in the 
same manner as the army of North Korea except that it would be 
less well armed. This was an error of judgement, however, for 
they were well organized, well equipped and well trained for 
guerrilla warfare. The consequence of this mistake was that the 
Chinese were successful at first, because the UN troops had no 
idea of the weaknesses in their tactics. It can take years to learn to 
understand the otherness of an enemy and develop counteractions 
suitable for one's own tactics and operational skills.130  The third 
challenge for intelligence officers is the ability to adapt to dynamic 
changes in situation after a long period of status quo. This has 
proved to be extremely difficult. 
3.4 INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS 
An intelligence product arises as an output from the analysis 
phase. Godson provides the following categorization of the 
analytical work involved: 
- The product may comprise a full description or explanation 
of a significant international political, military, technological 
or sociological trend. 
- Use may be made of sociological theory for the 
understanding of the raw data, and the product may be of 
assistance to political decision-makers in achieving their 
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goals or a means of proposing alternative methods of 
attaining these goals. 
One purpose of the product may be to obtain an early 
warning, e.g. of an offensive, to provide long-term 
predictions of further developments, to describe or estimate 
regional trends or to present evaluations based on 
experience. 
The product may arise from disparate items of information 
of a topical character concerning some special field of 
military, political or economic significance to political 
decision-makers.131  
It is natural in the light of the above that the academic 
world and the intelligence community, in accordance with UN 
principles, should collaborate more intensively and open-
mindedly than ever and concentrate their efforts on studying 
the cultures and societies of the target states. The aim is to 
achieve broad-based, reliable descriptions of these target states 
which comprehend all aspects of life, partly in order to prevent 
purely military information from acquiring a monopoly status 
in the supporting of decision-making.132  One of the problems 
inherent in the acquisition of information is that no criteria 
exist for classifying or supervising intelligence products in terms 
of quality, while qualitatively more information is available 
than it would ever be justifiable to collect. This is partly due to 
the fact that decision-makers are unable to state sufficiently 
clear priorities for the information to be acquired — no one is 
prepared to say that a certain matter is not worth looking into 
at all. Qualitative criteria have been proposed, however, e.g. 
the requirements that the information should be up to date, 
essential, of a sufficient quantity, of acceptable accuracy and 
obtained by certain methods.133  Similarly, intelligence manuals 
lay down qualitative criteria by applying certain attributes to 
good intelligence.l34 
At the operational and tactical levels, intelligence products 
are expected in part to supplement the situation description, to 
help in identifying and defining goals, to support the planning 
and implementation of missions by providing information, to 
reveal attempts at deception and surprise, to support its own 
side's attempts at bluff and to evaluate the results of missions 
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and the redirection of activities. Commanders' decisions should 
receive support from regular situation reviews in which the 
headquarters staff and lower echelons of the command structure 
report not only on the current situation but also on intelligence 
information and evaluations that have been received. The lower 
echelons of the command hierarchy are expected to produce 
both daily situation reports and predictions of future 
developments, statistics on the movements of both the enemy 
forces and their own and summaries of events and 
confrontations. An intelligence product thus arises as a 
consequence of the intelligence process, but it should be noted 
that it does not arise during a single cycle in the process but 
through an endless sequence of loops. This ensures that 
information and predictions generated during previous cycles 
can be constantly reassessed. Intelligence products arise in a 
routine manner - daily, weekly, monthly and yearly - as well as 
on an ad hoc basis.135  
Strategic intelligence supports decision-making by means of 
information on the military and economic strength of states, 
their internal political situations and possible internal unrest - all 
information that it is relatively easy to acquire. In addition, it 
produces information of the aims and plans of state governments 
and other countries' intentions - information that it is relatively 
difficult to acquire, and on the consequences of its own side's 
decisions and of the actions of other states - information that it is 
still more difficult to acquire. Among the end products of the 
intelligence work, the assessment of the situation consists of an 
examination of various matters in relation to each other, e.g. the 
intentions of states are compared with their undertakings, 
technical comparisons are made of weapons systems, and so 
forth. The complexity of the comparison process and the need to 
monitor the objects of investigation over long periods make it 
exceedingly difficult to achieve reliable intelligence products.136  
Such products can also differ in the temporal significance and 
duration of the information they contain. Particularly problematic 
situations for the generation of intelligence products arise when 
a new crisis breaks out in an area, for instance, for which no 
special knowhow exists nor are there any intelligence instruments 
ready for use there, or else the speed with which the crisis has 
broken out prevents the seeking of confirmation for the 
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information or its careful analysis. Problems also arise when the 
political approach that has been chosen has consistently led to 
disappointments - as this approach will have been partly based 
on intelligence products in the first place. 
On looking into the products of counter-intelligence one 
observes a certain connection between this and strategic 
intelligence, and further comparison of their products with the 
needs for information that exist at the commencement of a 
peacekeeping operation reveals another link. The products of 
counter-intelligence include: 
- 
	
	National counter-intelligence evaluations regarding persons, 
embassies and military bases at home and abroad and the 
threats facing allied countries. 
- 	Situation reports on the activities of foreign intelligence 
services, possibly including models for modes of action and 
profiles of individual people. 
- 	Proposals for the neutralization and manipulation of other 
states' intelligence services. These may include arrests, 
deportations and trials. The aim of manipulation is usually 
to lead foreign agents on a false trail. 
- 	Information, including details of the adversary's intentions, 
priorities or weaknesses.137 
Attention must be paid in the dissemination of intelligence 
products and information to the needs of the users and the 
degrees to which the products have to be encrypted. If necessary, 
the information has to be sanitized before distribution if the 
users' security ratings are inadequate. The security classification 
will be based on that applied nationally in the country 
concerned, while multinational operations may form a 
classification system of their own or observe the NATO 
classification, for instance.138 
Indications and early warning are often mentioned as one 
of the tasks of intelligence. In practice this means that the instance 
responsible for the implementation of the intelligence operation 
has to define the indicators and priorities for observing an early 
warning, so that when the indicators appear work can begin 
immediately on preparing the decision-makers for the eventuality 
of the signs of a crisis emerging. Once these signs come about the 
problem is how to convince the political decision-makers that 
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they have, or are about to have, a crisis on their hands. Decision-
makers tend to notice events that conform to their predictions and 
ignore those that fail to conform13' . Thus intelligence not only has to 
generate information but it also has to make sure that the political 
decision-makers understand the implications of that information. 
In the opinion of Robert Gates, this often leads intelligence services 
to produce for decision-makers items of information which they 
will not wish to know.140 The inabilities of decision-makers to 
make use of intelligence products are revealed well by a quotation 
from the report of the UN's first peace enforcement mission, in 
Korea: "It was not the absence of intelligence which led us into 
trouble, but our unwillingness to draw unpleasant conclusions 
from it"141  
3.5 SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE 
Sources of intelligence can be classified into three main groups: 
open sources, technical sources and human sources. The open 
sources are public ones to which anyone can gain access, e.g. 
the media, news agencies, published works, conferences and 
interviews with people who have been abroad. The technical 
sources are based on conventional photography or infrared 
imagery or the interpretation of electromagnetic radiation 
emitted by the object of interest, while information can be 
obtained from human sources either overtly or covertly. With 
the vast increase in the numbers of sources and the amounts of 
information yielded by them in the course of the last decade, 
data acquisition organizations have also grown immensely," 
and at the same time technological advances have meant that 
strategic intelligence in particular has moved away from the 
use of human sources to technical methods. These are naturally 
best suited to the evaluation of technical performance potential, 
the creation of basic databases and the supervision of the 
observation of arms limitation treaties. Their advantage lies in 
their ability to generate a large bulk of information, although 
this then places an additional burden on the analysis phase, 
while their weakness lies in the fact that they do not tell us 
anything about the political aspirations of the states in question 
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or their operational plans or clandestine research and 
development work.143  
Modern intelligence may be divided into seven main 
categories in terms of the agency responsible for it and the 
resulting product: 
CATEGORY CONTENT 
Human • HUMINT covers all information gained through human contacts. At the tactical level this 
Intelligence implies a wide scale of activities ranging from the interrogation of prisoners of war, the 
(HUMINT) acquisition of documents, patrolling, observations and collaboration with other military and 
paramilitary forces in the area to contact handling. HUMINT yields the greatest volume of 
information, but also calls for critical evaluation of the sources. Its targets include sources of 
information on plans, intentions, decisions, research and development work, doctrines, 
personalities, training and morale. HUMINT can also involve covert operations, including the 
use of agents and illegal collecting methods. Special forces, specially trained field HUMINT 
teams and patrolling troops can be used to collect information. 
Signals • SIGINT is based on the interception, location, analysis and monitoring of radio 
Intelligence communications (COMINT) and the interception and analysis or electronic measurement of 
(SIGINT) other radio transmissions such as radar signals (ELINT), in order to obtain information on the 
transmitter and its users. By combining information obtained in these ways and others it is 
possible to identify targets with the accuracy needed for precision weapons and predict the 
enemy's intentions. 
Specific varieties of ELINT include Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), 
Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT), which is based on the observation, collection and analysis 
of telemetric transmissions, and Radar Intelligence (RADINT), which is based on the analysis 
of data obtained by means of terrain reconnaissance radar, artillery identification radar, air 
control radar or fire control radar methods. 
Imagery • IMINT is based on the visual examination of photographs and the use of lasers, radar, infra-red 
Intelligence imagery, image sensors or synthetic aperture radar (SAR), from which information can be 
(IMINT) deduced by comparing and combining the results. In this way it is possible to locate and 
recognize buildings or equipment belonging to the parties to the conflict, concentrations of 
troops or other activities. The results obtained are highly accurate, easy to store and available 
for further processing. Some of the systems used enable real-time situation descriptions to be 
produced, e.g. oblique aerial photography and the latest laser radar devices. 
• Specific varieties of IMINT include Photo Intelligence (PHOINT), in which information is 
extracted by interpreting, classifying and evaluating information contained in photographs 
made available for intelligence purposes. 
Measurement • MASINT is a scientific and technological form of intelligence in which qualitative and 
and Signature quantitative analyses are made of data obtained by technical means on the basis of 
Intelligence measurements of various details and features observed. with regard to certain systems, by 
(MASINT) which they can be recognized. 
Specific varieties of MASINT include: 
• Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT), which relies on the collection and processing of acoustic 
phenomena. 
• Optical Intelligence (OPINT) 
• Electro-optical Intelligence (ELECTRO-OPINT), which is based on optical monitoring of the 
electromagnetic spectrum from the ultraviolet region (0.01 pm) as far as the infra-red region 
(1.000 pm) 
Infra-red Intelligence (IRlNT) 
Laser Intelligence (LASINI), involving laser-assisted technical and georefereneed 
identification of locations 
• Nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT), which relies on the collection and analysis of radiation from 
radioactive sources 
CATEGORY CONTENT 
Unintentional Radiation Intelligence (RIN), involving the observation, collection and analysis 
of unintentionally generated electromagnetic energy that has no clear directionality as does a 
nuclear explosion, for instance. 
Open Source • Open Source Intelligence is concerned with all data available to the general public which can 
Intelligence potentially be of value for intelligence purposes. 
(OSINT) 
Counter- • The aim of counterintelligence is to gather information and to take action to protect one's own 
intelligence organization. Its targets are acts of espionage, sabotage or assassination which other states, 
(Cl) intelligence organizations, persons, terrorists or other foreign citizens may plan to carry out. 
Technical • Technical Intelligence is used to monitor technological advances made by the parties to a 
Intelligence conflict at either the strategic or tactical level and the performance capabilities and operative 
('17) usefulness of technological innovations that could have military applications at the time or in 
the future. It is virtually synonymous  with Scientific and Technical Intelligence. 
Table 4. Categories of intelligence employed in this work.'"' 
The importance of HUMINT is emphasized in the case of 
low-level conflicts, as the small bodies of lightly armed and 
correctly trained troops typically involved in these are able to 
evade technical intelligence devices. By mixing with the local 
population or moving about in terrain where it is difficult to use 
technical surveillance devices, small groups of guerrilla fighters 
can avoid both observation and exposure to armed intervention.'45 
The targets may not necessarily differ very greatly between war 
and peace support operations, but there may be significant 
differences in the capacity to observe and locate them, and 
consequently it is necessary when developing the capabilities of 
armed forces to take both types of conflict into account. 
Determination of the disposition of a target state's forces is based 
on intelligence at both the strategic and operational levels, and 
most of the work has to be done by electronic means, which 
makes it both expensive and slow. The amount of time required 
is due to the fact that a target state's electromagnetic activity 
under peacetime conditions will be relative low, so that successful 
concealment and decoy tactics can mean that recovery of the 
"missing pieces" can take years. At the same time the sudden 
occurrence of unrecognizable or otherwise deviant signals can 
easily lead to over-reaction. 
The strength of SIGINT lies precisely in the high speed of 
data acquisition and localization. One of the principal tasks of an 
electronic intelligence system in peacetime is to gather early 
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warning observations, and the use of technical devices for 
intelligence purposes can be expected to increase as manpower 
is reduced and engagements take place over broader areas. On 
the other hand, this development may be forestalled by the fact 
that the funding required by technical systems will increase 
faster than the results achieved by them would warrant.146 
Targeting places still greater demands on intelligence in terms of 
both accuracy and speed. In spite of all the talk, current strategic, 
operational and tactical-level sensor systems do not yield 
sufficiently accurate data to enable the targeting of an armed 
response, which must be based on the transfer of highly accurate 
location and identification data to the weapon system. One 
solution to the targeting problem has been sought through the 
use of unmanned airborne vehicles (UAV). 
3.6 INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE (THE C4I 
STRUCTURE) 
The term C4I architecture will be used here as an aid to explaining 
the contributions of the various subsystems making up the 
technical part of the command and control system to the 
intelligence architecture as a whole, where architecture denotes 
a frame of reference or structure describing all the interactions 
affecting a given set of troops, system or activity147 . In Frank 
Snider's view, the architecture of a system usually consists of (1) 
clearly identified subsystems, (2) those functions of the 
subsystems that they will be expected to perform, and (3) interface 
standards for the subsystems.141 Although he proposes a four-
level scale for assessing the quality of a system's architecture, 
three of these levels will suffice for the present consideration of 
intelligence: 
- 
	
	Warfare effectiveness, which can be assessed according to 
how well the troops have discharged their mission. Various 
analyses are possible for this purpose under normal 
conditions. War effectiveness is synonymous with the ability 
of the C4I system to meet the information needs of the 
commander at the operational and tactical levels from an 
intelligence perspective. 
Functional effectiveness (C2) denotes the value added by the 
command and control function to the warfare effectiveness 
of the overall system. Functional effectiveness is synonymous 
with the ability of the C4I system to combine with and 
maintain the elements that affect warfare effectiveness, such 
as groups of liaison officers. 
System performance (C4) can be evaluated when separate 
elements have been defined within the functional 
effectiveness of the command and control system. After this 
the systems engineer is able to design the subsystems by 
combining the C4I systems serving the previous levels. 
System performance is evaluated from a functionality 
perspective. 
The definition of the C4I architecture originally set out from 
the need to create a command and control system that embraced 
all branches of the armed services and which forms a common 
information technology architecture that will solve the problems 
of interoperability, and the definition of the technical aspect of 
this was based on the demands of the command and control 
system and the information required.141  The aim from the 
command viewpoint was to create an overall system that would 
enable situation descriptions to be produced and transmitted 
with virtually no delay, as in the "C4I for the Warrior" scheme in 
the United States. As Paylor points out, the problem with the 
system is that the leaders at the strategic level are inclined to 
concentrate on micromanagement and what they should do if 
the information technology breaks down.15° When discussing 
the C4I system or architecture in general, people frequently fail 
to understand that there is no system yet in existence that is 
ready to use. It is much more a question of combining subsystems 
for each situation and mission separately.151 Where 
intercontinental communications between major powers have 
traditionally been reliant on satellite and radio connections, the 
C4I architecture of the future will be able to make use of other 
transmission possibilities. One new alternative that has emerged 
with recent advances in technology is optic fibre technology, 
which could be used to link the operational level, i.e. regional 
commands and operations, to the C4I system. Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode (ATM) could be used for transmission purposes, 
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which would allow for greater capacities and speeds. The tactical 
level could then be linked to this worldwide system based on the 
transmission of speech, pager information, telefax and electronic 
data by means of satellite connections. The development of 
systems of the kind proposed in the United States has set out 
from the need to participate with the immediately available data 
transmission capacity either in a global regional conflict or in an 
OOTW operation. The immediately available system implies here 
not only the capacity in one's own possession but also whatever 
commercial capacity that is immediately purchasable. 
One real field of problems concerns the compatibility of 
subsidiary systems and subsystems, where improvements have 
been sought by employing the International Standardization 
Organization (ISO) system as a frame of reference. The actual 
architecture has followed the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
model, which standardizes the interfaces between levels and the 
users' protocols that span these levels. The intelligence 
architecture integrates and combines subordinate systems such 
as data acquisition systems and producers and users of data. At 
its most extensive, this network of nodes and links would unite 
the commanders of regional forces, the commanders of operations 
or joint task forces and the national intelligence and command 
organizations in the home countries by means of a common 
intelligence database. An important role in this architecture would 
be played by intelligence centres at different levels, the purpose 
of which would be to provide common information services for 
all the troops belonging to the same intelligence network. This 
could be implemented in the form of an intelligence warehouse 
of either an Email or Internet type.152 
.1l 
4 REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN FOR 
INTELLIGENCE 
"... but officially, blue helmets 'have never and will never engage in 
intelligence activities' in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Commandant Franchet, 
UNPROFOR153 
4.1 UN COMMAND AND INTELLIGENCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
Decisions regarding peace support operations and the relation of 
intelligence to these 
The UN secretariat, the Security Council and the member 
states are well aware of the importance of command functions 
and data management for the success of peace support 
operations.1M Command practices in the UN naturally reflect the 
primary importance of political will and the reaching of a solution 
by diplomatic means if at all possible. Similarly they are well aware 
of the friction and reluctance to take risks or accept responsibility which 
are associated with political decisions. Attempts have been made to 
speed up decision-making by means of preparatory diplomacy 
and grouping of the issues. Connie Peck illustrates the difficulty 
of taking decisions at this level by explaining that UN 
Headquarters and the general staff of the operation concerned 
have a few hours in which to reach a decision which involves 
thousands of small details. It is understandable, therefore, that 
the narrowing of the decision-making window will inevitably 
increase the significance of the time available and of intelligence."' 
It is precisely the lack of command and intelligence systems 
that will force the UN in the future, as well, to hand over 
responsibility for leading demanding operations such as IFOR 
and SFOR to any member state or regional security organization 
that is capable of carrying it, given that the individual states have 
national interests in operating in the target area and have at least 
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some military structures already in existence there.156  Major-
General Franklin van Kappen is of the opinion that the operations 
led by the UN in the future will be first level ones of a traditional 
kind, while more demanding operations with a stronger mandate 
for the use of force, those of the second level, will be led either by 
the UN or by a state or regional security organization authorized 
by the UN. Operations at the third level, those that include 
sustained combat missions will continue to take place under a 
UN mandate but not under UN command. Van Kappen is 
nevertheless anxious to point out that as far as the soldier in the 
field is concerned such a division is pure theory and is of relevance 
mostly at the political level and in courts of law.'57 
Recent trends in the types of operation planned have been 
towards low-level conflicts, but the situation and the resulting 
tasks of the troops on the ground can alter very quickly. This 
means that the need for a traditional infantry-based supervision 
force has diminished and that for a heavily armoured force with 
adequate firepower and an efficient C3I system has increased.158 
The UN has concentrated to date on debating over the means of 
implementing the operation, whether it should come under Article 
VI or Article VII, and it has proved unable to reconcile military 
inevitability with political purpose, i.e. it has been incapable of 
defining strategic goals or target situations for its operations. The 
doctrine incorporated in the Agenda for Peace was written from 
the diplomatic perspective, as if operations could be divided into 
types and situations fitted neatly into four predefined categories. 
The Agenda proved unable to perceive or explain the complexity 
of states' internal conflicts or to present any pragmatic means of 
applying the categories.'59  The constant wrangles in the Security 
Council over the mandates for operations have meant that 
strategic command has become more a matter strategic 
ambivalence. 
Even if upper level command relations in the UN were 
clearly defined, there would always be a certain indeterminacy 
in the command structures of the operations themselveslbo This 
is felt to be due in part to the preservation of national command 
structures during operations. When it is a matter of defining 
intelligence procedures, the above facts can cause problems, in 
that contingents can interpret the mandate in different ways, 
favouring one party or another in the conflicts, or else contingents 
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cannot tolerate a situation in which their actions are being 
scrutinized by another state. Attitudes towards humanitarian 
interventions in particular have proved contentious in this sense, 
e.g. in northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Ruanda, because they 
have been a mixture of peacekeeping and peace enforcement and 
opinions among the participants have differed regarding 
command relations and interpretation of the content of the 
mandate.161  
Quoting the remark by Boutros-Ghali that "the time of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty has passed", Richard Smith notes that 
member states of the UN have begun to accept that it may 
intervene in their internal affairs in certain situations. The principle 
is always that any "infringement" of state sovereignty must be 
authorized by the UN, however.162  Stanley Hoffman goes further, 
and demands that any UN-authorized intervention must be 
justifiable not only in terms of the national interest but also on 
ethical grounds. It is difficult to define these ethical grounds, 
however, as moral distinctions do not form a clear basis for a 
political strategy, let alone a military one. A separate difficulty, 
both theoretically and politically, is that of distinguishing an 
intervention from a peace support mission.'' As Berdal points 
out, it will be essential in the future to separate peace support 
from peace enforcement, as it is primarily a matter of approving 
variation at the level of consent and of taking this into account. 
Through this procedure the troops can be prepared for action at 
the tactical level and have the right to use force to fulfil their 
mandate. The decision to use this force, without the operation 
becoming a peace enforcement mission, requires a thorough 
assessment of the situation.1" The degree of consent may differ, 
of course, between the strategic and tactical levels, but it is still 
the case that the success of a peacekeeping mission under all 
circumstances will be dependent on consent at the strategic level, 
whereas provided the action taken remains within the provisions 
of the mandate, fluctuations in the degree of consent may be 
accepted at the tactical level even in the case of traditional 
peacekeeping missions. 
It has been customary over the last decade to use air power 
to support ground troops, to protect air transport and to impose 
limits on mobility, e.g. in the form of no-fly zones. The operations 
concerned have been in the nature of interventions and have 
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proceeded according to existing doctrine and models. Adaptations 
are made mainly as far as the regulations regarding the use of 
force are concerned. The use of air power presupposes the establishment 
and maintenance of dominance over the air space in order to be able 
to use its main mechanism, firepower, in accordance with the 
aim of the operation. Any use of force presupposes intelligence, 
which should produce results at the same level of accuracy as 
applies to the weapon systems employed. Precision weapons call 
for precision intelligence, or targeting. At the same time the 
establishment of a no-fly zone requires control over the air space, 
for which support must be received from electronic warfare 
devices and surveillance systems.1 5`  
In the case of strategic decisions the Security Council lays 
down the political goals for the Secretary-General in the form of 
a resolution that specifies the tasks for the mission and the limits 
within which it will operate. This resolution arises in the Security 
Council as a result of unofficial consultations between the member 
states' delegations aimed at creating a set of commonly agreed 
principles before the issue is brought before the council 
officially.166  The Secretary-General is responsible for execution of 
the Security Council mandate at the strategic level, being assisted 
in his decisions in this respect (2-Decide) by the Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peace-keeping Operations 
(DPKO), Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and 
Department of Public Information (DPI). The Department of 
Political Affairs carries out the necessary political inquiries and 
analyses and has the main responsibility for advance diplomacy 
and the concluding of a peace agreement. The DPKO is 
responsible for UN military strategy, i.e. the planning, 
preparation, implementation (command) and monitoring of 
missions (1-Process and 2-Decide). The Secretary-General will 
then form a group known as the "Friends of the Secretary-General 
for..." to support each peacekeeping operation with information 
and diplomatic activity, i.e. to generate ideas, make comments 
and influence the parties to the conflict by diplomatic means. 
The UN member states share information with the secretariat in 
accordance with their national practices and interests, observing 
Article 51 of the UN Charter in the best cases.167  
Command of the mission in the target area itself is delegated 
by the Secretary-General to a commander, known either as the 
Force Commander, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General or the Chief Military Observer. The military part of the 
mission is usually entrusted to a Force Commander. These persons 
are appointed by the Secretary-General and are directly 
responsible to him. In this way he ensures that the mission 
carries out the tasks laid down in its mandate.161 Conclusions 
reached by researchers and opinions expressed by former 
commanders of such missions emphasize that the commander 
should receive adequate information on local conditions and the 
intelligence needs of his troops. It is also an advantage for the 
officers of the staff to have a uniform background, good morale 
and similar working methods. This will help the staff to create 
optimal conditions for the commander to make correctly timed 
decisions (1-Process and 2-Decide). The political representatives 
working alongside the commander of a mission are also of 
considerable significance in this. It is their duty to analyse political, 
sociological and psychological factors related to the behaviour of 
the target countries, for it is by combining political and military 
information in the framework of the UN command process that 
military actions can be made to serve political goals.i69  No source 
provides an unambiguous account of the command process or 
the way in which intelligence is linked with this, but it can be 
assumed that the command process conforms to the models put 
forwards in the theoretical chapter above (Figs. 3 and 4) and that 
the grounds for the necessary decisions are derived partly from 
intelligence sources, even though this is technically contrary to 
the UN's official command procedure."o 
There is no separate technical section in the UN command 
system, and the technical systems currently available to support 
decisions at the operational level are poorly adapted to crises at a 
lower level than actual war. A tactical-level HF, VHF or satellite-
transmitted radio system is set up in the target area for voice 
communications, and the command system relies mainly on 
commercial data transfer and management systems. Apart from 
face-to-face meetings, the main instrument used for mission 
command functions is the telephone and telefax, mainly using 
national post office, telegraph and other communications facilities. 
Encrypting devices are used on telefax communications between 
the command staff and UN headquarters. The computer terminals 
are largely commercial applications. In areas where the 
65 
infrastructure has been virtually destroyed or is very primitive, 
use is made of satellite telephones and associated terminals, but 
the use of satellites is in general restricted by considerations of 
cost.171  
The intelligence process and its principles 
Officially, the UN does not practise intelligence in the same way as 
nation-states do, but rather its secretariat, the Secretary-General's 
staff, gathers information as a basis for the decisions that have to be 
made. This is referred to as the acquisition of (military) 
information.172 Open discussion of the importance of intelligence 
and the need for it has increased over the last five years or so, 
but it has largely centred around the difficulty of reconciling 
national and international interests. There are also outstanding 
unresolved questions surrounding the rights over intelligence 
information - which is strictly speaking national property - and 
the sharing of this with others.173 The question of organizing 
intelligence within the UN will have to be solved sooner or later, 
however, as UN troops will not be able to manage new-generation 
missions without situation descriptions that are obtainable with 
the minimum of delay and integrated intelligence systems to 
support decision-making.174 The major powers have no direct 
need to develop UN intelligence practices, because their troops 
receive the intelligence they need from national systems, In fact 
these nations may be said to gain political power by offering the 
UN intelligence support, as they are able in this way to control 
the information on which the organization bases its decisions in 
accordance with their national interests. It is the small nations 
that can derive the greatest advantage from developing UN 
intelligence services, as this would enable them to be more closely 
involved in the decisions that take place.15 As far as the role of 
the regional security organizations is concerned, their intelligence 
practices can be expected to benefit from peace support missions 
and develop accordingly. 
The national intelligence services of member states produce 
information as a basis for decisions taken by their delegations 
and representatives, and in the end the permanent members of 
the Security Council are usually better informed on the current 
state of affairs through their own intelligence services than they 
would be through information received from the Secretary-
General or the DPKO. The information generated by the UN 
itself tends to be used for comparison purposes or as a basis for 
discussion, because it is available to everybody. This information 
reaches the Security Council via the Secretary-General, who 
directs its acquisition through the medium of his immediate 
subordinates.171 The UN Headquarters receives most of its 
strategic intelligence from the national systems of member states, 
and part from those carrying out the peacekeeping operations. 
Such information is nevertheless dependent on the performance 
capabilities of the national intelligence services and even more so 
on the willingness of the countries concerned to share their 
information. Likewise the information obtainable directly from 
UN operations is dependent on the troops made available for 
these operations, the extent to which they are equipped for 
intelligence work and the prevailing political situation. The main 
purpose of intelligence at the tactical level is to gather information 
relevant to the safety of the troops and their ability to perform 
the tasks demanded of them. UN documentation almost without 
exception attributes intelligence and command problems to 
command relations, which is evidently a reference to politicization 
of the information travelling within the organization and its use 
as an instrument for the exercise of power. The documents mostly 
suggest that the problems concern the reliability and confirmation 
of information and observations that have been communicated. 
At the UN Headquarters level efforts are made to reduce the 
politicization problem by gathering information from several 
independent sources and using as analysts people whose home 
countries have no political interests to defend in the target area. 
Some politicization nevertheless takes place in connection with 
selection of the information to be distributed.'" 
According to Eriksson, the current UN intelligence process 
entails the acquisition of information on a case-by-case basis, where 
each instance is followed by an analysis of whether activity or tension 
in the area concerned has grown or diminished. The information 
required for ensuring the safety of the troops engaged in a 
particular mission, for example, has at the present time to be 
acquired from national sources. The cautious attitude of the UN 
towards intelligence does nothing to reduce the need for 
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intelligence for decision-making purposes, nor does it relax the 
quality requirements in any way. As both Heidenrich and Palin 
emphasize, procedures will have to be found which take account 
of UN principles but ensure that decisions are based on adequate 
information. The level of consent is one aspect that affects the 
gathering of intelligence in the field, i.e. mainly at the operational 
and tactical levels. This information cannot be gathered by spying 
or covert action, as the neutrality of the UN is reflected directly 
in the fact that it uses the information that it has acquired for 
fulfilling its mandate and not for interfering in the affairs of the 
target state.178 Success in this requires practice on the part of the 
general staff on the basis of well-functioning instructions. 
Cohesion within the general staff directing a particular mission 
can be improved by adopting the lead-nation principle, under 
which the main body of the staff is derived from one country.179 
Organization of intelligence and its products 
As far as information is concerned, the Security Council relies for 
the direction of peace support missions on (1) the UN Secretary-
General and secretariat, and (2) the governments of member states 
and their obligations under Article 51 of the UN Charter to inform 
the Security Council via the Secretary-General of their actions and 
of the current situation. Even so, the obtaining of information is 
one of the greatest problems involved in arousing the interest of 
decision-makers so that they will react in time to both security 
threats and humanitarian problems (1-Process, 2-Decide). The 
lack of strategic guidance and the existence of mixed mandates 
make it more difficult to interpret the intelligence obtained and 
make the correct deductions in order to be able to react quickly to 
infringements or new situations. The problems are compounded 
further in second or third-level operations, because a considerable 
proportion of the UN member states are against peace 
enforcement.18° The UN Military Staff Committee is mentioned 
in the charter as a body charged with ensuring that the Secretary-
General is supplied with the necessary information on which to 
base his decisions and with formulating military strategiests' 
There is now a need to reorganize this committee and its command 
activities so that it can furnish those responsible for the planning 
and preparation of missions with information channels leading 
directly to national sources. This option has remained unused, 
however, because the United States, Great Britain and France 
have virtually rejected the idea of consulting the committee."" 
Although the committee is mentioned in United States Presidential 
Decision Directives 13 and 25, its role and significance have 
remained more or less unchanged. Closer inspection of these 
directives will not in any case lead to any credible proposal for 
solving the UN's operational command problems.' 
The Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) at 
UN Headquarters has a Situation Centre (SITCEN) for the purpose 
of updating situation reports round the clock (1-Process), 84 and 
the Information & Research Cell (I&RC) attached to this carries 
out an intelligence process practically in accordance with Orr's 
model. It is maintained in UN documents that no intelligence 
process exists anywhere below headquarters level, in that all the 
other levels merely implement the first phase, the gathering of 
information. Thus, from the UN Headquarters perspective, the missions 
primarily produce information simply for creating situation reports (1-
Process). Headquarters nevertheless obliges the general staff in 
command of an operation to draw up summaries and evaluations 
at certain intervals and to issue reports together with 
recommendations for action (2-Decide). 
The intelligence process is not based on handling of an 
extensive UN body of information but on the staff's opportunities 
for obtaining the necessary information from national sources. 
The intelligence staff and decision-makers are all aware of these 
acquisition defects, and this in turn detracts from the usability of 
the information in UN command relations, partly on account of 
staff attitudes. The Situation Centre is the only actual intelligence 
organization at UN Headquarters and its situation reports are 
used both for monitoring missions in progress and for surveying 
potential crisis areas in order to obtain early warnings. Similarly 
the I&RC is the only body specifically intended to carry out 
intelligence work, and a UN information acquisition organization 
spreads out around the headquarters anew for each mission that 
is undertaken, under the responsibility of the military command 
and in accordance with the mandate, the preliminary operational 
plan and the troops assigned for the purpose.1 The UN believes 
that it will obtain the necessary information by placing in the 
I&RC staff who have connections with national intelligence 
agencies. The cell has contacts at least with United States databases 
and those of certain other NATO countries via the JDISS system 
(2-Decide), and Connors maintains that at least Great Britain, 
Pakistan, Morocco and Nigeria share intelligence data with the 
I&RC. The western powers are particularly well represented 
both on the staff of the Situation Centre and in leading positions 
in the DPKO.186 The majority of the intelligence officers placed in 
these bodies are majors or lieutenant-colonels with intelligence 
experience, usually meeting the qualifications required of an 
analyst. The most serious problem is the excessively rapid 
turnover in staff. The tasks are normally carried out on a personal 
basis. There were five officers and one non-commissioned officer 
working in the office in autumn 1997. 
The duty officers in the Situation Centre produce daily and 
weekly situation reports, whereas the I&RC does not issue regular 
intelligence products at all, concentrating instead on situation 
and case-specific analyses of missions in progress and potential 
crisis points. The analyses of operations in progress chiefly consist 
of assessments of the fulfilment of the mandate or of violations of 
agreements between the parties involved in the crisis, and the 
principal occupation of the I&RC is the analysis of potential 
points of crisis, i.e. the production of early warnings. All its 
products come in two versions, an official version and an 
unofficial one, the latter being presented to the Secretary-General 
and the head of the DPKO personally by the I&RC chief. The 
products are distributed according to an estimate of who might 
need the information, but the usual recipients include the heads 
of the DPA, DPI and DPKO and other actors subordinate to the 
UN, such as UNHCR. The products are classified as either UN 
Confidential or UN Eyes Only. No quality classification is laid 
down for them, but instead each officer employs his own national 
classification. Missions are supported by distributing information 
on OSINT sources, public-level analyses and intelligence products 
in the case of the highest-level officials in accordance with national 
security classifications.187 
In some cases it proves impossible to differentiate intelligence 
as strategic, operational or tactical. An individual item of information 
may be relevant to all these aspects, e.g. a breach of a cease-fire 
agreement, the death of a UN soldier or a statement issued by the 
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government of a major power. Intelligence products and information 
should nevertheless be classified and their significance evaluated 
prior to distribution.18' Research has shown that this intelligence is 
used as background not only for military decisions but also for 
political ones, and also as an aid to civilian organizations carrying 
out humanitarian activities. Eriksson confirms this view in noting 
that a special representative or other negotiator will have difficulties 
in achieving results at the negotiating table unless he has a clear 
picture of the activities of the parties to the crisis, their intentions 
and their ways of working. The availability of objective, broad-
based information could be improved by extending co-operation 
between the academic world and the intelligence community, as 
scientific research could yield information on the cultures and 
societies of target states that was more free of bias and vested 
interests. This would lend an air of greater reliability and impartiality 
to the descriptions of potential crisis points, and they might indeed 
be more reliable and impartial. At the same time the intelligence 
officers would have a good opportunity to gain a better orientation 
towards their field of operation.189 
Intelligence methods and architectures 
The sources used for intelligence purposes consist first and 
foremost of open sources (OSINT), technical reports and 
publications and mission reports and notices. In addition, the 
I&RC receives unofficial copies of analyses produced by other 
UN departments. National sources nevertheless play a highly 
significant role both quantitatively and qualitatively. The UN is 
not advised in any way on how this national intelligence has 
been acquired, and it may be passed on either officially or 
unofficially, in internal meetings at UN Headquarters.'9°  
HUMINT is the most reliable and most important means by 
which information can be obtained on the intentions of the parties to a 
crisis in the context of a peacekeeping operation"' . When UN military 
observers are employed for intelligence purposes it is essential to 
recognize their special status as unarmed "military diplomats". 
Observers can yield valuable information on local conditions 
and customs, because they live among the local people. Another 
trustworthy and valuable source of information in Eriksson's 
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view consists of non-governmental organizations, although it is 
important when using such information to remember the nature 
of the informants' actual duties and their level of education.192 
Surveillance in connection with peace support missions is 
carried out by technical means, using satellites, aircraft, terrestrial 
systems and various radar systems (RADINT). Researchers reckon 
that the UN will never possess an intelligence system of this kind 
for itself but will continue to be reliant on national systems. 
Through the coordinated use of integrated systems even a small 
peacekeeping force can maintain surveillance over a vast area. 
Smith recalls the French proposal that the UN should purchase 
an intelligence satellite of its own, which the other member states 
regarded as a waste of resources. SITCEN in fact buys images 
produced by the French SPOT satellite, which have a resolution 
of 0.15-25 metres, and Russia has now offered its satellites for use 
on a commercial basis, promising a resolution of 2 metres. France, 
Italy and Spain, meanwhile, have indicated that they are 
considering making data from their Helios satellite available to 
the UN.193  Good use can be made of airborne SAR radar for the 
supervision of embargoes and no-fly or restricted access zones, 
and traditional air photography is also useful. Unmanned airborne 
vehicles enable the surveillance apparatus to be over the site for 
longer and with less risk of accident or detection. The acoustic 
and seismic sensors used in terrestrial devices can produce data 
on their specialized targets within the limits of their detection 
ranges. Radar, of course, has the advantage that it can still provide 
surveillance data under bad weather or visibility conditions.194 
In addition to traditional military intelligence methods, 
officers have to mingle with local inhabitants and maintain social 
relations in order to create trust and obtain information on local 
conditions. Use can also be made of contacts for this purpose. 
When the intelligence practices associated with a mission involve 
a wide range of methods, any limits on mobility imposed by the 
parties to the conflict will tend to decline in significance as barriers 
to the obtaining of information, but if intelligence is based 
predominantly on open sources such as the media or on national 
systems, the mission will find itself dependent on its sources of 
information and it will become difficult to assess the reliability of 
the findings. In the case of traditional operations, Eriksson favours 
the use of passive methods that remain undetectable to the parties 
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in the conflict, as this will help obviate unpleasant accusations 
and explanations. Similarly he is in favour of obtaining and 
processing this information in the contingent's home country. 
Only when there is a serious threat to the safety of the 
peacekeeping force or to the completion of the mission will he 
condone the use of all available means to gain information.195  
The UN sources and interviews do not allow any impression or 
evaluation to be formed of the intelligence or command 
architecture. It is largely a matter of taking advantage of 
commercial systems at the strategic level and of the national 
systems or subsystems of certain countries at the operational and 
tactical levels.196  
4.2 REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY NATIONAL 
DOCTRINES AND DIRECTIVES 
Participation in peace support missions and linking of intelligence to 
command and control 
The UN is expected to retain its prominent international 
role as a peacekeeping agency, but it is significant that participation 
in such missions has become a means by which many countries can 
defend and promote their national interests. This has prompted 
Patricia Chilton to claim that any country or alliance that is not 
actively involved in peace support operations will lack prestige 
in the world order of the post-Cold War period19 ' . It is this, 
perhaps, that explains Sweden's active role in operations in the 
former Yugoslavia, whereas Somalia has attracted less interest. 
Sweden also has a long tradition of participation in operations 
purely for reasons of solidarity.19 ' According to Stephen Stedman, 
Nordic involvement is based not only on experience but also on 
a theory of the escalation of conflicts which presupposes that one 
should respond to the use of force with force. The shows of force 
provided by the major powers are not necessarily incompatible 
with this theory, as their purpose is to prevent the use of force by 
others.'9' 
A state is taking a strategic decision when it agrees to 
participate in a UN mission, and the decision must be in line 
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with national interests.200 Any participation also requires the 
fulfilment of certain political preconditions, however, as laid 
down in Presidential Decision Directives 13 and 25 in the United 
States and defined separately in most other countries. These 
preconditions may include demands regarding command over 
the troops and the end state to be aimed at under the mandate20' 
It is common for the head of state, as supreme commander of its 
armed forces, to retain nominal command over the troops 
regardless of what organization they have been subordinated to, 
but the "stringency" of this command relation varies from one 
country to another. Directives such as PDD 25 allow 
developmental demands to be made on security organizations or 
diplomatic notification to be made of the limits which the state 
concerned is not prepared to exceed. The leadership of the United 
States, for instance, is of the opinion that the UN will never reach 
the necessary command and intelligence capacity to enable it to 
direct an enforcement operation202 , even though it believes that it 
is capable of supporting operations by coordinating the 
reconstruction and humanitarian aid programmes of civilian 
organizations. The strict provisions of PDD 25 reflect US 
experiences of multinational operations and ones that involve 
demonstrations of force.203 
The concepts and types of operation mentioned in the 
doctrines and ordinances correspond for the most part to those 
presented in the theoretical chapter above. Participation in peace 
support missions has become a very important part of the security 
and defence policy agenda for many states and of the activities of 
their armed forces, as revealed by the up-to-date nature of the 
directives governing the armed forces.204 
The United States favours a show of force and the use of air 
power first, before committing its troops to a ground operation, 
and justifies participation primarily in terms of defending national 
interests. The national strategy dictates that participation in 
missions for humanitarian reasons can only be considered when 
the level of risk involved is low. The strategy also emphasizes the 
ability , to achieve a dominant military presence immediately 
circumstances become even remotely dubious, and the possibility 
of a conflict escalating to the point where the mission becomes 
one of peace enforcement.205 Participation in such operations is 
viewed as one of the main duties of the US armed forces in the 
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future, and the intelligence community that was developed in 
the course of the Cold War is to be adapted to the new situation 
so as to support operations such as those in Haiti and Bosnia. 
The United States is expected to implement the principle of 
extended control of battle space as applied to traditional warfare 
in the context of these missions and to complete the decision-
making cycle faster than its adversaries206  
Against a background not only of peacekeeping operations 
but also of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and former colonies, 
the approach adopted by Great Britain is understandably more 
cautious and traditional. From around 1995 onwards it has 
implemented its policies in accordance with the doctrine of "wider 
peacekeeping".207 By participating in operations, Great Britain is 
acting to promote world peace and stability, in accordance with its 
own defence policy. It will be interesting in the future to see 
whether British policy develops in the direction of that pursued in 
the United States, i.e. towards restricting participation to missions 
that are in the national interest.208 When deciding on commitment 
to a mission, the British normally take account of public opinion as 
reflected and shaped by the media, and they also favour the use of 
existing military structures in the missions themselves, being 
disinclined to place their troops permanently under UN command 
in accordance with the Standby Force concept. Military force is 
looked on as a proactive instrument aimed at de-escalation or 
escalation of the situation. The British emphasize the correct timing 
of military interventions and the use of relevant intelligence in 
support of every operation. The principal theme of their doctrine 
is the appreciation of variations in the level of consent, a factor 
which distinguishes peacekeeping from enforcement - as the use 
of force can result in one becoming a party to the conflict209 
France has followed similar policies to Britain, although 
with an additional Gaullist legacy in the form of a Europe-centred 
approach and an insistence on decisions being taken nationally. 
France has moved closer to NATO in recent years, however, and 
has accepted the leading role of this organization in future crisis 
management operations.210 Patricia Chilton looks on peace 
support operations as the most dynamic area of French defence 
and security policy. The country has gained its experience in UN 
operations conducted in recent times and earlier colonial 
encounters. The Rapport Trucy defines military and political peace 
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support operations and enumerates the dangers entailed in 
military operations carried out in the name of peace support. The 
concept of consent is regarded as a flexible one in the same 
manner as in Great Britain, and is taken as implying an ability to 
react on one's own initiative at the tactical level, using force if 
necessary. In the French view, the confusion of enforcement with 
other peace support activities will lead to impotence, insecurity 
and humiliation, as was the case in Yugoslavia. The spirit of the 
doctrine is "aggressively active", however, emphasizing a 
readiness to use force in order to fulfil a mandate.211  
The NATO concept of CJTF can be applied to peace support 
operations where these are in the interests of the alliance in 
general and concern areas close to the land or sea borders of its 
territories. Its interests may range further afield, of course, if the 
conflict poses a threat to security and stability in Europe. The 
numbers of countries participating in operations will increase by 
virtue of the Partnership for Peace programme, which should 
enable many countries to contribute effective contingents to 
international operations. As Marcuse points out, the ability to 
undertake peace enforcement operations that is incorporated in 
the CJTF concept will increase the alliance's capacity for 
forestalling and containing crises 212 
The wishes of the military strategists for clear mandates are 
grounded in the fact that it is the,mandate that forms the moral 
foundation for an operation, defines the legally justified methods 
that can be employed, lays down instructions and specifies the 
end state that should be reached213.  This will enable clear 
guidelines to be drawn up at the various levels of command and 
their fulfilment to be verified (2-Decide). 
In order to appreciate the complexity of command relations 
in an operation, it is necessary to look into the command, control 
and intelligence practices of the participating countries. The 
national concepts must be placed within the correct frame of 
reference and temporal framework in order to avoid erroneous 
conclusions. Having first gained a familiarity with national 
command relations and chains of responsibility, together with 
the demands and opportunities introduced by the alliances that 
the same states have entered into, it is possible to deduce that the 
command process does indeed follow, with some modifications, 
the models proposed by Lawson and Orr.214 
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As the doctrines maintain that the command of any operation 
should take account of the interests, doctrines and education, 
equipment, cultural distinctions, linguistic skills and mutual trust 
of the participating countries, these factors will inevitably affect 
the architecture of the command structure. In addition, particular 
emphasis naturally has to be placed on UN principles such as 
neutrality and consent, and on general command principles such 
as unanimity and purposeful leadership 215 The Swedes, following 
the Nordic tradition, also stress avoidance of the use of force. 
When formulating his decisions, the commander of a peace 
support operation has to digest a vast influx of information in a 
short time as the tempo of events is stepped up, i.e. his decision-
making window216 narrows all the time. The political nature of 
peace support makes the operations multidimensional and 
obscures the boundaries between strategic, operational and 
tactical command functions, so that a combat event on the 
technical level can easily acquire strategic proportions. In spite of 
this, the fundamentals of command and control functions do not alter 
appreciably between peacetime conditions, crisis management and 
outright war. It is more a matter of differences in the weight 
attached to the various factors.217 National directives do not 
make separate mention of a technical aspect of the command 
system applicable to UN operations that might deviate from the 
theory or from UN requirements, but rather the contingents' 
contributions to the technical aspect are implemented in 
accordance with their national command practices and the 
principles and responsibilities dictated by the UN. 
The national doctrines of the major powers mention operations 
involving demonstrations of force in addition to peace support 
operations. These are in the nature of joint operations that require 
compatibility of functions between land, sea and air forces in 
order to be successful, together with the use of specialized troops 
and space systems. In an operational sense, crisis management can 
begin with a show of force, which will serve as a preparation for 
forceful entry. The United States directives underline the possibility 
of escalation and the need to allow for this, e.g. in that humanitarian 
assistance can develop first into peacekeeping and then into peace 
enforcement. They also recognize that it is very much easier to 
differentiate between these levels of conflict in written statements 
than it is in a practical combat situatiora218 . 
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High priority is given to force protection measures, especially at 
the deployment stage in an operation, and it is the duty of intelligence 
and counter-intelligence to support the operation commanders 
at the deployment stage with information on any terrorist or 
criminal groups active in the target area, paying particular 
attention to threats that may be directed at troops of specific 
nationalities. The US directives also stress the importance of 
counter-intelligence arrangements.219 
Foundations of intelligence 
The national directives usually include intelligence as one aspect 
of the command process in peace support operations, and the 
same principles apply to it in this context as in war. The 
commander's own knowledge of intelligence systems becomes 
still more important in the case of multinational operations.220 
Intelligence activities directed at other states are normally 
regarded as acceptable, although there are differences of opinion 
over methods of acquiring information and the difficulties of 
reconciling intelligence with democratic values are recognized. 
Demands for greater openness and responsibility 
characteristically become more forceful at times of least threat to 
national security, but it should also be remembered that excessive 
openness can increase the opportunities for using intelligence 
information for personal ends, which leads to politicization of 
the intelligence service. Any effort at making confidential 
information public is also likely to reveal the sources of that 
information, at least in the course of time, which would restrict 
the chances of using those same sources in the future.22' 
Intelligence practices in connection with UN operations are 
usually laid down in accordance with directives and doctrines 
applying to joint operations, because the two are basically similar. 
The greatest differences arise from national practices and 
traditions, which have to be taken into consideration when 
applying the doctrines. This implies resolving national differences, 
coordinating the distribution of intelligence, processing 
information obtained from national sources, the creation of a 
multinational intelligence centre and the arranging of common 
procedures for the exchange of intelligence.'-' The joint use of 
intelligence acquisition mechanisms incorporated in NATO's 
CJTF plans marks a major change in NATO practices, as this 
organization has not previously been in the habit of sharing 
intelligence with non-NATO countries. Its intelligence work is 
based on the use of information produced by national systems, a 
considerable proportion being from the United States. France 
has attempted to make up for this by means of European co-
operation, by developing the intelligence capacity of individual 
operations and increasing the resources devoted to intelligence, 
but in spite of all the efforts, the CJTF general staff organizations 
need national systems and they need the American command 
and intelligence system.223 One strength of the major powers' 
intelligence community is the ability to detect and locate small-
sized targets and transmit the information quickly from one 
level of command to another for the necessary decisions to be 
made. The disadvantage of this performance capability is the 
danger of excessive control and the suppression of micro-level 
command initiatives. The internal problems of the intelligence 
community mentioned in the theoretical chapter of this work - 
mutual competition, differing interests and legislation - affect 
the intelligence support received by individual operations. The 
national links that exist in both the chain of command and data 
management allow member states to intervene in affairs at the 
operational and tactical levels in order to serve national interests. 
Intelligence in connection with peace support operations 
represents a combination of intelligence capabilities and needs at 
the strategic and operational levels with civilian organizations. 
Strategic intelligence is required to provide support for 
both political and military decision-making by keeping those 
responsible up to date on the operational situation relative to the 
predefined end state. If this branch is inefficient, efforts are likely 
to be made to minimize the uncertainty attached to the decisions 
by appealing to intuition and personal experience. Counter-
intelligence in this field can be expected to increase in importance 
in the future224 . 
Operational and tactical intelligence provide the 
commander with decision-making support in matters related to 
the use of force, furnishing him with strategic, operational and 
tactical-level predictions of the consequences of the use of force 
and interpretations of how this will serve the purpose of fulfilling 
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the mandate. The decisions themselves may be made at either 
the operational or the tactical level. The operational intelligence 
system has to be adapted in each case to conform with the frame 
of reference dictated by the operating environment, and this will 
call for a physical expansion in facilities for the gathering, 
processing and reporting of information. Established ways of 
working have to be adapted to the speed of working within the 
operation, at the same time as preparations have to be made for 
facing the intelligence problems brought about by the 
multinational nature of such operations, in as far as these cannot 
be solved by technical means. At the tactical level it is possible to 
make use of information acquired by HUMINT methods more 
rapidly and with a lower level of risk, because the commanders 
have clearly defined tasks to fulfil and are guided by the ideas 
generated at the higher levels of command. The fundamentals of 
intelligence for an operation should be formulated and practised 
before deployment actually takes place, and it is at this stage that 
it should be possible to delegate information acquisition 
responsibilities among the national and international actors 
involved.25  
The point of departure in the organization of American 
intelligence services is always a wartime system, which can then 
be adapted in each case separately to correspond to the needs of 
the operation. No country's military doctrines address the question 
of the relation between intelligence and decision-making, or that 
of the politicization of intelligence, but this is a problem that 
largely concerns strategic intelligence. At the operational and 
tactical levels the functions of intelligence can be defined as follows: 
- Early warning, which implies risk management and 
minimization of the possibility of being taken by surprise. 
- 
	
	Preparation and command of intelligence activities, which 
form the basis for intelligence planning and organization. 
- 	Force protection, including security and counter-intelligence. 
- 	Monitoring of the situation, based on the use of all sources 
of information to construct assessments. 
- Formulation and maintenance of a coordinated intelligence 
architecture. 
- 	Targeting, enabling the identification of objects for physical 
destruction or psychological impact and critical targets with 
respect to each object. 
:1 
Evaluation of the effects of the use of firepower. 
Participation in geographical surveys and analyses of the 
terrain.226 
Targeting and evaluation of the use of firepower have not 
traditionally belonged to the sphere of peacekeeping, not are they 
mentioned in older directives. Targeting involves the description 
of objects or systems considered for strikes, weaknesses observed 
in them and evaluations of how critical they are to the other side. 
It is the responsibility of intelligence to analyse each object, select 
and name objects to be targeted and make recommendations on 
the weapon system to be used in each case. Finally intelligence is 
also responsible for evaluating the success of the strike. Targeting 
takes place at all levels of operation, in accordance with the 
requirements and aims defined for each. 
In the case of demonstrations of force, intelligence is based 
on the joint strategic and operational intelligence capabilities of 
all branches of the armed forces. This is largely due to the fact 
that tactical forces can be assigned to very distant operations for 
which they have no up-to-date situation reports or other 
intelligence that they have obtained for themselves. The 
peacekeeping tasks undertaken by the British Navy, for instance, 
require broad-based intelligence or data management so as to be 
capable of constabulary and maritime power projection, and 
consequently it is the task of the navy's strategic intelligence to 
produce information on the maritime situation (1-Process). The 
importance of this task is greatest at the beginning of an operation, 
when the decision to initiate it is to be made, as this has to be 
based on a profound long-term analysis (2-Decide). Operational 
intelligence receives its principles from a higher level and 
concentrates on military factors and surveying of the area covered 
by the operation. The military information that it generates is 
then linked to the political, economic and psychological contexts 
in order to obtain a reliable analysis. Tactical intelligence is mostly 
a matter of maintaining the maritime situation report.'' In the 
case of airborne operations, information can be obtained for 
supervising a truce or cease-fire, and information which is 
applicable to either the strategic, operational or tactical level can 
be acquired through the use of aircraft. This information may 
serve the purpose of improving the overall efficiency of the 
operation, minimizing surprises and risks or creating a foundation 
for the use of air power. 
The intelligence process 
The intelligence process, its organization and the principles for 
its implementation are in practice more or less as described in 
the theoretical chapter. The point of departure for American 
intelligence is that it should observe the same principles and 
ways of working in UN operations as in warfare. The main 
deviation from the theory of Lawson and Orr is the inclusion of 
intelligence planning in the process as a separate phase before 
Sense. One of the main problems as far as success of the intelligence 
process is concerned is the obtaining and retention of the time needed 
for comparing information. The significance of comparative 
information and the obtaining of this are emphasized in particular 
in connection with early warnings. External influences can be 
reduced when the process is directed towards forecasting 
intelligence based on careful preparation of the actions to be 
taken, e.g. by updating the databases on parties to the conflict 
and date available on the area covered by the operation. This 
means in practice the implementation of intelligence tasks in 
accordance with the doctrine put forward earlier in this work.228 
Snider believes that this cannot be achieved by means of the 
traditional intelligence process, as the characteristics identified 
in the process are linked with too general a set of background 
material. The difficulty in the case of peace support missions lies 
in the broad-based nature of information acquisition, for which 
no military intelligence system has been constructed or trained. 
National processes can and should be used in peace support 
missions, provided that the accuracy requirements are taken 
into account and the results are placed in their correct context in 
the history of events. This presupposes continuity on the part of 
the intelligence process, combined with long-term planning and 
systematic storage of information for later use.229 
The United States and NATO begin their intelligence 
processes at the stage of planning of the operation, with a phase 
known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), although 
this process as applied to UN operations differs in perspective 
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and level of detail from that employed in cases of war. The 
process consists of analysis of the area to be covered by the 
operation, its demography, the expected impacts of the measures 
to be taken and possible dangers. After this, five-phase predictions 
are drawn up of the development of the situation, which are 
followed through in the manner of war games. It is on the basis of 
this process and the plan for the operation as a whole that plans 
are laid down for synchronization and the acquisition of 
intelligence.230 The necessary information may be available from 
the UN, from the countries contributing troops to the operation, 
from the media or from humanitarian aid organizations. 
Corresponding information is compiled in the Nordic 
intelligence process, after which it is assessed for reliability and 
accuracy and an analysis with conclusions is drawn up before the 
final analysis.231  The five-phase NATO intelligence process is 
observed at all stages in the operation. One product of this planning 
is a synchronization table, on the basis of which the various levels 
in the chain of command are assigned their overall intelligence 
responsibilities and duties with respect to different branches of 
activity. The intelligence acquisition plan defines for each stage (1) 
the Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR), (2) 
objects of early warning, (3) special intelligence needs, (4) methods 
and sources to be used and proposals for additional needs, (5) 
times and places for reporting, and (6) other facts to be noted. The 
plan reconciles the information needs with the particular features 
of the objects to be investigated and the methods to be used for 
acquiring the information, with requests for support from national 
intelligence systems arising as a by-product. The plan and table 
are filled out as required once the operation has begun and the 
commander has developed his plans further. In the course of the 
processing of information the raw data are worked up into a form 
in which they will be applicable for the purposes of analysis and 
intelligence production. At the tactical level this forms a part of the 
control of information acquisition, as the producer of the 
information is frequently responsible for working it up as well, 
but at higher levels it is usually a matter of combining the new 
information with ready-made intelligence products. At the end of 
the analysis the information produced by intelligence is combined 
with existing products so as to correspond to the needs of the 
user. For more details on products, see the section devoted to this 
aspect. The last phase involves distribution of the information to 
those who need it, which is the responsibility of each level in the 
command structure separately. The American organization for this 
employs both push and pull modes of distribution, which is faster 
than the constant issuing of requests and proposals for support 232 
It is important to recall the principles governing UN activities 
when considering intelligence, i.e. consent, neutrality and 
openness. Consent, at least, must prevail at both the strategic 
and the operational level233,  while every effort should be made to 
achieve and maintain it at the tactical level by behaving in an 
impartial manner. The parties to the conflict may easily look on 
intelligence as a hostile act even though the gathering of 
information is one of the main functions of peacekeeping forces, 
and it must therefore be made quite clear to them that the 
information obtained in this way will be used only for actions 
that lie within the operation's mandate. In some cases suspicions 
can be allayed by sharing the information with he parties to the 
conflict2 . The intelligence process must always remain within 
the limitations laid down by the states that have contributed 
troops to the operation or by the Security Council, which has 
issued the mandate, but even so it must provide all the information 
necessary for directing the operation and fulfilling the tasks 
assigned to it. There is always someone who will accuse the 
peacekeeping forces of bias or spying, but in spite of this it is 
important that intelligence activities should not undermine the 
authority of the UN or the success of the operation.2 
The organization of intelligence 
The states participating in peace support missions usually arrange 
their intelligence organizations to serve the purposes of both the 
mission itself and national political decision-making. The most 
powerful intelligence system at the present time is that of the 
United States, and it can indeed be claimed that the standard of 
a country's intelligence organization reflects fairly well the level 
of development of its national armed forces. As far as the 
formulation of intelligence practices is concerned, the British 
guidelines, for instance, urge commanders to create a military 
intelligence organization that is integrated at all levels, in addition 
to which the organization should maintain co-operation with 
the UN, the media and civilian security elements.236 
The person in charge of creating a strategic-level intelligence 
organization and intelligence architecture for NATO-led missions 
is the commander responsible for military strategy, e.g. SACEUR, 
according to guidelines received from NATO and the national 
command headquarters.237 The responsibilities that the national 
intelligence systems have for supporting each other are defined 
in the national directives and statutes. The American directives, 
for example, decree that all information from national systems 
intended for the use of a particular mission should be directed in 
a centralized manner to the JDISS workstations of the National 
Intelligence Support Team (NIST) responsible for military 
strategy. The composition and performance capacity of this team 
should be tailored according to the commander's information 
needs.238 An intelligence centre can be set up outside the peace 
support mission itself, or else an existing national intelligence 
centre can be assigned to the mission (Fig.6). This body can be 
referred to as a Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC), for instance. The 
remote terminal for such a centre within the mission will then 
comprise a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE), which will 
again be tailored to the needs of the headquarters that it is 
intended to support. This element should be capable of processing 
information from the joint and all source systems and of taking 
account of the culture and ways of thinking of the country 
concerned in the analyses that it produces.239 
Figure 6. Example of the organization of a Joint Intelligence Centre for 
supporting a mission.240 
It is the responsibility of the commander of a Operation to 
set up a broad supervision and intelligence system that extends 
from the operational level to the combat technology level and in 
effect covers every person under his command. An intelligence 
support team should also be attached to this system in order to 
synchronize the command of intelligence operations between 
the levels and arrange collaboration and the exchange of 
information with civilian organizations. It is reasonable to arrange 
joint intelligence centres at both the operational and tactical level 
within a mission, these being subordinate to a Head of 
Intelligence, who defines the intelligence practices to be observed 
by all those engaged in the mission.241  If it is impossible because 
of the nature of the mission or the country in which it is operating 
to link intelligence directly to the headquarters as one of its 
functions, the American directives maintain that it should be 
infiltrated into the other offices in the headquarters. A full-
complement headquarters as allowed for in the CJTF model 
should be capable of running a multinational intelligence system 
covering the various branches of the armed forces, and the 
composition of such a headquarters can be altered as the situation 
demands, assigning officers to it to represent the participating 
contingents. 
The question of command responsibilities in the case of 
operations of long duration has remained open so far, as a CJTF 
headquarters is intended for temporary assignments.2 The 
nucleus of the headquarters should be functioning before the 
operation commences, working within the parent headquarters 
chiefly on the planning and preparation of various operations. 
Additional staff trained for this specific purpose can be taken on 
from the parent headquarters or from the nationalities 
participating in the operation. The intelligence department of the 
joint headquarters (CJ-2) is responsible for coordinating the 
intelligence of the separate branches of the armed services, and 
the intelligence process is carried out in this department, so that 
the information can be analysed in its correct context and at the 
right time. Similarly it is possible by this means to coordinate the 
work of all the intelligence systems in the most appropriate 
manner. In the CJTF model the national officer groups, NIST and 
NIC, are located in the joint headquarters.2 
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Figure 7. Composition and structure of the intelligence department (CJ-2) of 
a CJTF headquarters 24  
Certain countries participating in peace support operations 
have regularly included intelligence personnel in their 
contingents, either because this is laid down in their doctrines or 
belongs to their military training or else because they have a 
need to gather information on peace support operations. The 
most significant reason in the opinion of Eriksson is that these 
states do not regard UN intelligence as adequate to guarantee 
the safety of their troops.245  As one of the preconditions for 
successful intelligence operations mentioned in the doctrines is 
proper training for the personnel involved, the requirement being 
that the command and intelligence processes should be planned 
and the staff trained before commitment to the operation.246 
A person selected as an intelligence officer should have a 
proper understanding of "the otherness of the enemy", which 
can be achieved only in the course of time, through active 
intelligence work, and he should also have a sound scientific 
background, in order to produce reliable analyses, and the ability 
to comprehend an overall situation, which in some cases may 
mean the evaluation of several target groups simultaneously in 
relation to the goals of the operation or the safety of the troops. 
Boyd also raises the need to report on the contexts of observations, 
in order to avoid erroneous interpretations. Experts of different 
kinds are required for intelligence duties, depending on the level 
of command: experts in the culture and language of the area, 
analysts, interrogators and security personnel. They should 
possess not only the knowhow required for the intelligence 
process but also a knowledge of local affairs, linguistic skills and 
fieldwork experience. Personality difficulties and deficiencies in 
professional skills can come to the fore in the most surprising of 
circumstances, causing a person or group to cling on to old 
values in situations where adaptability and dynamism are called 
for. It is likewise important that they should internalize the 
subordination of military decisions to the political arm at all 
levels.247 They should also be able to read and write reports in 
such a way that both civilians and military personnel can use the 
same intelligence products in their decision-making. In view of 
the above, it is clear that the professional and human relations 
requirements for intelligence personnel will gain in importance 
in situations where the decision-makers are motivated by a strong 
political ideology. Artur Hulnick concludes his thoroughgoing 
treatment of this subject by noting how negative attitudes multiply 
and propagate through an organization, and that this can only be 
rectified by training and joint action, the mutual trust generated 
by which is a fundamental prerequisite for successful decision-
making. Intelligence workers and decision-makers have to be 
aware that they differ from each other as groups in the ways in 
which they handle information.248 
Intelligence products 
The commander should be supported in the decisions that he 
has to take by means of an up-to-date picture of the situation 
and by supplying the necessary intelligence products (1-Process 
and 2-pecide). Intelligence needs are more extensive and more 
diverse in peace support operations than in ordinary combat 
operations, since it is not a question of a single enemy but of 
parties to a conflict. The commander therefore requires updated 
background information on the political situation in the area, 
including historical and cultural influences, at all stages in the 
operation, together with portraits of leaders and persons of 
influence in the conflict (2-Decide). Also, he needs information 
for comparative purposes (1-Process) on local troops, ethnic 
groups, parties with an interest in the conflict, and particularly 
the deployment, attitudes and performance capabilities of 
potentially hostile elements. The intelligence system should make 
observations on all events and changes in the situation in the 
area and its security environment that could threaten the stability 
of the situation, perhaps within a very short time.249 
Intelligence requirements are usually based on an 
evaluation of the existing threat, which serves as the grounds on 
which the commander defines his information needs (CCIR). 
Under difficult conditions the commander should be able to 
state clear, unambiguous, prioritized information needs that will 
ensure successful collection and analysis of information, and this 
should be timed so that an intelligence protocol for the operation 
can be formed and the troops are able to practice its 
implementation before deployment. If the protocol is formed 
only after deployment, intelligence will be operating in the wake 
of planning and will not be able to make its full contribution to 
the command process.25° In an ideal situation the results of 
intelligence work will be available for use in the peace support 
command process at the same time at both the strategic and 
tactical levels, thus ensuring that the UN Security Council and 
the tactical commander receive notice of any change in the 
situation simultaneously, so that it will serve as an early warning. 
This is possible only if intelligence is able to make its own 
contribution to the situation report (1-Process). 
Tactical intelligence should produce information on the 
implementation of the task in hand, including observations of 
troop withdrawals or breaches of treaties, and these should be 
appended to existing background information, data on the aims of 
the parties to the conflict and assessments of their performance 
capacities. This will generate analyses of events and predictions of 
future developments which take account of the overall situation 
and are of maximum use for decision-making purposes. In order 
to guarantee the quality of the end products, the process should 
contain a classification system and analytical facility. In fact, the 
production of information for use in decision-making is one of the 
most important tasks of peacekeeping forces 251  As part of their 
national contribution, the commanders of the United States regional 
forces support operations with analyses and databases and by 
coordinating the work and results of organizations already gathering 
intelligence in the area concerned (2-Decide), as described above. 
The multinational dimension is taken into account by 
delivering this information in ready-filtered form so that it can 
be distributed to all participants (2-Decide).252  IMINT images 
received as national support are transmitted to terminals in digital 
form, and hard copies can be made of these for immediate use. 
They can also be stored on tape or in databases for later use and 
further manipulation. SIGINT results are processed in this 
branch's own handling centres and the end products are 
distributed to users via intelligence departments or offices at the 
various levels of command. MASINT interpretation facilities are 
available, even in the American intelligence system, only at centres 
specialized in this.253  In addition to background facts on the 
operational environment, such the infrastructure, the terrain or 
the weather, the tactical-level commander of a peace support 
mission will probably want answers to the following questions 
at all stages in the operation (1-Process, 2-Decide): 
- 
	
	The conflict. What are the points of departure of the conflict 
at the local level and how can these be influenced? How 
extensive is its impact? 
- 	The parties to the conflict. What skills do the parties to the 
conflict possess, what are their future intentions and what is 
the state of their morale and discipline? What are the 
characters of their leaders? What is the structure of their 
command systems and how well do they work? How are 
their troops divided into combat units and what are their 
levels of preparedness and resilience? 
- 	Changes in the situation. How probable is an escalation of 
violence? Why is this likely to happen, when and where? 
- 	Demography. What is the ethnic distribution of the 
population and what attitudes prevail in the local people? 
What part are they likely to play in the coming operations, 
and how can they best be induced to help in the process of 
resolving the conflict? 
- 	Infrastructure. What are the data transmission and 
telecommunications networks in the area like? What is the 
state of the arms industry there? What is the structure and 
capacity of energy supplies? How will the terrain affect 
military operations and supplies? What is the state of the 
environment? 
In addition to answers to the above questions, it is necessary 
to produce counter-intelligence analyses of the parties to the 
conflict, the impact of terrorism and crime in the area and factors 
affecting the safety of the troops, and also to construct intelligence 
scenarios from the viewpoint of the parties to the conflict and 
predictions of the future course of events. Operational-level 
predictions normally apply to the next 48-96 hours, but longer-
term analyses can be drawn up as required. Meanwhile targeting 
intelligence calls for estimates of the weaknesses of the parties 
involved, the centre of gravity of their deployment, location of 
strategic targets and their identification marks, and technical 
intelligence requires investigations into the combat potential of 
the various parties. One of the most significant intelligence products 
at the upper command levels, e.g. SACELIR, is an evaluation of the 
impact of the operation in the form of a comparison of the results 
achieved with the end state defined in the mandate. Also connected 
with this is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the use of arms, a 
document which ends up with the political decision-makers 2M 
A further intelligence product is the indications and early 
warning, i.e. an observation or identification of an impending 
crisis and a report on this. The generation of early warnings is 
dependent on the ability of strategic intelligence to perceive 
signs recognized as indicative of a crisis. It should be possible to 
include early warnings in preliminary analyses. The NATO 
directives stress the breadth of the area of responsibility of the 
intelligence services and the need for control over the entire 
situation in connection with the observation of changes. The 
indicators that serve as early warnings vary from one level of 
command to another, and may be individual details such as 
movement on the part of a person or target at the operational or 
tactical level, whereas at higher levels they are more likely to be 
based on analyses provided by the intelligence system as a whole, 
such as a notification of preparations for mobilization or 
significance alterations in the political, economic or social situation 
in the country concerned.255 
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In the opinion of Williams the command system requires 
good initial information at the beginning of an operation. 
Experience suggests that the first six weeks are decisive for the success 
of an operation. This initial information includes details of the area 
concerned, the deployment of the troops engaged in the conflict, 
conditions in the area and its infrastructure and the ethnic 
composition and attitudes of the local population (2-Decide). 
These facts will be of help in estimating the threat to the safety of 
the peacekeeping troops, for instance.256  In order to ensure the 
supply of initial information, Smith proposes that regional 
intelligence centres should be set up. The problem is that the 
member states themselves are reluctant to do this, as there is no 
guarantee that the resulting information will be used for the 
correct purposes. The sources emphasize the need for broad-
based information which can be filled out in time according to 
the user's needs.257 Thus when Admiral Blair put forward his 
views on the future of United States intelligence backing for 
peace support operations in the Defense Intelligence Journal, he 
laid down the requirements, or information needs, separately for 
the different stages in an operation. At the planning and 
preparation stages intelligence is expected to produce predictions 
of developments in the situation for use in UN and operational 
command decision-making (2-Decide). These predictions should 
concentrate on possible policies and aims of the states and groups 
involved in the conflict and the capacities of the armed forces 
stationed in the crisis area and are intended to help in the 
deployment of troops within the operation. Once initiated, the 
intelligence process will involve updating of databases, atlases 
and any operational plans regarding the crisis area. It will also 
lead to the creation at the planning stage of an intelligence system 
to support the operation proper, which will contain both national 
and tactical elements. The structure of this system and the choice 
of elements should be based on the information needs expressed 
by the commander.258 
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Table 5. Requirements placed on intelligence services in the various stages of 
an operation?5' 
Intelligence information should be distributed to all troops 
participating in an operation regardless of nationality. The US 
practice is to include this distribution procedure in the information 
acquisition and synchronization plan, and in any case distribution 
and security measures must be decided upon in advance and 
with due attention paid to national restrictions. Distribution 
problems become more acute when one is dealing with non-
governmental aid organizations (NGOs), for instance. In view of 
the situational nature of the information, the Americans have 
deemed it appropriate to set up an office for UN operations that 
attends to the censoring of information before distribution, while 
another approach, involving intelligence support teams, is 
devoted largely to ensuring the passage of the necessary military 
intelligence within the command process and the appropriateness 
of its distribution.260 
Both Smith and Williams state that the intelligence aspect of 
an operation should produce situational and intelligence reviews 
for the use of the upper levels in the command structure and that 
these reviews should indicate the intentions of the parties to the 
conflict, changes in the situation and the influence of these factors 
on the ability of the peacekeeping forces to complete their mission 
(2-Decide). Political and military analyses at the operational level 
should be performed jointly, and intelligence at this level should 
be capable of furnishing the decision-makers (2-Decide) with 
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proposals for policies by which the alternative scenarios can be 
managed. As Smith puts it, control over information of this kind 
makes the UN a party to the politics of the crisis area whether it likes it 
or not.261  The results of the intelligence work are normally 
distributed in written form, as documents, telefaxes, letters or 
courier messages, especially in cases where the data transmission 
systems of the various nationalities cannot technically be rendered 
compatible within the intelligence architecture. The electronic 
distribution of products is becoming more widespread, however, 
as it is faster and enables further processing of the data. New 
possibilities introduced by advances in technology are video 
conferencing and search-based services of the Internet type 
intended for users of computer terminals.262 
All the authors emphasize the substantial problems attached 
to the last phase in the intelligence process, distribution, the most 
serious of these being the handing over of national intelligence 
products to other states, or even to the parties in a conflict. One 
concrete example of this mentioned by John Mackinlay is the 
sharing of strategic intelligence between the United States and 
non-allied nations. An attempt has been made to resolve this 
problem in PDD 13 and at a practical level in the planning of 
operations and in exercises - but with poor results.263 
Multinational operating environments inevitably entail 
intelligence leaks, either intentional or accidental, and this affects 
the interest of the producers of intelligence and the parties to the 
conflict alike in participating in such activities or even permitting 
them. Eriksson maintains that the problem can be reduced by 
adapting intelligence products to individual recipients, but the 
danger is that the decision-makers will receive different 
impressions of the situation, and thereby different grounds on 
which to reach their conclusions (1-Process, 2-Decide) and that 
the information will become politicized. As Raevsky notes, all 
information that bears essentially upon the taking of decisions 
must be transmitted to those responsible regardless of 
nationality.2' 
It, is inevitable, of course, that the parties to a conflict will 
attempt to work towards their own ends, and this may take the form 
of feeding disinformation to the operation's intelligence system. 
Allowance must be made for such practices by means of both 
counter-intelligence and technical monitoring, and it naturally 
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places additional demands on systems for ascertaining the quality 
and reliability of intelligence information. Supervision and 
efficiency assessment must be extended to the whole of the 
intelligence process, with the ultimate aim of improving its ability 
to support decision-making. 
Intelligence methods 
Open sources (OSINT) which can provide extremely useful 
information to fill out that obtained as the result of intelligence 
analyses include Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Jane's books and 
magazines and the publications of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS). The practically instant ability of the 
media to provide information about the outbreak of a local 
conflict or about events in a crisis area anywhere in the world 
should be exploited to the full for the acquisition of information. 
This also implies that the media can prove to be sources of early 
warnings.265  Observation or adoption of the following factors 
would improve the performance of the UN and its operations: 
- 
	
	The collection and processing of data from general sources - 
the CNN, press agencies, research institutes and the press 
itself, also local media. 
- Combination and processing of information from other UN 
organizations, such as WHO, UNESCO etc. 
- 	Limited rights of access to national intelligence offices - 
affecting member states. 
- 	Ability to receive information from satellites and process it - 
purchase of information or its receipt as a donation, 
- Operation command intelligence support from the Secretary-
General's office 24 hours a day. 
- Encoded communication connections for member states 
producing information and for the command functions in 
operations266 
The advantage with open sources is the abundance of 
information available, and the greatest drawback the need for 
processing and critically evaluating all the material. Although 
computers can be used to organize the mass of information, the 
decisive factor for the final outcome depends on the professional 
skills of the analyst. Another problem is concerned with 
variations in the availability of OSINT material, e.g. interruptions 
in Internet services or blocking of the desired address. The 
Internet is undoubtedly the most cost-effective means of 
acquiring up-to-date open source information, and as Dander 
points out, there is also software available for OSINT analysis 
purposes, e.g. the Project Pathfinder and Sentinel programs in 
the United States.267 
In the case of traditional peacekeeping missions the primary 
sources at the tactical level are the battalions themselves, local 
citizens, psychological operations groups, UN civilian sections 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The last-
mentioned are regarded as extremely useful sources for the 
purposes of UN operations. A considerable amount of 
information can be gathered by following the local news media 
and those of nearby areas.268 The commanders of missions have 
to prepare themselves for sudden crises by having rapidly 
deployable military intelligence staff at the ready, and this is 
possible only in an integrated intelligence system where all the 
available intelligence technology and equipment can be 
mobilized. The US directives place emphasis on IMINT and 
SIGINT intelligence employing aircraft and space vehicles, but 
peacekeeping intelligence operations should also be ready to 
make use of manned and unmanned electronic, optical and 
acoustic surveillance equipment, justification for the use of 
which can be found in the "spirit" if not the wording of the 
mandate. Nordic directives, on the other hand, point out the 
human ability to make more accurate observations than any 
technical devices269 
The intelligence methods recognized by NATO are 
HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT AND CI. It is noted that 
IMINT allows a general impression of the area of the operation 
to be formed together with an assessment of the capacity of the 
forces operating there, and it also permits control to be 
maintained over the methods used. HUMINT is normally the 
main source and the most reliable means of obtaining information 
for the use of peace support missions, and of confirming 
information derived from other sources. In a peace support 
context the advantages of SIGINT come to the fore best in the 
issuing of early warnings, because little use is normally made of 
the electromagnetic spectrum in missions. OSINT is the 
outstanding intelligence method at the planning stage and when 
forming the initial databases, and it has also proved useful for 
early warning purposes with advances in telecommunications. 
The security of the troops themselves can be improvement by 
the use of CI methods, i.e. counter-intelligence, but the capacity 
of this approach to yield intelligence information as such has 
not so far been exploited to the full. As noted above, HUMINT is 
the chief tactical intelligence approach adopted in traditional 
peacekeeping,27° but in the opinion of Martin Urquhart its 
traditional division according to levels of command should be abandoned 
and all HUMINT for a particular mission should be coordinated 
jointly and centrally271 . Activities corresponding to HUMINT are 
referred to in the Nordic Countries as surveillance. Field 
observation and reporting are among the basic elements of peace 
support, and are used for detecting and indicating changes in 
the prevailing situation (1-Process). The observations concerned 
may be breaches of agreements or evidence of such that provide 
the basis for decisions leading to sanctions (2-Decide). The Nordic 
directives give expression to the traditional spirit of peacekeeping 
with their mention of a combination of patrols and the use of 
sensors272 . 
Patrolling remains one of the principal military tasks in peace 
support missions, as it allows the commander to gain an intelligence 
advantage over the parties to the dispute at the tactical level. 
Patrols can also be used for confirming or supplementing 
information obtained from field observations or technical systems, 
and it is well suited as an intelligence method where supervision 
is to be maintained over wide areas. The firepower of armoured 
intelligence vehicles, their mobility and their protective and 
communications equipment make them particularly suitable for 
military confrontations, for mobile field observations, for 
protecting transport columns, as a reserve and for probing routes. 
Helicopter patrols can be used for surveillance and the gathering 
of information over wide areas with the minimum of delay, 
while aircraft and satellite systems can be complemented with 
unmanned airborne vehicles equipped with various remote 
sensing devices. Military police can be assigned protection, 
supervision and conventional policing tasks.273 
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Eriksson also mentions that the United States, Great Britain 
and France all use special forces for intelligence and humanitarian 
work in peace support missions. These forces can be deployed 
without arousing attention even to points situated far away 
from the command centre, and their possession of foolproof 
communications facilities means that they can undertake liaison 
and intelligence tasks and send back situation reports. They 
can also provide real-time data on the situation and weather 
conditions as an aid to regular battalions being moved to the 
area (1-Process). These forces are also suitable for offensives of 
a limited kind, tactical intelligence, illumination of targets for 
precision weapons, anti-terrorist activities and light infantry 
functions.274 Hunter notes that the observation points set up 
by the special forces and battalions of the British army, 
including the covert ones, are particularly valuable for the 
acquisition of information. The directives also recommend 
special forces for attending to civilian matters, for co-ordination 
work and for public information duties. They are similarly 
available for gathering together, exercising and organizing local 
scattered armed groups or security forces belong to the host 
country.275 
Troops specialized in electronic warfare (SIGINT and EW) 
are capable of providing an operation commander with short-
delay electronic descriptions of the situation and of issuing early 
warnings (1-Process). Naval vessels are equipped with a wide 
range of intelligence devices and systems, and these have the 
advantage of being immediately available for focusing on the 
target area around the clock once the vessel has arrived at its 
station. This means that general intelligence work can commence 
as soon as an embargo on shipping or trade has been declared, 
with more precise intelligence tasks being defined as the operation 
proceeds.276 
Counter-intelligence (CI) employs in part the same methods 
as military intelligence in order to obtain information. The safety 
of one's own troops is dependent on information acquired by 
counter-intelligence regarding the performance capacity and 
activity of the other side's intelligence and the objects of its 
interest. The role of counter-intelligence is expected to increase 
in the case of local conflicts, as also will its role as a producer of 
information. Although covert action is regarded as a tool for the 
promotion of democracy and the advancement of peace in the 
United States, the Europeans look on it as contrary to the nature of 
peace support missions.27  
The doctrine of wider peacekeeping introduced in 1994 
stresses the importance of consent. Peacekeepers should act in 
such a way that they cannot be accused of illegal or covert action 
of any kind. The US directives state that the parties to a dispute 
may regard intelligence in general as a hostile act and lose 
confidence in the whole peace support operation as a consequence. 
It may be said that on the whole the major powers accept partial 
consent at the tactical level, but neutrality must be preserved 
under all conditions except in the case of peace enforcement 
missions. The Nordic doctrine holds that the acquisition of 
military intelligence should be as overt and discreet as possible 
and should take place with the consent of the parties to the 
conflict 278 whereas the British document insists that all personnel 
regardless of rank are obliged to contribute to the gathering of 
information. Peacekeepers should be taught and trained where 
to look for information and how to report it. The training of the 
troops on arrival at the area of operation should include setting 
up observation posts, defence exercises, fortification, daily 
routines, the keeping of diaries, the writing of reports according 
to a standard model and the use and servicing of observation 
and surveillance equipment. They should be instructed in the 
identification of the fixed-winged aircraft, helicopters and land 
vehicles in use in the area, and their basic training should have 
included the recognition of a wide range of weapons of different 
types.279 
Intelligence architecture 
The commander should determine the intelligence architecture 
to be adopted in such a way that both early warnings and 
prompt, accurate, clearly presented intelligence information can 
be distributed to all the troops. This is essential for their own 
security in the first place. The intelligence architecture of a 
traditional operation is based on communications equipment 
owned or leased by the UN, and the commissioning of this 
equipment is allowed for separately in the Status of Forces 
Agreement for the mission. The civilian wing of the UN will be 
responsible for arranging the lines of communication between 
the operational headquarters and the UN headquarters, while 
those between the operational headquarters and the troops will 
be built and maintained either by the signal division of the 
operational command or by the contingents themselves. The 
contingents will almost always be responsible for their lines of 
communication with their home country. The Nordic directives 
do not say anything specific about the intelligence architecture, 
but assume that intelligence will use the command system in the 
same way as any other user of the computer terminals. The 
handbook at the combat technology level nevertheless encourages 
the integration of surveillance systems in order to achieve 
improvements in coverage and reliability.280 
The NATO directives state that the information technology 
systems used in a peace support mission are a combination of national 
military systems and the civilian systems of the host country. They 
also warn about placing excessive reliance on the local 
telecommunications network. The data protection directives point 
to the need to be ready to use encrypting to maintain security, 
but at the same time note the importance of impartiality and 
"transparency". The directives are fairly comprehensive all told, 
when both the UN political leadership and the needs of joint 
operations are taken into account. The core of the communications 
system for ground troops will usually be formed by the data 
transmission system of one country, to which the lower levels of 
the command structure are linked by means of interfaces that 
conform to NATO standards. 
The intelligence architecture should be designed and 
constructed in good time, and both this and the data protection 
system should take into account the multinational nature of the 
operation and the participation of non-NATO countries. 
Intelligence support teams are an essential part of the 
headquarters of any operation. The principal task of the 
designers of the architecture will be to achieve compatibility 
between the various data processing and transmission 
systems.281 The information travelling via the architecture must 
be defined and it should be possible to trace its passage in each 
case, as the ability to identify the source of each item of 
information means that it can be assigned to the correct context 
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and its confirmation can be proved to be from a different source. 
Simplicity is an advantage in that it facilitates development of 
the architecture, and particularly the linking of new non-NATO 
contingents and civilian organizations to it. It is maintained in 
the SIPRI yearbook that Australia, Canada, Great Britain and 
the United States at least have been working actively to develop 
the performance capacity of UN missions in the fields of 
information technology and data transmission., with the accent 
on interoperability.282 
US intelligence at the national level observes the "split-
based operations" principle, which means that the troops 
deployed in a mission received support from their own country 
or their own garrison. This support is mediated through the 
ability of the C4I system to establish worldwide data 
transmission connections. Systems will undoubtedly be 
developed further in the future to the point of becoming 
browser-based information services, referred to in the 
intelligence community as Joint Intelligence Virtual 
Architectures (JIVA). Existing systems of this kind correspond 
in level of performance to the C4I for the Warrior. Development 
work is still in its early stages, however, and the system is not 
expected to be operational for many years yet.283  
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Figure 8. An example of the structure of an intelligence architecture. The 
diagram shows how national intelligence systems, the operation's own 
intelligence products and the operation's tactical intelligence system are linked 
together by means of a communications network and how they are joined to 
the JWICS system. The lowermost information user in the diagram receives his 
intelligence both via the JWICS database and directly from the tactical system, 
e.g. in the form of an image from an unmanned airborne vehicle.'' 
The practically ideal intelligence architecture presented in 
the theoretical chapter above is based on the American C4I for 
the Warrior doctrine. The architecture links both the national 
intelligence systems and those participating in the mission and 
the corresponding users of their terminals together, the success 
of this being dependent on careful planning that takes account of 
the prioritized demands for the passage of information over each 
stage in the connections. The scheme for the architecture is then 
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passed on to those responsible for lines of communication as a 
basis for further planning and implementation. As explained by 
Barry, data transmission within NATO relies on the fixed NATO 
Integrated Communications System (NICS), so that any CJTF 
data transmission architecture has to be developed on ad hoc 
principles out of the national systems of the United States and 
other countries. He reckons that this dependence will continue at 
least for the foreseeable future.285 The main items of equipment 
in the CJTF headquarters intelligence architecture are the 
telephone and telefax machine, with or without an encrypting 
device, and workstations attached to the CRONOS/LOCE and 
SHED COINS data management systems. 
A CJTF headquarters functioning at sea would need the 
corresponding naval workstations. The workstations are linked 
together by means of LAN and WAN transmission networks, 
employing satellite systems, the local telephone network and 
radio systems for transmitting the signals. These enable links to 
be made to TARE and IVSN/national systems and support 
security-classified video conferencing and telephone calls. Special 
transmission systems are used for the images produced by 
unmanned airborne vehicles.286 British naval doctrines favour 
the creation of a rapid, efficient intelligence architecture in order 
to connect all the sensors, information technology and data 
systems, databases and other intelligence systems in the area. 
The use of transmission systems calls for high levels of 
professional skill on the part of the personnel, but these strategic 
and operational systems have many advantages, including a 
centralized command for all naval operations anywhere on the 
world's oceans.287 
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5 EXPERIENCES WITH THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
"We had preliminary intelligence data on the types of threats we would 
most likely encounter and were very well prepared. A typical load out 
of the Prowlers would consist of three ALQ-99 pods, a single wing-
mountedfuel tank and a single wing-mounted HARM." 
Captain Baxter, USMC Tactical Electronic 
Warfare Squadron 4, Operation Deny Flight28" 
5.1 EXPERIENCES WITH EXISTING PEACE SUPPORT 
OPERATIONS 
The lack of national interest on the part of the major powers 
became evident in the case of the problems in Yugoslavia and 
Somalia and the attempts to solve them. The Security Council 
was slow in intervening and had no military power at hand to 
pursue its strategic goals. The interests of the major powers 
coincided with the international interest only at the point when 
United States influence began to suffer. It is reasonable to claim 
that it was only when Washington, London and Paris had reached 
a consensus that UNPROFOR received a strategic directive in 
which the mandate, political pressure and military power were 
in the correct proportions. This did not occur until the late summer 
of 1995, reaching its culmination in the initiation of Operation 
Deliberate Force.289 
The commencement of an operation of the Lead Nation type 
is usually connected with protection of the national interests of 
one or more permanent members of the Security Council, for in 
Lawrence Freedman's view attention to such interests can easily 
involve operations carried out in the name of peace support by 
the major powers, for which legitimation in the eyes of the 
international community is sought from the UN or some other 
organization.290 Efforts are made to ensure the correct decisions 
in the Security Council by lobbying the other members prior to 
taking the matter to the council, and the member that makes the 
initial proposal then takes responsibility for leading the operation, 
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accepts the physical risks and pays the costs. Those who abstain 
from voting remain on the sidelines to see whether the operation 
is a success. The United States withdrew from Somalia, for 
instance, because its troops encountered greater risks than the 
administration and the nation were prepared to accept. On the 
other hand, a successful operation such as that in Haiti may be 
said to have survived the external and internal political and 
military pressures and to have been of more or less the planned 
duration.291  
The operations in Yugoslavia are divided into a number of 
missions and based on a number of Security Council resolutions, 
so that the troops are acting on the strength of several mixed or 
multidimensional mandates. A mission comparable to the CJTF 
set-up was tried for the first time in the IFOR and SFOR 
operations, and the results were encouraging, in that the 
command headquarters were able to control both the NATO and 
non-NATO troops effectively. When it comes to developing the 
CJTF concept further, use will undoubtedly be made of 
experiences gained not only from the ground operations but also 
from the Deny Flight air operation commanded by AFSOUTH 
and the Sharp Guard naval operation.2 Operation Deny Flight 
was undertaken under UN Resolution 816/12.4.1993, and its aim 
was to supervise the air space and force the parties in the conflict 
to observe the mandate, which prohibits fixed-wing and rotary-
winged aircraft from entering the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The operation was also detailed to defend UN 
bases, under UNPROFOR command, and by request, with 
legitimation accorded under resolutions 836 and 958 (chapter 
VII). On UN orders and under its co-ordination, NATO carried 
out air strikes on certain targets that threatened the UN protected 
zones. In addition, supporting flights were carried out in 
connection with control procedures, intelligence and maintenance 
of the operation.293 The NATO air force implemented the 
command process connected with its operations according to 
virtually the same cycle as in the Second World War, the Gulf 
War,and the Bosnia operations, based on an intelligence report 
issued twice every 24 hours and an air tasking order issued at six 
o'clock every morning. This meant that in the worst case air 
operations would be performed on the strength of information 
that was 36-48 hours old, due largely to financial savings in the 
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data transmission functions of the C31 system.294 
Command of the Somalia operations was complicated to a 
significant degree by differences in the interpretation of the UN 
mandate between the various states and experts involved. The 
operation began as a humanitarian mission, UNOSOM I, in which 
the United States participated from August 1992. At the second 
stage, the UNITAF operation, a limited use of force was added to 
the mandate, while the third stage, UNOSOM II, was a peace 
enforcement operation which involved combat episodes. It was 
in this latter operation that the differences in national interests 
and political agendas began to be seen, together with the 
complexity introduced by the use of a multinational force. The 
military commander had to adapt his strategic approach in order 
to ensure that it would continue to be possible to control the 
operation. The complexity and multinationality of the command 
relations led to significant difficulties in the exchange of 
intelligence, one reason being the US desire to retain a strict 
national command over both its troops and its intelligence.295 
Operation Up-Hold Democracy, focused on the island state 
of Haiti, began on 18.4.1994, although preparations were put 
under way in September 1991, when Jean Bertrand Aristide was 
elected president. It had become clear to the United States by 
summer 1994 that it would be impossible to achieve a political 
solution, and thus USACOM received the command to prepare 
for either forceful or peaceful intervention. A decision to intervene 
with force was taken on 18.9.1994, but it was rescinded only a 
few hours before the operation was due to start and redefined as 
a peaceful intervention. 296 
The Bush and Clinton administrations in the United States 
have increased the amount of intelligence support given to the 
UN, but certain sources suggest that the upper limit is now being 
reached in terms of both the amount of information that can be 
communicated and the financial resources that can be devoted to 
this. The Republicans, who have been calling for restrictions in 
this support, have been particularly dissatisfied with the UN in 
the matter of ensuring the security of intelligence information, 
and have proposed a bill to place substantial limits on intelligence 
co-operation.297 
Experience clearly indicates that the UN is incapable of running 
the more demanding types of operation, i.e. second or third-level 
operations. The disarming of parties to a conflict without full 
consent has proved to be tantamount to a combat situation, and 
the impotence of the UN in such matters may be seen to be due 
partly to defects in its own structure and the inconsistencies 
between its own principles and the nature of the interventions 
required, and partly to the unwillingness of the member states to 
arrange and pay for the firepower required for enforcement 
operations.298 All the conflicts concerned are fundamentally 
struggles for power, irrespective of whether the operations are 
initiated in order to provide humanitarian aid or to limit the 
scope of an armed confrontation. As Lawrence Freedman points 
out, experience shows that the parties to the intervention inevitably 
become parties to the conflict, with their own distinct interests.299 
5.2 INCORPORATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN 
COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The UNPROFOR command system has been criticised not only 
for its poor decision-making process and command structure 
but also for its poor co-operation with the UN and NATO. 
Collaboration between political and military command elements 
at the operational level has been accused of a lack of co-ordination. 
One point that was raised in a seminar held by former 
UNPROFOR commanders in Oslo was the way in which certain 
participating countries insisted on commanding their own troops 
on national lines, in addition to which the overall UNPROFOR 
command process was deemed disorganized and unable to make use of 
the information supplied to it by the intelligence process. It is evident 
from the Lewis report that demanding peace support operations 
cannot be run without a clear military command structure, as 
revealed most obviously in missions that have a mixed mandate. 
According to Roberts, it was this that eventually led to the 
situation in UNPROFOR in summer 1995 in which the UN 
Secretary-General, with US backing, withdrew his special envoy 
Akashi from the command process for deciding on the use of 
force. 300  The outcome was that the UNPROFOR commander 
called on the RRF to plan its actions so as to support the UN 
forces and as a separate RRF operation. The situation had 
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developed by July 1995 to the point that the commander ordered 
full integration of the planning and implementation of command 
processes for the RRF, UN and NATO (air force) military 
operations. At the same time the intelligence processes of the 
organization were focused on supporting this planning initiative 
(1-Process, 2-Decide). A strategic outline for an integrated plan 
for air and ground operations was available by 29.7.1995, and 
the actual product of the whole command and intelligence 
process, the air and ground operation plan, was completed in 
the last week of August, on the eve of Sarajevo Market Place II. 
The plan was put into effect from 2.00 hours on 30.8.1995 and the 
operation finally terminated on 20th September. No infantry 
confrontations took place at all during the operation, and the 
Bosnian Serbs did not once fire back. Colonel Nicholls concludes 
from this that the UN did not become a party to the conflict even 
though it used force against one of the parties.301  
When LANDCENT was acting as the command headquarters 
for IFOR a distinction was made in its command process between 
overall planning of the operation and the command function 
proper. The planning section, CJ-5, was responsible for planning 
future action, ensuring capability between political and military 
action and the planning of alternative measures such as 
evacuations, while the Joint Operations Centre was responsible 
for commanding and directing the implementation of the existing 
plan under the supervision of the operational section, CJ-3. The 
responsibilities of intelligence in this overall plan consisted of 
danger assessments, map services, the danger assessment, 
intelligence architecture, counter-intelligence and troop safety 
aspects of intelligence planning, HUMINT and the command 
and co-ordination of intelligence. 302 
Experiences in Somalia suggest that the overall planning of 
the operation should take account of political, humanitarian and 
military considerations and the interaction between these. Planning 
should be based on essential, reliable and exhaustively analysed 
information, and should be backed up with intelligence services 
that are available to all the participating countries and headquarters. 
Intelligence practices also need to be defined in the course of 
general planning.° Lieutenant-General Hugh Shelton, commander 
of the Haiti operation, led the preparations for this from Fort 
Bragg and moved to his flagship only two days before the landing. 
This meant that he was able to benefit from the services of the 
intelligence centre of the XBVIII Airborne Corps (CMISE) 
throughout the preparations. The use of video-conferencing 
facilities made it possible to conduct routine conversations between 
commanders and ensure co-operation between headquarters staffs. 
The commander also used this form of "telecommunications" for 
negotiating with the President and senior members of the Ministry 
of Defense. Video-conferencing was continued throughout the 
operation, as it had proved during the preparation stage to be a 
reliable and natural means of exchanging information and views. 
It meant that the commander was able to be advised on the situation 
in accordance with the accepted doctrine both when on the move 
and when at his headquarters. 3°4 
In practice it is almost inevitably the case that the levels of decision-
making in peace support operations become indistinct, with lieutenants 
and captains having to take rapid decisions of considerable 
importance so as achieve the desired concrete results at the 
strategic level. One cannot prepare for such situations in advance, 
nor can one practise for them. It is therefore important that all 
levels of command should be in possession of an overall picture 
of the political and military situation and of the culture of the 
area concerned.305 
5.3 THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ITS 
FUNDAMENTALS 
One of the most significant findings of the UNIDIR questionnaire 
was that the majority of peacekeeping operations have not had any 
operational-level intelligence procedure specified for them. Although 
the battalions have received information and exchanged 
information among themselves, no systematic intelligence 
practices have been defined for them. The command and 
intelligence processes have both remained unclarified. The same 
survey also reported that the mediators in the Yugoslavian 
dispute appointed by the international community did not receive 
intelligence information from the regional security organizations, 
although they did receive information from their own national 
intelligence sources. Channels of the latter kind were also 
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available to some of the UN commanders who served in the 
former Yugoslavia. The questionnaire claims that UN 
Headquarters did not have the necessary channels open to it. It 
is similarly evident from Lord Owen's memoirs that there was 
an aspect of national interest involved in the conflict management 
operation, although it was not clear what the ultimate aims 
were.306  UN intelligence practices are determined in each case 
by the mandate, which may require supervision over the use of 
heavy arms, and this in turn may mean monitoring the 
movements of combat troops and weapons systems on both 
sides as well as the verification of demobilization. If the operation 
is incapable of doing this, it will lose its credibility in the eyes of 
the parties to the conflict and the international community in 
general, so that intelligence practices may well be the key to a 
convincing presence as a whole.307 
Another of the main purposes of intelligence in peace support 
operations is to ensure the security of the troops, which implies 
the use of counter-intelligence methods. Similarly, the operability 
of the intelligence system as such must be ensured in order to be 
able to locate and monitor weapons and weapon systems 
maintained by the parties to the conflicts as part of the drive to 
prevent their movement. This presupposes a broad scope of 
action for the intelligence services with respect to both the 
acquisition and distribution of information. Experiences in 
Somalia confirmed the already evident need for deciding upon 
an official UN intelligence protocol. 
The UN must be prepared to renew its own procedures and 
to make use of all available information when directing 
demanding operations. The elaboration of an intelligence protocol 
begins with defining the process and organizing the intelligence 
system. No common intelligence protocol was drawn up for the 
Somalia operation, whereas in practice it would have been 
important to define how use could be made of the various types 
of intelligence and means of acquiring information. One dismal 
example of this is the fact-finding mission that was sent there, 
which, was linked to the UN only for the duration of its field 
investigations and failed completely to generate the information 
needed for the Security Council to reach its decision (2-Decide). 
Some states such as Australia and Indonesia define in their 
national doctrines the intelligence tasks relevant to low-level 
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conflicts (OOTW), and in this way they are able to decide on 
their own participation in the management of such conflicts. 
They are able to direct their own intelligence towards identifying 
possible conflicts in good time (1-Process) and to preparing a 
body of intelligence data (2-Decide) for the eventuality of 
commencing an operation.308 
Experiences confirm the claim put forward earlier that the 
classification of intelligence into strategic, operational and tactical 
is unreasonable in connection with peace support operations or 
demonstrations of force. Another observation is that the greatest 
failures materialize at the operational level. In Somalia, for 
example, the operational intelligence architecture was constructed 
around commercial satellite connections, which meant that the 
JTF did not have any ready capacity of its own but needed to 
purchase it. Similarly the operational level has often found itself 
having to act in a new environment, built up areas such as 
Mogadishu, Sarajevo and Port au Prince, engaging in urban 
intelligence in places where conventional intelligence is not 
accustomed to functioning.309  The political leadership of the 
United States called off the arms embargo on the Bosnia muslims 
of its own accord on 11th November 1994, and at the same time it 
stopped distributing intelligence information on the blockade to 
troops taking part in the peacekeeping operation, including those 
of NATO members. This placed Admiral Leighton-Smith in a 
situation in which he had to pretend not to know anything about 
these matters when discussing the arms embargo with General 
Janvier of UNPF and General Smith of UNPROFOR. At the same 
time the US intelligence machinery was producing information 
on the embargo (1-Process, 2-Decide) which Janvier and Smith 
were not receiving via their own channels.310  By way of contrast, 
both Smith and Caldwell raise the case of Lieutenant-General 
Sanderson, Australian commander of the UNTAC operation, 
who received intelligence from both national and American 
sources, mainly because of his Australian nationality. The opposite 
extreme was represented by General Nambiar, the first 
commander of UNPROFOR, who was refused NATO intelligence 
support because he was Indian.311  
The manner in which IFOR shares its information among 
participants shows that some progress is taking place. The IFOR 
Russian staff located in SHAPE, for instance, received all the 
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intelligence information relevant to the operation. A second 
demonstration of a change in the right direction is the Joint 
Analysis Center (JAC), through which NATO and its allies 
received support in connection with peace support operations. 
The practical implementation was in this case the work of a 12-
person co-ordination group containing staff from 6 NATO 
countries. Apart from these operations, the JAC also produced 
information to back up naval operations in the Baltic.312 
Intelligence practices in the SHAPE headquarters began to alter 
as far as both staff and information technology were concerned 
at the time of Operation Deny Flight, as information technology 
made it possible to search for intelligence information according 
to the user's needs. Practices developed after that to the extent 
that the intelligence systems in Bosnia maintained data acquisition 
around the clock under NATO control. Now the clear-cut IFOR 
command system has allowed a broad-based intelligence protocol to be 
established. Under the existing protocol the small states have had 
to accept their position and the fact that the major powers control 
intelligence in peace support operations.313 
The Haiti operation was the first real test of joint intelligence 
for the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), in that the 
command headquarters received support from the Joint 
Intelligence Center (JIC), in the form of the Atlantic Intelligence 
Command (AIC). The operation was implemented in practice by 
JTF-180 and JTF-190, which were similar in their intelligence 
architectures, ways of acting (TTP) and directives and had 
compatible data transmission and distribution equipment and 
devices. Their common intelligence protocol was based on the 
USACOM publication "Atlantic Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures" (ATTP), which laid down the principles for 
intelligence work, the idea behind it and the headquarters' 
intelligence organization and activities. The third edition of this 
publication was in use by the time the Haiti operation began. 
Comparable intelligence directives for joint operations exist on 
the strategic and tactical levels. The intelligence practices followed 
in the Haiti operation had been created and rehearsed in annual 
JTF-level exercises and the finishing touches had been put to the 
compatibility between the JDISS and the army's Warrior system.314 
At the planning and preparation stages of peace support 
operations, and also at the deployment stage, the headquarters 
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staff have to accept and handle considerable amounts of detailed, 
unclassified and uncoordinated information (1-Process), as the 
intelligence process for the operation as such is not yet functioning. 
In the case of the initiation of UNPROFOR, this lack of an 
intelligence process was due to the absence of any statement of 
intelligence requirements and practices, and also to national 
differences of opinion within the headquarters staff as to the 
intended nature of the intelligence and command processes. It 
was felt at the beginning that there was insufficient time to 
gather background information and train command and 
intelligence organizations. In the UNTAC operation, for instance, 
the UN staff had not gone into the recent history of the region, its 
culture or the conflict as such, and as a result the goodwill of the 
local people was soon lost. There should have been time to gather 
background information, as the initiation of an operation usually takes 
several months.315 
The body appointed by the US European Command 
(USEUCOM) to plan the operation in Yugoslavia (YPJC) adapted 
the intelligence process so that the service provided would 
correspond to the information needs of the regional commanders, 
which meant that to some extent it functioned in reverse, e.g. the 
information was not classified according to the degree of secrecy 
required but "declassified" according to the extent to which it 
could be made public. This made it easier to take account of the 
national backgrounds of the recipients and to distribute 
information in an open system.316 The intelligence process at the 
operation level must be adapted to local conditions, so that in 
Bosnia, for instance, the sighting of four tanks did not necessarily 
mean "just a platoon on the march", for under local conditions 
there could be a considerable force involved, perhaps a 
"mechanized brigade" moving from Pale. In other words, each 
observation had to be interpreted in accordance with existing 
knowledge of the deployment of the local troops for combat 
purposes and the levels of armament of the parties concerned. 
The intelligence process received support at the operational and 
tactical levels from recognition keys compiled by the national 
organizations, knowledge of the tactical instructions drawn up 
for the Yugoslavian army in its time, and a knowledge of local 
conditions. The material required began to accumulate only when 
the operation had actually begun. The initial information was 
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used for the recognition of critical indicators such as equipment, 
points in the terrain and directions of movement, and it was 
possible on the strength of these indicators to support decision-
making (2-Decide) by creating bodies of information that would 
enable troops, intentions, rotations and changes to be detected 
and recognized.317 
The intelligence process observed in the IFOR operation 
was in accordance with the theory but adopted a counter-
intelligence viewpoint. One problem was adaptation of the 
HUMINT and CI products into a suitable form for the user. 
Evaluation of the reliability of the process lasted six months, after which 
it was possible to say that the limits within which the intelligence 
products lay were properly known. Considerable attention was paid 
to the planning and preparation stages in the IFOR operation, 
which gave a good impression of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the system. It is important at the stage of planning the 
intelligence architecture to have a clear idea of the information 
systems and data transmission systems available to those 
responsible for intelligence and those using the computer 
terminals, as this will enable the system to be made as clear and 
straightforward as possible.318 When it came to transferring 
responsibility for the command of the IFOR operation, however, 
the staff that was taking over planned its future activities on the 
basis of intelligence products received from outside. Support 
from national systems and NATO intelligence services was 
invaluable for LANDCENT, and for this reason the creation of 
an intelligence architecture was regarded as one of the first tasks, 
so that a general view could be obtained of all the instances 
providing information and what connections existed with these. 
In order to ensure the receipt of information, the participating 
countries were asked to send groups of liaison officers to join CJ-
2. The actual intelligence protocol for the operation was laid 
down in the IFOR permanent instructions. Having assumed 
responsibility for intelligence, LANDCENT used both manual 
and automated methods for directing its activities. The Collection 
Cell was responsible in practice for controlling and implementing 
the intelligence process and for its integration into the higher-
level intelligence system. Intelligence for the whole operation 
was synchronized according to a plan drawn up and maintained 
by the Collection Cell.319 
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The intelligence process for the 10th Mountain Division in 
Somalia was an application of the IPB and METT-T processes 
laid down in the ordinances, the databases in particular having 
to be adapted for the purpose. A synchronization table was 
produced for the operation's intelligence activity, which was 
then used as a basis for constructing a table of events. This in 
turn enabled control and planning of the intelligence activities 
proper. An attempt was made to apply every stage in the 
intelligence process, and the result was at times found to be 
good. The processes could not be made to function in the desired 
manner at the lower levels of command, however, because the 
processes at the combat technique and tactical levels did not 
contain any knowledge of the demography or political spectrum 
of the target area. In addition, the intelligence process was 
adjusted to support 48 and 72-hour decision-making cycles, and 
as the command cycle became faster the intelligence process still 
received enough material but it began to skip over some stages, 
so that the end products deteriorated in quality. The US Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) began to define the commander's 
information needs in the course of UNOSOM II, and in effect 
took control over intelligence. This meant that the operation's 
intelligence process lost its tactical-level control, i.e. JTF 
intelligence control. Attempts were made to solve distribution 
problems by means of liaison officers, as in UNPROFOR, the aim 
being to achieve a process that was almost in accordance with 
Lawson's model, although this situation was never reached 
entirely.32° 
An IPB intelligence process was applied to evaluation of the media 
impact and the planning of its exploitation in the case of the Haiti 
operation. This process provided the commander with an 
evaluation of the objects of media interest and their needs and 
impact and gave intelligence justification for producing the 
necessary background material. At the same time it produced a 
list of things and targets that should be concealed from the 
media, on the grounds of the confidentiality of operations and 
the safety of the troops — Command and Control Warfare.321  The 
JTF-190 intelligence process in the Haiti operation began with an 
analysis of the capacity of the intelligence system to fulfil its task 
of exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the system. The 
conditions in Haiti were such that instead of an order of battle 
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the troops needed an evaluation of the current situation, an 
evaluation of its probable development and a geological estimate. 
One essential factor for the success of the process was co-operation 
inside the intelligence centre that would be concentrated around 
the all-source analysis group as this combined the data obtained 
from the various sources. The duty officer held internal co-
ordination meetings in the centre at which evaluations were 
made of both the current situation and the intelligence products, 
future activities were planned and it was confirmed that the 
process was generating products that were in accordance with 
the declared information needs.322 
One of the basic duties of intelligence within IFOR was to take 
part in the targeting process. The organization responsible for this 
process was the Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board, which 
combined the work of headquarters departments CJ-2, CJ-3 and 
CJ-5 and was inspected once a month. The objects targeted varied 
from geographical areas and structures to institutions, which 
were classified into those to be destroyed and those to be taken 
over. LANDCENT could also name as a target a function or 
object that was to be protected from one of the parties to the 
conflict or from a particular action. In Haiti all levels of command 
took part in the targeting process, in accordance with the doctrine, 
and attempts were made to check the location of each target by 
HUMINT and CI methods. The process was developed to 
comprise both technical sensors and human observations of the 
most important sites.323 
5.4 THE ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
Experience suggests that determining the organization of 
intelligence services is a highly problematical matter, as officially no 
such organization exists and information is communicated in accordance 
with the command structure. This problematical nature of 
intelligence is well illustrated by the arrangements that 
accompanied the operations in Somalia. In UNOSOM II, for 
instance, the UN had JDISS terminals operating in five towns in 
addition to Mogadishu and could, according to Smith, have 
received intelligence support from the United States, but was 
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unwilling to accept this because UN Headquarters did not trust 
the information provided by US military intelligence. This 
scepticism had arisen partly on account of the unsuccessful US 
attempt at abducting General Aideed on 3rd October 1993, in 
which intelligence had been unable to support the commander 
of the raid by creating and maintaining an accurate description 
of the situation (1-Process) or by formulating an updated 
evaluation of the existing threat (2-Decide). The initial situation 
was complicated still further by the reluctance of the United 
States to share intelligence with the UN previously, during 
UNOSOM I. According to the report by Connors, UN 
Headquarters was able to support the commanders of the 
operations in the decisions that they had to make (2-Decide) by 
means of the JDISS system, acquiring information from the US 
National Military Command Center and National Military Joint 
Information Center.324 
As the area of intelligence responsibility of the US European 
Command (USEUCOM) covers not only Europe but also parts of 
Africa and the Middle East, the USEUCOM Yugoslavian Joint 
Planning Cell (YJPC), as part of the Operations Planning Division, 
was engaged in analysing the situation in the former Yugoslavia 
and evaluating the possibilities for the United States to react to 
events there. This use of the YJPC represented the first experiment 
in combining crisis management planning with JTF operations, 
its purpose being to plan and direct intelligence simultaneously 
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. After 1993 the 
planning cell set up more or less permanent offices in Sarajevo 
and Kiseljak in Bosnia and in Split and Zagreb in Croatia to 
provide a service for the US, NATO and UN forces. In some 
cases the YJPC would send a liaison officer into the field to assist 
the UNPROFOR troops, e.g. in interpreting U-2 images (IMINT, 
2-Decide), or to assist UN officials and UNPROFOR officers in 
negotiations with the US command authorities.3u One of the 
USEUCOM intelligence centres, the Joint Analysis Centre (JAC) 
at RAF Molesworth (Fig. 9), provides support for both US and 
NATO troops in the SACEUR responsibility area and has in 
practice been distributing its products to US and allied troops in 
the context of the Yugoslavian peace support operations. More 
recently its support has also been extended to forces supervising 
the No-Fly Zone in Iraq, the operations in Albania and Zaire and 
the UNTAES and SFOR missions. The Operations Division is 
responsible for situational intelligence and the distribution of 
information, e.g. early warnings and updates of the maritime 
situation, while the Analysis Division is responsible for analysed 
products, the Command and Control Warfare Division for 
targeting and task organization and the IMINT Division for 
IMINT analyses. The Multinational Intelligence Co-ordination 
Center (MICC) accepts requests for support and directs 
intelligence accordingly, while the LOCE Division is responsible 
for data transmission to the various parts of the intelligence 
architecture and for providing the groups of liaison officers with 
the necessary information technology.326 
Figure 9. Composition of the USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center327 
As a form of national support, the United States included the 
Task Force CI Coordinating Authority as a CI and HUMINT 
element in the Provide Promise operation, and a six-person 
counter-intelligence group from this element was seconded to the 
headquarters of this operation in Zagreb. A group of similar 
composition was also used in the Support Hope operation in 
Ruanda in June 1994, when the detachment consisted of 36 persons. 
In the IFOR mission, counter-intelligence officers were used for 
maintaining contacts with local police and military authorities in 
matters of counter-intelligence and for exchanging information 
when participating in situation assessments at the various IFOR 
headquarters. The active involvement of these liaison officers and 
CI/HUMINT groups ensured that intelligence would be linked 
with command functions.328 When the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) 
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arrived in the former Yugoslavia in June 1995, there were two 
planning groups engaged in preparing its deployment and 
activities, one in Zagreb, Croatia, and the other in Kiseljak, Bosnia. 
The RRF was reliant initially on the UNPROFOR troops and 
command structure already established in the area for their 
command and services functions, and in the same way its 
intelligence was dependent on the UN system. The RRF operational 
command was located in headquarters maintained by the British 
Royal Marines in Kiseljak, and a NATO-based intelligence centre 
for the Bosnia area, run mostly by the Americans, was located in 
the same place, so that it naturally also produced information 
required by the RRF (1-Process,2-Decide).329 
Figure 10. Composition of LANDCENT CJ-2 ?° 
The commander at IFOR command headquarters was 
assisted in the synchronisation of air and ground operations by a 
Battlefield Co-ordination Element (BCE), and it was the 
responsibility of intelligence to keep the various elements up to 
date with the actions and plans of the parties to the conflict, 
communicate battle damage assessments (BDAs) to the 
commander of the ground element and supervise the passage 
and availability of intelligence information to the air commander. 
The final task was to assist in updating targeting data.331 The 
organization of the intelligence section of LANDCENT at IFOR 
command headquarters is described in Figure 10. The head of 
intelligence was in command of the section and was responsible 
to the IFOR commander for the organization of intelligence 
services. The actual products were the work of the Production 
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Cell, one officer from which was located in the Joint Operations 
Centre (JOC) to ensure appropriate joint direction of intelligence 
and the operation itself. The Collection Cell maintained the 
intelligence architecture, monitored intelligence requirements and 
synchronized the use of resources, while the Targeting Cell took 
part in the targeting process and constructed battle damage 
assessments (BDAs). The Plans, Ops & Policy Cell participated in 
the planning of future operational activities under the leadership 
of the planning section (CJ-5), and the CI & Sy Branch maintained 
the security situation and organization for the operation and 
produced information for the use of other intelligence bodies. 
Geographic Support was responsible for cartographic services 
for the operation and for specialized analyses connected with 
these. SIGINT was subordinated to the operational section (CJ-3) 
as a part of command and control warfare planning and 
management. Co-ordination of electronic warfare was assigned 
to a separate Electronic Combat Signals Cell, which was located 
physically within the intelligence section but was subordinate to 
the operational section. Personnel duties were designated in such 
a manner that each individual was responsible for the 
implementation of one part of the intelligence process, for some 
specialized branch of intelligence and for contacts with his own 
country's SIGINT systems. The British officer, for instance, was 
responsible for contacts with command bodies subordinate to 
IFOR, for the analysis of ground operations intelligence and for 
maintaining the ground forces' electronic operational chain of 
command.332 
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Figure 11. Composition of the IFOR Electronic Combat Signals Cella" 
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The United States made abundant use of CI and HUMINT 
resources in order to ensure the security of its troops in the 
operations carried out in the 1990's, deploying no less than 110 
persons in this capacity in Bosnia, for example. The need for this 
arose out of experiences with previous operations, so that efforts 
were made in Bosnia to apply all the regulations and methods 
laid down in the relevant directives. The CI and HUMINT functions 
of the multinational division led by the United States were implemented 
as an integrated whole, with four-person CI/HUMINT groups 
providing support for the battalions and the division. The 
resources were even increased for a time in connection with the 
elections in autumn 1996, and liaison officer support was extended 
to the Polish-Nordic brigade. Separate standing procedures were 
laid down for this operation'334 in which the intelligence section 
at the divisional headquarters coordinated all the division's CI 
and HUMINT functions. This procedure was an adaptation of 
the centralized command of HUMINT activities practised by the 
United States335,  the Joint Doctrine and the TTP directives, 
although it could not be applied in its entirety, as the division 
possessed only ground and air components. The practical 
consequence of this was the provision of small J2X elements in 
the US National Intelligence Command as part of the ARRC 
headquarters in Sarajevo and within the intelligence section of 
the G2X multinational division (Fig. 12). One significant feature 
of this arrangement was that there was no intelligence force 
subordinate to the G2X division, but rather it coordinated all 
divisional, IFOR and national HUMINT activity in its area of 
responsibility and maintained contact with the ARRC.336 
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Force Eagle 33' 
It was the USCENTCOM intelligence department that 
established the intelligence protocol for UNOSOM II in Somalia, 
with strategic support provided in the form of a national 
intelligence support team (NIST). Operational support was 
produced by the USCENTCOM intelligence centre, which was in 
this case responsible for formulation of the military strategy, 
while the intelligence section of the JTF headquarters for the 
operation functioned at the tactical level, synchronizing and 
combining the higher-level information and that obtained from 
the operation itself to provide a situation description for the use 
of the commander. A fourth level was formed by the troops 
engaged in implementing the intelligence activities. Intelligence 
within the operation was organized on the basis of evaluations of 
the situation (METT-T), the size of staff permitted under the 
mandate, the logistic capacity and the infrastructure available in 
Somalia. The outcome was a mixture of staff and materials that 
proved inadequate for the task at hand. The reasons for this lay 
with the METT-T process, the planning principles available, the 
priorities laid down for USCENTCOM intelligence and the poor 
preparation of the Somalian operation.338 
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Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) began its preparations 
for the Haiti operation by sending 15% of its staff to the joint 
intelligence centres (JICs) requiring support to undertake 
instruction and training duties. This meant that the lower levels 
in the command structure could be introduced to the intelligence 
updating arrangements, the acquisition of data, targeting, analysis 
of the operational chain of command, computerized data 
processing and telecommunications. These people were then able 
to act as liaison officers at the relevant headquarters, bases and 
embassies during the operation. Each JTF was reinforced with a 
national intelligence support team (NIST), which contained 
personnel from the DIA, CIA and NSA, and these teams were 
supplemented with groups of liaison officers from the local 
command, with a view to both furnishing additional skills and 
providing additional information. The teams were equipped with 
user interfaces of the kinds laid down in the protocol.339 
The hard core and leadership of the Haiti operation was 
formed by the XVIII Airborne Corps, JTF-180, and the framework 
of its intelligence system was provided by the 525th Intelligence 
Brigade. The principal intelligence task was to accumulate enough 
situational data to ensure the safety of the operation's own 
troops310 , and from this point of view the starting point for the 
preparations was the worst possible, an intervention by force. 
The brigade's Analytic and Control Element (ACE) set up a joint 
intelligence centre (JIC) for the area covered by the operation on 
USS Mt. Whitney, while the part of the operation remaining on 
the mainland, at Fort Bragg, was the Corps Military Intelligence 
Support Element (CMISE), intended to provide backing for the 
513th Intelligence Brigade in accordance with the split-based 
design. The idea behind this was to ensure continuity of 
intelligence at all stages in the operation, and particularly at 
times of troop movements. The CMISE intelligence centre began 
preparing its back-up operations in October 1993, and activities 
were intensified from January 1994 onwards, reaching a peak in 
March 1994, with exercises in preparation for the JTF-180 
operation. All this time the intelligence centre was producing 
additional background data for planning purposes and taking 
part in the training of the troops. The essential aspects of the 
preparations as far as intelligence was concerned were the creation 
of databases, the compiling of information from national sources 
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and practical preliminaries for implementation of the split-based 
design. 
The intelligence centre sent intelligence support elements 
(ISEs) to all the forces entering the operation as they moved to 
their stations, and preparations for the elements to be deployed 
along with JTF-180 reached their climax with the assessment of 
the situation in Haiti produced by the back-up intelligence centre 
on 10.9.1994, after which preparations began to be made for 
commencing the operation within ten days. Once this situational 
assessment had been made, the personnel began working round 
the clock to extend the centre's acquisition of data to other 
intelligence systems in order to be able to produce broad 
assessments for the commander's use. For this purpose teams of 
officers were seconded to it from all the branches of the armed 
services and other intelligence organizations. This meant that the 
intelligence centre was able to provide support for the operation 
until such time as the ACE centre on USS Mt. Whitney was ready 
to assume command. A four-person team of CMISE liaison officers 
was then located in the JTF-180 operational centre to ensure 
communication between it, the intelligence department and the 
CMISE. The liaison officers' duties and the places where they 
were stationed varied as the operation proceeded, but all the 
groups had ASAS Warrior terminals with them with the necessary 
databases, chains of command and IMINT products installed. It 
was through these groups that the intelligence centres gained 
access to national-level information and services such as the 
armies' daily intelligence surveys. The SIGINT liaison officer 
served on USS Mt. Whitney throughout the operation, distributing 
the information that had been acquired and analysed to the 
operational command and the JTF through electronic channels. 
When JTF-190 assumed responsibility for intelligence after the 
landing on Haiti, the back-up intelligence centre continued in its 
support function and also served as an alternative intelligence 
centre in a more general sense.341  The intelligence work required 
in the operation itself was carried out by the 110th Intelligence 
Battalion, which was equipped for counter-intelligence, long-
range intelligence patrols and the formation of liaison teams, 
while teams A and B of the 3rd Special Force Group was available 
for more demanding operations, including counter-intelligence, 
for which the teams were spread over 27 locations. Actual troop 
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intelligence support was arranged by the 519th/525th Intelligence 
Brigade, and additional information was gathered by the 16th 
Military Police Brigade, these troops being engaged mainly in 
counter-intelligence and the interrogation of Haitians placed 
under arrest. 
The main tasks of the joint intelligence centre (JIC) set up 
within JTF-190, itself formed by the 10th Mountain Division, 
were the issuing of indications and warnings, reporting, 
construction of threat analyses, planning of directions for the 
acquisition of information, analysis of information generated by 
the all-source system and targeting, and the centre had a 
comprehensive, efficient intelligence architecture for the execution 
of these duties. Darren Sawyer mentions as the success factors 
behind the Haiti operation the training and instruction provided, 
the experience that the intelligence centre possessed, the wide 
range of expertise contained within the intelligence architecture 
and the skill shown by the commanders. The intelligence forces 
that were available were evidently well suited to the task» It 
should be remembered that every act of setting up an intelligence 
centre is a unique event. 
The joint intelligence centre for JTF-190 was located in an 
industrial building in Port-au-Prince, and the premises were 
arranged so that every room had facilities for pinning the 
necessary maps, photographs and diagrams on the wall. The 
terminals and communications devices were installed with LAN 
connections as well as AC/DC electricity supplies, but as 
deliveries of some of the material were delayed, priority had to 
be given initially to the distribution of JDISS terminals. The 
support groups (JSE and NIST) brought the equipment that they 
needed with them. Experiences gained in the course of the 
operation suggest that more training should be provided in the 
use of the JDISS system, the arrangements for dealing with 
requests for intelligence support should be explained in detail to 
all those concerned and the groups of liaison officers and other 
ancillary staff should be located in the intelligence centre from 
the preparation stage onwards.344  The means for gathering 
intelligence, i.e. the individual groups, were controlled from the 
tactical operations centre (TOC) of the 519th MI Battalion, 
employing radio, telephone and Gold Wing systems. The 
command drew up summaries of the process twice every 24 
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hours and communicated these to the JTF-190 intelligence centre. 
Following withdrawal of the US intervention forces at the 
beginning of April 1995, the UN-led UNMIH operation received 
intelligence support from the Military Intelligence Support Team 
located at its headquarters.345 
The US troops setting out for Bosnia, Somalia and other UN 
missions received training in intelligence and security in addition 
to conventional peacekeeping duties, the intelligence aspect 
comprising the construction of unconventional intelligence plans, 
individualized intelligence duties, recognition, troop intelligence 
and the dissemination of information. Likewise, it was laid down 
that the regular duties of a battalion included the construction of 
intelligence plans for each stage in the operation and 
implementation of these plans in accordance with UN principles. 
In view of experiences in Macedonia, it was also stated that 
intelligence practices in operations carried out under stable 
conditions should be adaptations of classical combat 
reconnaissance, e.g. omitting clandestine elements.346 
The DANORP report maintains that the work of the 
UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP headquarters could have been 
facilitated if UN doctrines and tactical instructions had been 
available that applied to all countries. The headquarters of the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Command, on the other hand, was set up 
with due attention paid to these problems, and the framework 
for it was derived from the NATO Northern Army Group, so 
that it had experience of working together, of the decision-making 
process and of the use of a common language. It was felt important 
that the headquarters staff should be similar in background, 
working morale and accepted headquarters procedures, and that 
particular emphasis should be placed on the training of 
intelligence officers, as the training of a skilled intelligence officer for 
a particular aspect of the work can take years. One of the major 
problems in multinational operations is linguistic skills. One 
example of this is the chain of reporting adopted by UNPROFOR, 
in which information travelled from Sarajevo to Zagreb and 
from there to New York, each report being rewritten three times in 
the course of this process in wording chosen by writers of vastly 
differing language ability, leading to a substantial deterioration 
in the reliability, comprehensibility and usefulness of the 
intelligence information provided.347 
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5.5 INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS 
As Lt.-Gen. Rose puts it, a correct picture of the situation (1-
Process) and an awareness of the limitations affecting one's own 
actions (2-Decide) can help to prevent false expectations arising 
in higher command circles and provide solid information on 
which to base strategic decisions at UN Headquarters and at the 
national level (2-Decide). This is particularly true of media reports 
regarding sensational events in the area of operations, a process 
in which the general public emerges, through the agency of the 
media, as a major factor influencing strategic decisions. Sarajevo 
Market Place I and II, for instance, taking place on 14.2.1994 and 
28.8.1995 respectively, were isolated events that gained strategic 
importance on account of their treatment in the media. In each 
case the UN reaction was elicited primarily by a media outburst 
rather than by a thoroughgoing investigation.348 
In the case of the Haiti operation the JTF-190 commander 
defined his intelligence needs, which were then adapted to the 
methods available, by a process that led to the construction of a 
synchronization table for intelligence activities. The commander 
of the UNITAF operation in Somalia set as his intelligence needs 
(1) to be able to locate heavy armaments maintained in the area 
by parties to the conflict, (2) to be able to predict the probable 
actions of local political and military persons, (3) to be able to 
identify internal and external threats to the troops engaged in the 
operation, and (4) to be able to locate minefields. The requirements 
were also defined at the technical level in order to ensure receipt 
of the necessary information. Co-ordination was the responsibility 
of the JTF intelligence branch. On the other hand, when the 
operation became UNOSOM II, its commander, General Bir from 
Turkey, was unable to direct its intelligence activities as the 
system was mainly American.m9 
At one time the situations centre of the DPKO at UN 
Headquarters used to issue weekly summaries of strategic 
decisions regarding operations in progress, but the production 
and large-scale distribution of these had to be discontinued 
because certain permanent members of the Security Council were 
attempting to politicize them, by removing information or using 
it for their own purposes, with the intention of influencing the 
decisions that were taken. Instead, the duty staff of the situations 
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centres took to issuing a brief daily report of one or two pages on 
the previous day's events for individual operations such as 
UNPF.310  As far as the support provided during operations is 
concerned, Ratner notes that the UN Secretariat did not distribute 
detailed information on the progress of UNTAC but relied instead 
on the content of the Secretary-General's periodic report, a practice 
that he believed failed to meet the needs of either the Security 
Council or the command process within the operation itself. 
Smith goes as far as to mention the nature of operational-level 
intelligence as one reason why the UN failed to achieve a dialogue 
between the warring parties in the UNTAC framework.351  
The operational support provided by USEUCOM included 
information on the background to the conflict, the history of the 
region and progress in intelligence practices. Its Yugoslavian 
Joint Planning Cell (YJPC), for instance, recorded data on 
movements of heavy armaments in the Bosnia region, their 
volumes and the command relations in a separate database, the 
same model as was adopted for monitoring the flow of refugees 
in Ruanda. The cell also generated analyses of Yugoslavian 
history, culture and politics as a basis for strategic decision-
making (2-Decide) and time-bound alternative scenarios for the 
development of the operation or the practical situation for 
decision-making at the operational level (2-Decide), incorporating 
analyses of combat strengths and deployments and the build-up 
of forces as a function of time. At the tactical level, the cell 
supported decision-making (2-Decide) by analysing the terrain 
and evaluating the performance capacity of given weapons 
systems under the conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia. In spite 
of the acclimatization that had already taken place, the planning 
cell realized that it had interpreted the gathering of groups of 
people in school yards in connection with the capture of Srebrenica 
as being "in the nature of a demonstration" when these had in 
fact been troops belonging to the Serb army in Bosnia. The lesson 
to be learned was that strategic-level information and events in low-
level conflicts can depart entirely from the scales to which one is 
accustomed. The strategic-level change at Srebrenica was brought 
about by the introduction of ten or so tanks. One notable 
drawback, however, was felt to be the fact that there was no one 
in the field (HUMINT) to corroborate the information obtained 
by technical means, and as a result the YJPC was unable to 
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construct an entirely reliable picture of the situation (1-Process).352 
USEUCOM's JAC intelligence centre was engaged round 
the clock in producing situationally and spatially bound advanced 
warning data for the troops in its area which could be 
communicated to SFOR, for instance, by radio. The centre also 
responded to requests for support from the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force in Sarajevo and exchanged information 
with its own team of liaison officers. One further significant task 
was to supply data for the construction of US and NATO marine 
defence situation reports. Its Analytical Division also produced 
daily analyses of current events which were distributed to users 
in the same manner as advanced warnings, while its Command 
and Control Warfare Division was responsible for targeting and 
the formation of the operational chain of command in Europe 
and produced analyses of the weapons systems in use in its area 
of operation. The JAC intelligence centre was able to receive and 
process IMINT data from U-2 aircraft and from national systems. 
The Multinational Intelligence Co-ordination Centre (MICC) co-
ordinated intelligence support for the IFOR operation from the 
beginning, responding to some 500 requests in the course of a 
year. The co-ordinating body was responsible for distributing 
intelligence obtained from national sources among the NATO 
countries, and this took place rapidly, as the officers concerned 
had direct contacts with their own defence ministries. The system 
was of considerable significance when western civilians had to 
be evacuated in response to the Albanian crisis, for instance.353 
USEUCOM experiences confirm the vital importance of being 
able to inform decision-makers of the objectives and intentions 
of the parties to a conflict (2-Decide). There have been some 
peacekeeping missions in which this was not possible, so that the 
intelligence service was forced to placate its clients with large 
quantities of information irrespective of quality. USEUCOM has 
also felt at times that it is competing with the media in terms of 
the speed of communication, to the extent that news reaches the 
people in their living rooms before it reaches the commander a few 
kilometres away from the scene of the event. It is essential to be able 
to point intelligence sensors in directions dictated by the troops' 
information needs, and the definition of precise priorities in this 
respect is of particular importance because the national systems 
are obliged to serve two masters, their own governments and the 
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UN. The YJPC, for instance, was in a situation of having its 
priorities determined for it where support for command processes 
was concerned, as the United States already had about a dozen 
operations in progress in the area of the former Yugoslavia before 
IFOR began." 
- 	Force protection: air defence systems threatening US troops 
in Macedonia and Zagreb and NATO airborne operations. 
- 	Ground truth: to ascertain what the parties to the conflict 
are really doing. 
- 	Air operation support: target selection and battle damage 
assessment (BDA). 
- Support for the planning of NATO ground forces: planning 
of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. 
- 	Support for operations by UN peacekeeping forces. 
Products of the intelligence services were used to support 
the UN troops escorting UNPROFOR convoys of humanitarian 
aid by providing situation assessments (1-Process) and threat 
evaluations (2-Decide), the aim being to keep them informed of 
the routes available to them and of potential crisis points. 
Demands for situation assessments then increased with the arrival 
of the RRF, and intelligence was now required to provide 
estimates of the threat to it (force protection) and the information 
required for planning and executing its tasks (1-Process, 2-Decide). 
Some of this information was obtained from NGOs. It is said that 
UNPROFOR finally lost control over the combat situation (1-
Process) in Lt.-Gen. Rose's time because of the restrictions placed 
on the intelligence systems to be used and distribution of the 
information generated by them (2-Decide). During the hostage 
crisis of May 1995, for example, it was extremely difficult to gain 
an adequate impression of what was going on. This was due to 
the small numbers of intelligence personnel in the field and the 
lack of people who could be rapidly released from one assignment 
and seconded to another.355 
The national intelligence organizations within IFOR suffered 
from the problem that not all the existing information on the 
operation was made available to them, the same problem that 
afflicted the Mogadishu and Fort Drum organizations within 
UNITAF. In the case of IFOR, short-term situation assessments 
could be formulated on the basis of information acquired and co- 
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operation between intelligence services, but there was little point 
in distributing these in graphical or textual form because a proper 
understanding of the results would have called for personal 
experience in the field. Individual events and products, together 
with conclusions and digital illustrations, could be communicated 
to users within four hours of the occurrence at the fastest, so that 
in the case of the Usora Bridge explosion in August 1996, for 
instance, details of the event were at the commanders' disposal 
before they had reached the CNN. One factor that increased the 
amount of work involved in intelligence reports was the need to 
communicate everything in two forms, one in accordance with 
the command structure of the operation itself and the other in 
accordance with the national structure.356 
When LANDCENT was acting as the command headquarters 
of IFOR, its intelligence department received and evaluated 
intelligence products both from within the operation itself and 
from outside and distributed its forecasts on both an immediate 
time-scale (0-24h) and for the future (24-96h). These were intended 
to provide an evaluation of the current situation and to present 
estimates of possible developments, and were distributed to 
COMIFOR, the headquarters, the commanders of the ground 
and air forces and SHAPE. In view of experiences during 
Operation Deny Flight, a facility was developed at NATO's 
SHAPE headquarters by which "clients" could access the 
intelligence products they needed from an electronic notice 
board357 . The source material for these evaluations was obtained 
from NATO Headquarters, the operation's own headquarters, 
the command headquarters of the different branches, national 
sources, IFOR troops and open sources, and particular emphasis 
in their construction was laid on the importance of joint action, 
so that intelligence could be directed in a manner that conformed 
with operational needs, intelligence would be able to participate 
in the wargaming aspect of planning and intelligence would be 
able to influence future trends in the commanders' information 
requirements. 
The evaluations produced by intelligence were distributed 
as parts of the Intelligence Summaries and Assessment Reports 
products in accordance with the day's schedule. Battle damage 
assessments were drawn up by the Joint Targeting Cell as part of 
the targeting process, while the CI-INTSUM and CI-INTREP 
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reports issued by counter-intelligence contained matrices of 
information on threats facing the operation's own troops and the 
needs for protection, the current protection situation for the troops 
and counter-intelligence, and forecasts and instructions for the 
troops. These reports were distributed to the command 
headquarters of the various branches, the Allied Military 
Intelligence Battalion and SHAPE. One example of products that 
were regarded as being of particularly high quality was the set of 
medium and long-term forecasts drawn up in connection with 
the elections in autumn 1996. Similarly, promising experiences 
were gained with the combining of information in IFOR and 
SFOR, e.g. the combining of all HUMINT information on the 
operation in the C2X intelligence centre in Sarajevo. The uniting of 
national forces for the combination of intelligence data has proved to be 
an exceptionally efficient solution.358 
The problems largely concerned distribution of the 
information, as no standard distribution list was ever drawn up, 
and it was this that led to accusations from national intelligence 
organizations that not all the data processed within the operation 
were being divulged to them. The barriers to efficient distribution 
included the sheer bulk of information generated, the numerous 
levels of command that existed both vertically and horizontally, 
and naturally the speed of reporting, which made it impossible 
to implement distribution in the "everything to everybody" 
manner laid down in the initial doctrines. At the same time, the 
non-NATO countries suffered from the problem that they were 
denied access to the CRONOS system, and when the majority of 
the data in the possession of the SFOR headquarters was 
transferred to a LAN/WAN network these countries had neither 
the necessary terminals nor the authorization to use such material. 
This problem had been realized at the DSACEUR level in October 
1996, but it still had not been solved by April 1997.359  In the case 
of the violation of the protective zone at Srebrenica on 5.-11.7.1995, 
for instance, it would have been possible to have a warning of 
the threat in the form of a revised situation assessment, as both 
American and French intelligence was aware of the Serbs' 
intention to attack the town, but Raevsky maintains that these 
countries refused to release the information because France and 
Britain were accusing the United States of favouring the Muslim 
government. General Janvier was informed in his capacity "as a 
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French officer" but not as commander of the UNPF. Smith 
indicates as one explanation for this procedure the fact that 
members of the peacekeeping forces of certain UNPROFOR 
countries had leaked information to the party that the country in 
question favoured.360 
UNITAF intelligence reported that the available databases 
were incomplete with respect to both maps and the georeferencing 
system, and the basic data for producing threat scenarios were 
also deficient. No one properly understood the local politics or 
the importance of the clans when the Somalian operation began, 
and the supporting intelligence sources were inclined to view 
the situation "through western eyes" and failed to comprehend 
that for the Somalis the dispute over Aideed was one between 
rival clans, for they did not see the problem as personified in one 
individual. The presentation of intelligence findings followed an 
adaptation of the protocol for LIC operations, and the tactical 
signs failed to correspond to the established practice. The result 
was that intelligence was able to issue early warnings only on a 
very limited regional basis and could not aspire to broad-based 
generalizable predictions or evaluations. Again the fears of UN 
member states and organizations regarding leaked information 
were by no means unfounded, to the extent that Smith claims 
that the armed confrontation in Somalia in October 1993 arose on 
account of a UN communications failure, i.e. an information 
leak. Incidents of this kind do not encourage national intelligence 
organizations to divulge sensitive information, for fear of their 
sources being revealed, the information between used by 
recipients to their own ends and the creation of "problems of 
hygiene" in areas close to the source nation's own borders.361  
Widespread dissemination of information during the UNOSOM 
II operation was prevented by US legislation, which meant that 
the officers of the intelligence support element (ISE) at 
USCENTCOM acting within Operation Continue Hope were 
unable to provide support for the UNOSOM II commander and 
his American deputy. Attempts were made to resolve this 
question in a variety of ways, but the difficulties were 
compounded by the manner in which the intelligence architecture 
had been formed and the vast geographical area to be covered. 
US legislation prevented the ISE from being placed under the 
command of the American general who was vice-commander of 
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UNOSOM II on account of the fact that he was subordinate to the 
UN.362 
Distribution of strategic and operational-level intelligence 
products on Haiti was constructed around the JWICS and JDISS, 
which meant that the force's intelligence wing was in direct 
connection with the National Military Joint Intelligence Centre 
and the intelligence branches of the various armed services. The 
intelligence architecture made it possible to transmit data, IMINT 
images, graphics and video images at the tactical level as well, 
and the JDISS provided IMINT analysis facilities and provided 
the tactical command levels with direct access to strategic-level 
national databases, the distribution of products and the office 
automation software system. The information requirements of 
the operation determined the contact requirements according to 
which the communications network was developed. The back-
up intelligence centre for Haiti (CMISE) was to a great extent 
concerned with all-source analysis for monitoring of the overall 
situation, and was directed by a group of its own that drew up 
an independent matrix for distribution of its products. This took 
account of the categories, levels and users of information and 
was developed into a stepwise data acquisition synchronization 
table for operational planning purposes. This ensured that the 
users' information needs were met when designing intelligence 
activities. 
The analytical work was concentrated in the ACE, which 
produced a Daily Intelligence Summary (DISU) and fortnightly 
digests. Two situation reviews per day were arranged at the 
back-up intelligence centre during preparations for the operation, 
in addition to which it issued information for users at 12-hour 
intervals and ensured that its bulletins had reached their 
destination by supervising the distribution process. Information 
was distributed to the lower levels of command in accordance 
with the intelligence architecture. Once the operation had begun, 
intelligence reviews were sent out at two-hour intervals, and the 
airborne troops taking part in the landing were provided with a 
last-minute situation update for the target area, including the 
movements of key figures, immediately before entering their 
aircraft. Once responsibility had been taken over by the 
intelligence centre on board USS Mt. Whitney, the back-up centre 
at Fort Bragg began producing long-term evaluations that went 
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into the history of Haiti, recent events there and the effects of the 
operation, with the objective of constructing a strategic forecast. 
The invasion force (JTF-190) received subsequent support in the 
form of various matrices and diagrams, which concentrated on 
counter-intelligence. 
Ten days after the commencement of the operation the JTF-
190 Intelligence Battalion was able to produce a list of Haitians 
likely to pose a threat to the troops and a diagram of their 
whereabouts. Direction of the acquisition of this data was based 
on adaptation of the products to the known intelligence needs, 
and to these ends co-ordination meetings were arranged at the 
intelligence command point that were attended by liaison officers 
or representatives from all the troops involved in the intelligence 
system and contacts from other supporting organizations. These 
meetings discussed the situation as it was at that moment, the 
current phase of intelligence operations and their plans and the 
stated information requirements, and were acknowledged to have 
increased synergy within the intelligence system and allowed 
more efficient use to be made of resources.363 
5.6 INTELLIGENCE METHODS 
Perhaps the most frequently used of the open sources of 
information has been the television, particularly the CNN channel, 
which was watched regularly by intelligence officers at the 
situations centre in UN Headquarters, those on USS Mt. Whitney 
and those of the LANDCENT intelligence centre. One purpose of 
this close monitoring was to check on possible erroneous 
information contained in its reports, especially regarding losses 
among UN forces. The principal source in terms of the volume of 
information acquired, however, has been the press, which 
primarily offers a suitable means of monitoring the political and 
economic situation in a country over longer periods of time. 
Also, by combining details from newspaper articles it is possible 
to extract vital information on changes in personnel among the 
military leadership of a country, in its parliament or at the 
battlefront. Reports in local newspapers can provide information 
on new weapons acquired by the parties to a conflict, 
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appointments, organizations and operations. It is essential, of 
course, to bear in mind that military details contained in the 
media will often be inexact, even to the point of constituting 
disinformation.364 
A separate set of sources consists of the news agencies, so 
that practically all the intelligence units functioning in the former 
Yugoslavia received the bulletins issued by the news agencies 
either directly or through offices of their own. The political 
analysis team at UNPF Headquarters, for instance, compiled 
daily press summaries covering current events together with 
trends deducible from long-term monitoring or forecasts of future 
development in the situation, usually the political situation. These 
summaries were distributed both by the UN staff and offices and 
by the Zagreb embassies of the participating member nations, 
and extracts from them were published as media analyses in the 
operation's own UN magazine, as was done by Mark Thompson 
in his UNPROFOR News columns,365 and similarly in Haiti. 
Another comparable product was the "Night Owl" report of 
information carried by the local press, radio and television drawn 
up daily for the commander of the IFOR US division. This also 
contained facts that were believed to be of interest to commanders 
at the tactical level and was distributed on the open 
communications network.366 
Theses and dissertations submitted in the course of officer 
training should also be exploited when compiling basic data. 
Some such dissertations produced in the United States contained 
accounts of military strengths, performance capacities and 
weaknesses that could have been of use for intelligence purposes 
in Yugoslavia, Somalia or other regions, and proper use of these 
could have done much to extend both general knowledge of the 
areas concerned and also the capabilities of the staff for operating 
there. They could also have helped in constructing surveys of the 
interests of the major powers in certain regions, e.g. the British 
interest in the Bosnian war or US policies in the Balkans as a 
whole. Collaboration between civilian and military intelligence 
organizations took place at the sectoral and operational 
headquarters levels within the UNPF, with the involvement of 
political officers, analysis and assessment units and heads of 
civil affairs on the civilian side and military observers, 
headquarters intelligence offices and policy and planning offices 
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on the military side. Such collaboration was highly unofficial in 
the Sarajevo sector, for example, and consisted mainly of 
conversations on daily events and alternative scenarios for future 
developments, while UNPF Headquarters served as an official 
analytical working group that met once a week to discuss 
developments in the situation in Yugoslavia and the co-ordination 
of coming activities. This collaboration was always based on the 
principle of confidential consultations between professionals. 
Much can be done to further a peacekeeping operation 
through well-timed, accurate publicity, and intelligence 
information can be used to provide support for the public 
information and information operation plans that form part of 
UN missions by similarly employing properly verified 
information to avoid erroneous conclusions and place events in 
their correct contexts (2-Decide)367 . The advance of the Information 
Society has meant that intelligence organizations and their 
practices have become more open, so that, as Lt.-Col. Moore 
points out, financial restrictions and demands have begun to be 
placed on intelligence, with the consequence that it will soon 
have to attract its own clients and serve its own community more 
conspicuously than at present. It is clear that the granting of 
resources in the future will depend on the impact that present-
day intelligence achieves.368 It is sometimes possible, of course, 
for intelligence to make use of the products of other organizations, 
e.g. the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which gathers 
information from refugees from the former Yugoslavia and from 
NGOs that have acquired it by their own efforts. Utilization of 
information acquired by the court or placed before it is not 
without problems, however, and the procedure can lead at the 
local level to the cancellation of agreements or even to threats of 
violence, as it can undermine confidence in aid organizations or 
even prevent them from operating successfully. Thus information 
gathered from this source should largely serve a confirmatory 
function and the command process should in no way be 
dependent on it.369 
At the strategic level, the intelligence office at UNPF 
Headquarters was in daily contact with both UN Headquarters 
and also the 5th Air Force and USEUCOM, in addition to which 
its officers received information on the political situation through 
their own embassies, while at the operational level it maintained 
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military contact with the liaison officers of the parties to the 
conflict and the UN military observers. The intelligence officers 
working for the observers took part in the morning briefings at 
the office and also received an unofficial updating at afternoon 
coffee, and collaboration in the sectoral headquarters followed a 
similar pattern. At the tactical level, collaboration was a question 
of the concrete combining of information and skills. The practice 
in the Sarajevo sector, for example, was to combine EW-assets, 
Cymbeline-countermortar radar, battalion and military observer 
intelligence and situational data and reviews obtained from 
neighbours and from the UNPF with information from the 
political sphere and news agencies to produce a daily situation 
assessment and an official communique for the day. 
When the RRF arrived in the region, its representatives, the 
MNB intelligence officer and the artillery commander also took 
part in the intelligence process. Very close, frank collaboration 
was maintained between the intelligence forces in the sector. 
HUMINT amongst the local population produced reliable 
information for the creation of situation assessments both in 
Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia (1-Process), with experience 
leading to the conclusion that more reliable information was 
forthcoming from women and children, and from observing their 
movements, than from people who supplied information in 
exchange for payment. The success of this HUMINT activity 
paved the way for the unhampered movement of troops and for 
co-operation with NGOs. Many intelligence officers criticized 
the accent placed on technical intelligence and the equipment 
required for this at the expense of HUMINT in spite of the 
experience that intelligence derived through patrolling was of 
greater service to the command and control process at the tactical 
level in peace support operations than was intelligence derived 
through technical means. The effectiveness of HUMINT is 
grounded in language skills, of course, which caused difficulties 
in Somalia, as each patrol had to have one person capable of 
speaking the language.370 American experiences in Somalia, Haiti 
and Bosnia indicate that counter-intelligence groups and 
interrogators are good at acquiring HUMINT information, as 
alongside their own specific functions, they can provide both 
military and civilian organizations with value information. The 
accent placed on counter-intelligence in the US armed forces is 
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understandable in the light of the suicide raid in Beirut, which 
still colours both their attitudes and their activities, and the 
approach adopted by the British is likewise influenced by 
experiences in Northern Ireland.371  
The traditional HUMINT techniques employed in peace 
support operations have been visual observation and patrolling 
by normal troops, but parties to conflicts have been increasingly 
apt to interfere with these functions by restricting the movement 
of patrols and observers, firing on personnel and jamming radio 
communications. In Sarajevo, for example, the warring factions 
intentionally directed the UN troops to the poorest observation 
posts and forbade them to built posts at the best sites, which 
detracted from the efficiency of intelligence, because it proved 
impossible in Yugoslavia, any more than in Somalia, to rely on 
technical aids for monitoring the use of mobile weapons systems 
such as 2S1 tank-mounted howitzers or combat tanks.372 UN 
military observers serve as the "commander's eyes and ears " at 
the field observation level, being persons with a certain level of 
military skill and experience who can be moved about rapidly 
over the whole area of operations. As Captain Madsen remarked 
in an interview, "Working as a UNMO is like a cat and mouse 
game. They try to hide things and we try to find them." It is 
essential for the observers to maintain credibility with the parties 
to the conflict by acting openly and honestly,373 although the 
creation of the Total Exclusion Zone in Sarajevo and the search 
for heavy weapons led to their being treated as spies and "tank-
hunters". Their principal task is to supervise the implementation 
of agreements and facilitate solution of the conflict at the local 
level. They must not be expected to gather data for targeting 
purposes, nor should their neutrality be called into question 3'4 
Of the British special forces, at least the Special Air Service 
(SAS) employed HUMINT methods in Bosnia. The SAS served 
as Joint Commission Observers (JCO), an organization set up by 
Lt.-Gen. Rose at the beginning of his period as commander in 
1993 that was directly subordinate to the UNPROFOR commander 
and whose chief acted as the commander's special advisor. The 
JCO groups were located in the sectoral and UNPROFOR 
headquarters, and their duties ranged from patrolling to 
intelligence and messenger functions. Their participation in 
patrols gave them a knowledge of local conditions, the area 
139 
covered by the operation and the local population and military, 
and their mobility as such was an expression of the UNPROFOR 
commander's demand for complete freedom of movement. Their 
intelligence work consisted mainly of confirming information 
received from other sources, but they were also engaged in 
acquiring real-time data on developments in the Srebrenica and 
Zepa protective zones for the UNPROFOR commander at the 
time of the Serb offensives (1-Process). The JCO groups also had 
preparatory and observational duties in support of the NATO air 
raids, and when the situation worsened towards the end of August 
1995, the group in Sarajevo was reinforced and air raid support 
and gunfire observation posts were set up.375 The information 
supplied by the special forces was detailed and in part ready 
analysed, and their intelligence products were regarded by 
UNPROFOR headquarters as extremely reliable. The JCO groups 
reported both to the UN headquarters responsible for the area 
concerned and to the command position, where the position's 
chief of command and intelligence officers together with the 
UNPROFOR intelligence officer drew up the necessary analyses 
and reports as a basis for the UNPROFOR commander's decisions 
(2-Decide) 376 
Experiences in Somalia were parallel to those in Yugoslavia. 
Here US special forces moved about relatively openly and 
associated with the population in order to acquire information 
on local conditions, and as they were not especially numerous, 
they were not perceived as a threat by the people.37 In the case of 
the Haiti operation, a reinforced Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (JSOTF) was formed, known as JTF 188, with a strength of 
2200 men from all branches of the armed services, which was 
responsible to the USACOM commander and was designed to 
have the duties of looking after the evacuation of civilians, 
supporting the prevention of movements by sea, direct action, 
unconventional warfare and special intelligence.378 When the 
operation was "softened" as of 19.9.1994, the majority of the 
JSOTF was recalled. In addition to the above duties, these troops 
were utilized mainly for intelligence and supervision purposes 
during the deployment phase. It had been learned from the 
operations in Somalia and Panama that these troops should not 
be used for "witch-hunting" in the target area, and in practice 
their duties were modified once the landing was complete to 
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comprise mainly humanitarian aid and resolution of the hostage 
situation. Also, it was these special forces that were employed on 
surveillance and intelligence missions in 27 towns in the area 
during the first week of the intervention, while the main troops 
remained in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. At this point it was 
realized that the United States did not have enough trained 
HUMINT personnel.371 The planning of the operation was in a 
way a test of the future Adaptive Joint Force Packaging principle, 
which involved locating specially formed units in the vicinity of 
potential crisis points. The main aspect requiring further attention 
as a result of these experiences was collaboration and the division 
of labour between the special operations forces, those responsible 
for civilian affairs and the PSYOP groups.38° 
SIGINT has yielded intelligence information for use at all 
levels of command in peace support operations. As far as the 
planning and preparation stages are concerned, the 
commencement of operations is usually hampered by a shortage 
of linguistically qualified EW operators, and the problems become 
still greater if the operation to be supported becomes prolonged. 
Problems of this kind were encountered equally frequently in 
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. Follow-up 
operations can be conducted with a smaller staff either from the 
home country or from their base. Ground-based EW units were 
employed in both UNPROFOR and IFOR, where the personnel 
were chiefly British or Canadian. Tactical EW failed to achieve the 
expected results in the former Yugoslavia, however, mostly on 
account of the efficient emission control and rigorous 
communications discipline (COMSEC/OPSEC) implemented by 
the parties to the conflict and the poor command of Serbo-Croat 
on the part of the EW operators 381 In Somalia the initial intelligence 
analysis failed for some reason to appreciate the dependence of 
the clans on long-range radio communication, and thus no specific 
SIGINT capability was included in the initial army and marine 
complements. For Haiti, on the other hand, intelligence support 
of this kind was planned and implemented entirely by the SIGINT 
branch of the CMISE, which meant the recruitment of staff with 
an adequate knowledge of Haitian and French and their training 
to form a well-integrated group. Attention was also paid to the 
technical organization and adaptation of the necessary equipment 
and to the data transmission aspects of the system. A full Joint 
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SIGINT Process was implemented for the duration of the operation, 
the end-products of which were both daily situation reports and 
interim reports sent by the duty officer to the commander at the 
end of his shift. After the landing the officers of the SIGINT 
support group moved to Port-au-Prince to assist JTF-190. No 
mention is made of the systems employed in the SIGINT work 
during this operation.382 
The targeting list distributed to those responsible for the 
NATO and UN command and intelligence processes (2-Decide) 
at the planning and preparatory stages of Operation Deliberate 
Force comprised air defences, command and control systems, 
supply lines, traffic junctions and other key sites as described by 
IMINT techniques, although preparations for the operation also 
involved verification of these data and practice runs (1-Process). 
The pilots' approaches to the sites were facilitated by video 
filming of the routes (topography and landmarks) on 
reconnaissance flights. Rules of engagement were laid down for 
the airborne electronic warfare elements EF-111A Raven and 
EA-6B Prowler, and electronic orders of battle (EOB) regarding 
troops in the target areas were acquired and worked up in good 
time before incapacitation of the air defences (SIGINT). Each air 
raid was based on accurate localization and recognition data for 
the aggressor, and those responsible for deciding on the raid 
were in possession of real-time information on the chances of 
impact on the target (1-Process, 2-Decide).383 
Both French and American unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 
were used for intelligence purposes (IMINT, SIGINT) in Bosnia, 
these being in effect national systems that were used with the 
UN's "tacit consent". The Tier II Predator unmanned airborne 
vehicle system was taken into use in the Albanian sector in June 
1995, and over 70 runs had been made by October of that year, 
amounting to some 600 hours of flying time. In August 1995 the 
Predator was used to produce a virtually real-time video image 
of a target for battle damage assessment purposes which was 
distributed both to the 5th ATAF command centre for the 
operation and to the United States from the Predator system's 
ground station via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communication System (JWICS). Unmanned aircraft were used 
to monitor movements of Bosnian Serbs in the Brcko Corridor, 
the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the 12-km total exclusion 
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zone (TEZ) around Sarajevo and movements of the Bosnian Serbs' 
air defence missile equipment. At least two UAV's were lost, one 
owing to a technical fault and one shot down by the Bosnian 
Serbs. It is also claimed that unmanned craft were used for 
airborne intelligence purposes in Somalia,384 but as noted by 
Stuteville, these aircraft were left behind in the United States at 
the beginning of the UNITAF mission in view of the limited 
strategic airlift capacity and the opinion of the helicopter pilots 
that it would be dangerous to use them in the operation's airspace 
- the latter reason proving the decisive one. At the time of 
UNOSOM II it was evidently a matter of the use of national 
resources, which was based on a gentlemen's agreement between 
the US generals.385 
The first experiences of the use of imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) for peacekeeping purposes were obtained with the 
French SPOT satellite as support for the peace mission in the 
Golan Heights. Following the declaration by President Bush in 
September 1992, the United States also made its imagery facilities, 
including both satellite and aircraft-mounted cameras, radar 
devices and electronic sensors, available to UN peacekeeping 
operations. Interpretation of IMINT products calls for specialized 
skills in processing and "reading" digital images, and experience 
shows that surveillance of this kind can be effectively evaded by 
camouflage or the use of underground facilities and distorted by 
dense vegetation cover or steep landforms. The United States 
provided IMINT support for UNPF intelligence in such matters 
as the search for mass graves around Srebrenica and the 
monitoring of the movements of the Serbian FROG-7 artillery 
missiles, but the performance of the J-STARS system in Bosnia 
was hampered by the terrain, the topography and the climate. 
The system was most successful in identifying the movements of 
fairly large numbers of men and motorized troops, especially 
when it was known beforehand what geographical area had to 
be surveyed, e.g. in the supervision of an agreed disengagement 
of troops or the verification of a ceasefire. In the Haiti operation 
the IMINT analyses produced by the CMISE at the planning 
stage yielded data on built-up areas and potential sites for 
parachute or helicopter landings. The results were distributed to 
the Task Force and the troops subordinate to it, and it was 
possible to extend the services to the company command level. 
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Analyses of images of selected sites were produced throughout 
the operation, and a total of almost 8000 images were printed for 
use by the troops. The AIC supplied the intelligence centre on 
board USS Mt. Whitney with IMINT images for targeting 
purposes.386 
Flight trajectory radars (RADINT) were deployed by Lt.-
Gen. Rose to supervise the 20-km Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) 
created around the city of Sarajevo as a consequence of Sarajevo 
Market Place I, the first five trailer Cymbeline Mk1 devices 
arriving in February 1994, to be replaced by the Mk2 version in 
September of the same year. The countermortar radar troop of 
the Royal Horse Artillery set up a command post and three radar 
sites within the city, each normally comprising two Cymbeline 
Mk2 radars. The troop also acquired a HALO sound detection 
system in January 1995, but this proved unreliable, its capacity 
being restricted by malfunction of the microphone stations and 
transmission connections and by the steep topography of the 
area. Since EW was hampered by similar considerations, these 
two technical intelligence systems, RADINT and SIGINT, were deployed 
"in parallel". The stations were placed with reference to the activity 
of the parties to the conflict, the firing distance from the centre of 
Sarajevo and the possibilities for protecting UN functions in the 
area. The best locations were unavailable, however, as the 
combatants were apt to prevent any UN activity there, or even 
deny access altogether, e.g. by opening fire.387 One problem in 
the use of radars that emerged particularly at times of heavy fire 
at close range was to distinguish the impact point from the firing 
point, and the combatants learned to take advantage of such 
weaknesses, as also of limitations in radar coverage. Confirmation 
of the radar findings was sought from the battalions' observation 
posts, the military observers or EW. Individual weapons and 
small artillery units could usually be identified extremely well 
and reliably. 
A countermortar radar from the Dutch marines was also 
obtained as part of the multinational brigade (MNB/RRF), and 
this was deployed in the preparations for Operation Deliberate 
Force and as firepower in the operation itself, in addition to 
which a MSTAR ground surveillance radar was used for fire 
control and area surveillance at the MNB observation positions 
in Sarajevo. The Jordanian battalion had a troop in the northeast 
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UNPROFOR sector which was equipped with US-built anti-
artillery radars. Its task was to search for and locate heavy 
weapons firing on the town of Tuzla, a UN protection zone. The 
troop was deployed about three kilometres from the frontline, so 
that its radar had a range of about 24 km. The chief problem 
affecting the performance of this device was the low level of 
competence of the personnel manning it.388 
The purpose of technical intelligence (TI) is to ascertain the 
technical specifications and capabilities of the combatants' weapon 
systems. Smith points out the difficulties involved in 
distinguishing the weapons used by the combatants by crater 
analysis, a problem that was compounded in Yugoslavia by the 
fact that both parties to the conflict were using weapons systems 
inherited from the Yugoslavian People's Army. In Cambodia, on 
the other hand, the weapons systems that were in use dated back 
to the Second World War. In spite of these difficulties, an 
intelligence collection system should possess adequate expertise 
to enable identification of the aggressor in each instance e.g. 
Weapons Intelligence Section.389 
NATO-led air operations intelligence comprised sections 
devoted to large-scale mapping, threat identification and location, 
and battle damage assessment. Activities were initiated by 
NATO's E-3 aircraft, flying in Hungarian airspace in October 
1992 with the full consent of that country's government 391  but 
once NATO was able to use its AWACS aircraft for airspace 
surveillance and reporting of breaches of the No-Fly Zone, 
patrolling in connection with the maritime embargo was entrusted 
to WEU/NATO aircraft. Interest focused at the beginning of the 
operation on the integrated air defence system deployed by the 
Bosnian Serbs, which was based on anti-aircraft missile systems 
dating from Soviet times and personnel and material air defence 
support received from Serbia. Intelligence with regard to targets 
such as nodes in the communications system and radar stations 
was provided by means of aircraft-mounted strategic and tactical-
level IMINT and SIGINT sensors, and it was this information 
that formed the basis for creating the NATO air corridors in 
Bosnia. The intelligence grounding for Operation Deliberate Force, 
which began in August 1995, provided the basis for the use of 
precision weapons against the Serbs' SA-6 missile stations and 
other significant target, and further intelligence support was 
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received from the Pentagon's Defense Airborne Reconnaissance 
Office, which produced the hyper-accurate data on the desired 
targets required for the use of precision weapons. 
The UN employed American U-2 aircraft for strategic 
intelligence purposes both in Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort) 
and in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). The US has in effect been 
providing the airborne strategic intelligence component for UN 
operations since 1975, 91 and altogether some 20 000 low or 
medium-altitude tactical-level reconnaissance flights with both 
IMINT and SIGINT equipment have taken place in that time. 
Direction-finding accuracies as good as 0.5-1% are achievable 
with the SIGINT/ELINT equipment normally carried by aircraft, 
whereas the results obtained with SAR radar devices in Bosnian 
terrain were very much poorer than had been expected, on 
account of the pronounced relief and sharp topography, which 
interfered with the passage of the radar beams, and the lush, 
dense vegetation, which provided effective camouflage for 
military installations. American EA-6B Elso aircraft were used 
experimentally in a stand-off capacity for independent search-
and-destroy missions, employing a pair of aircraft to search for 
surveillance and fire direction radar stations and induce the 
Bosnian Serb air defences to use them. This meant using their 
ELINT systems to detect and locate the object and firing radiation-
homing missiles at it. The principle originates from the US 
Command and Control Warfare Doctrine C2W.392  The Rapid 
Reaction Force (RRF) used Gazelle reconnaissance helicopters, of 
which the AMB had 9, and a Lynx LH9 equipped with an 
automatic gun and anti-tank missiles for operational intelligence 
and planning. Prior to the arrival of these, the French ALAT 
division's helicopters were also used for surveillance duties. 
The focus of counter-intelligence was on the commencement 
of the IFOR operation, and the CI personnel were assigned to it 
at the initial stage. The work was hampered, however, by the 
security regulations applied to these troops by the American 
division, e.g. the restrictions on their movements. This meant 
that they were unable to move freely in the area which they were 
intended to cover, and although the regulations were 
circumvented by various temporary arrangements, contacts with 
the local population were made substantially more difficult. Only 
the Nordic Brigade and the groups subordinate to this division 
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were able to move more freely. The most important piece of 
equipment was found to be the digital camera, which enabled 
pictures even to be relayed to the national intelligence community 
within four hours of the event. It was similarly the case in Somalia 
and Haiti that the majority of the intelligence was produced by 
counter-intelligence groups and interrogators, as indeed had been 
the intention. All the feedback and sources for learning from past 
experiences emphasized the significance of appropriate training 
both for intelligence personnel as such and for ordinary soldiers 
on patrol who are required to make patrol and incident reports.393 
In most operations the actual parties to the conflict have 
been hostile towards intelligence activities on the part of the 
peacekeeping forces. This has been manifested most obviously 
in efforts to deceive the peacekeeping force or to exploit its presence or 
actions for the protagonists' own purposes. The use of special forces 
in the area of operations has been apt to arouse suspicions and to 
place the peacekeeping force in a difficult situation. The use of 
such troops for target indication purposes at Gorazde in 1994 
engendered such a level of suspicion that the JCO were shot at.394 
The operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia have 
demonstrated that at the tactical level, peacekeeping forces 
have to operate with only partial or occasional consent from 
the parties to the conflict and must therefore be prepared to 
suffer losses. This means that, where internal conflicts within 
states are concerned, the peacekeepers should pay appropriate 
attention to force protection, tactical mobility, good and reliable 
communications and adequate intelligence support. This need 
not necessarily be inconsistent with efforts at mutual 
understanding between the strategic and operational levels and 
the parties to the conflict, but it is essential to preserve the 
principle of impartiality at all levels, and most of all at the tactical 
level. Berdal adds that the British doctrine has demonstrated the 
coincidence of theory with practical experience in this respect, 
and experiences are confirmed by the observation of Cedric 
Thornberry that "without the principle of impartiality UN 
peacekeeping operations would be acts of self-destruction". 
General Rose put the British doctrine into action in Bosnia under 
the heading of "robust peacekeeping", the point of departure in 
which was to preserve impartiality while at the same time being 
capable of reacting with a show of force, and if necessary its use, 
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at the tactical level in order to discharge one's mission and protect 
one's troops. Such reactions should constitute immediate acts of 
self-defence, e.g. an air strike against a position that has fired on 
the peacekeeping force. The principle of freedom of movement 
was likewise implemented by using military support to deliver 
humanitarian aid without seeking permission from the parties 
engaged in the conflict.395 
5.7 INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 
The US doctrine of a centralized data management architecture 
was tried out in a peace support operation for the first time in 
Somalia. The original need for a centralized architecture, first 
perceived in the Gulf War, arose out of the split-based 
organizational concept, in which a considerable proportion of 
the intelligence support is produced in the background. When 
the Somalian operation began, USEUCOM was using an 
experimental version of the Theatre Rapid Response Intelligence 
Package (TRRIP) data system, largely consisting of a user interface 
that had been tested at the American military hospital of 
UNPROFOR in Zagreb in order to develop a communications 
architecture with which intelligence terminals could be brought 
to the tactical level. The next stage was to extend the system to 
Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia. The second version of 
TRRIP, adopted for use in Operation Provide Comfort in April 
1994, had a digital camera and scanner added, and by this time 
there were terminals installed in Naples, Skopje, Macedonia and 
Zagreb, some of which were still using the system in December 
1997. Six TRRIP terminals were used in Operation Support Hope 
in Ruanda, and the system was also functioning during Operation 
Uphold Democracy in Haiti.391  These terminals and the services 
they provided were indirectly available to the UN, as they 
remained United States property. 
The C4I architecture used in IFOR was created in the space 
of three months and was designed to take account of the broad 
scope of the data acquisition task, the military and civilian 
organizations involved and the complexity of the environment 
in which the operation was taking place. One special feature 
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associated with counter-intelligence and HUMINT was the facility 
for processing and transmitting digital pictures taken by hand. 
The directives for the operation applied to both reporting and 
the supervision of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) material, as 
the TRRIP system was based on commercially available products 
and used the MSE telecommunications network, INMARSAT, 
the Trojan SPIRIT systems and the regional network as its 
transmission channels, since by linking these together it was 
possible to include the battalion level in the architecture as a 
fully accredited subscriber. Implementation of the architecture 
was hampered by the shortage of space and the location of the 
command posts in places that were not readily accessible from a 
communications point of view. The Secret Internet Protocol 
Network (SIPRNET) used for communication between command 
posts proved extremely useful, while the best contribution to the 
analytical capacity of the system was achieved through the JDISS 
system, which enabled the use of sensitive compartmented 
information (SCI). The corresponding means for handling open 
information was the public version of the same system, the Non-
classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).397 
Figure 13. The IFOR intelligence architecture in autumn 1996 3'e 
The support provided for the NATO troops engaged in 
IFOR by the USAEUCOM intelligence centre was based on the 
LOCE system, NATO's only common system for encrypted speech 
and data transmission. This also has gateways to national 
equivalents such as the Allied Battlefield Information Collection 
and Exploitation Initiative (BICES), SHAPE's CRONOS network 
and the SACLANT Maritime Command and Control Information 
System (MCCIS). The intelligence centre (JAC) used the LOCE 
system to implement its connections with both national 
intelligence and the headquarters of the operations, and for IFOR 
it was the primary channel for communicating with US national 
intelligence systems such as the DIA's Blackbird database. When 
LANDCENT was preparing to take responsibility for directing 
the IFOR operation, the work of forming an intelligence 
architecture was begun in good time, and the resulting 
architecture enabled transmission and terminal device systems 
to be defined for connecting the various levels in the command 
hierarchy. Here the use of LOCE terminals by means of the 
CRONOS system occupied the key position as far as the 
operation's intelligence activities were concerned. The Electronic 
Combat Signals Cell (ECSC) used Sun Sparc 20 EW software and 
the NATO Emitters' database program in order to command 
electronic warfare and intelligence 39' 
In the case of the Somalian operation the UNOSOM II 
architecture proved unsuccessful because it was too heavy and 
complex relative to the situation and the resources available. 
This architecture was based on the JDISS system, by which 
intelligence products were to be distributed to both the UN and 
US troops, and had a dual-level architecture in which Level I 
comprised products that could be shown to UN or Allied troops 
but not left in their possession, so that the information travelled 
only via channels controlled by the United States, while Level II 
implied that the products had been censored to a form in which 
they could be made public, so that there were no restrictions on 
their transmission within the architecture. Contacts between the 
intelligence support element (ISE) in Mogadishu and Fort Drum 
- in accordance with the split-based concept - were implemented 
using the Trojan SPIRIT system, which comprised vehicles of its 
own, a satellite data transmission system and power sources and 
was intended to convey speech, data and processed IMINT 
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information. The system was supported by STU-III, in which 
speech and data could be transmitted in encrypted form. JDISS 
services could be provided by installing its software in the Trojan 
SPIRIT system, but actual telecommunications called for the 
renting of commercial satellite connections. The channels used 
for transmitting tactical intelligence were tactical-level satellite 
systems, i.e. INMARSAT and a lap-top computer, and the MSE 
telecommunications network.400 
USACOM's strategic-level intelligence architecture during 
the Haiti operation was based on the JWICS and JDISS systems, 
in both of which the GCCS system provided the transmission 
channels. For the strategic level, this architecture enabled 
practically instant monitoring of the tactical situation, 
development of the capabilities of the troops from all the branches 
of the armed forces and the concentration of these on monitoring 
work. The systems were managed by the navy at the initial 
stages of the operation, but when command of the operation was 
transferred onto the land, responsibility for its implementation 
switched to the ground forces. Due attention was paid to 
experiences in the Somalian operation when formulating the 
architecture, which was based to a great extent on HUMINT 
needs. Of the services offered by the system, perhaps the most 
attention was aroused by video teleconferencing (VTC) and the 
facility by which the lower command echelons could recover the 
information they needed from the higher echelon databases. 
Data transmission within the operation took place in the form of 
speech, data and video images, extending from the President to 
the tactical commanders. The greatest problem for USACOM 
was the insufficient supply of technical personnel, as had been 
realized in the exercises that preceded the operation.40' 
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Figure 14. The intelligence architecture of Operation Uphold Democracy, 
viewed from the perspective of the XVIII Airborne Corp, or JTF-180.402 
The CMISE intelligence support element within JTF-180 in 
the Haiti operation was supplied with materials that granted 
access to USACOM databases and those of other national 
intelligence systems via a JDISS terminal. The distribution of 
intelligence took place by means of transmission and terminal 
devices belonging to the architecture depicted in Figure 18. The 
ASAS Warrior terminal and Defence Secure Network 3 
transmission system were used to distributed SIGINT 
information, and the JWICS transmission system, through which 
the video teleconferencing took place, for instance, was used for 
strategic command purposes. The intelligence support element 
stationed with JTF-190 at Port-au-Prince used the Trojan SPIRIT 
system for its data transmission, the practicality of this system 
being reflected in the fact that the support element had its 
communications channels ready and had commenced data 
transmission within an hour of arrival at its position. Planning 
and execution of the JTF-190 intelligence architecture within the 
Haiti operation required both the communications element (J6) 
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and the users to practice formation and use of the system in 
advance. The main systems as far as the intelligence centre was 
concerned were (1) the JWICS system, which had a utilization 
rate of 10-20% and was used by the national forces operating in 
the region (AIC) and the JTF intelligence co-ordinators for 
synchronizing intelligence activities, and (2) the JDISS system, 
with a utilization rate of 80-90%, by which those responsible for 
the analyses were able to contact databank services at the national 
level (SCI services), send and received Emails and process IMINT 
products and cartographic material. Data transmission within 
these systems called for high baud rate satellite connections. 
JDISS connections within the operation were implemented with 
the General Service Communications (GENSER) field 
communications system.403 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 ON THE RESEARCH ITSELF 
Theory and topics of the research 
When formulating a theory of command, control and intelligence 
it proved possible to combine knowledge from several spheres 
into an entity that enabled the material acquired here to be 
handled analytically and logically. The C3I theory of Lawson 
and Orr, which was the main theoretical approach applied here, 
allowed intelligence to be coupled with command and control 
functions, the interface between the two processes being taken 
to comprise the stages of formation of a situation assessment 
and decision-making at the end of the command process. The 
sources used here confirm that this is the case in practice. The 
essential thing is to understand that these processes fuse together 
in everyday life and that interaction takes place in which the 
determining factors are needs, the situation and time, and not 
merely theory. It may be claimed in the light of this work that the 
theories as such have not been realized at any level of command or 
within any of the processes, although many operations led by the 
United States and some NATO-led ones have come close to 
arrangements that conform to the theory. 
One of the results obtained here was the observation that 
the C3I theory does not allow for a feedback system after the 
operation. Although individual countries and the UN have their 
own "lessons learned" processes, it is felt from experience that 
the method has not been able to remove the problems affecting 
interaction between intelligence and command. An analysis 
performed after the operation can ensure that the command and 
intelligence processes are developed in the light of the experiences 
gained,. In the American military tradition, feedback has been 
used to develop the link between intelligence and command, 
and its inclusion in the theory and practice would undoubtedly 
be of benefit to future crisis management operations. 
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A "research matrix" was drawn up on the basis of the topics 
to be considered and the theories of command and intelligence to 
facilitate the work by dividing the questions to be answered 
into precisely specified subquestions. This made it possible 
within the work proper to analyse and compare the subject 
matter corresponding to one subquestion at a time: (1) the 
association between intelligence and command, (2) the 
fundamentals of intelligence, (3) the process, (4) organizations, 
(5) products, (6) methods, and (7) architectures. Answers to the 
subquestion were thus found by comparing the theory lying 
behind the research, the requirements placed upon intelligence 
and the experiences obtained from operations with respect to 
one of these topics at a time. Godson's division of intelligence 
into three parts, organization, products and methods, as used at 
the beginning of the work, was filled out at points where 
deficiencies or overlapping could be observed. Once the topics 
to be studied and the questions to be answered had been 
successfully defined, the finding of answers to the questions 
and the formulation of conclusions based on these proved 
relatively straightforward. The drawback, however, is that 
reporting according to this format entails repetition at many 
points, which detracts from readability. 
Reliability and generalizability of the research 
It may be claimed on the basis of this work that intelligence within 
peace support missions has changed as operating environments have 
changed. It is not such a straightforward matter, however, to 
discern whether intelligence practices observe primarily the 
impartiality principle laid down by the UN or military 
expediency. More emphasis tends to be placed on the latter as operations 
become more demanding and the risks attached to them grow, i.e. as 
one approaches peace enforcement. The major powers do not 
perceive any contradiction in terms between military expediency 
and impartiality in the organization of intelligence, provided 
that the actions of the peace support troops do not render them 
parties to the conflict or place them in one camp rather than the 
other. Since the sensitivity of intelligence activities is 
acknowledged, care is exercised in selecting the intelligence forces 
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and their equipment and methods and incorporating these into 
the operation. Experiences during the 1990's denote a clear 
tendency for an increase in the quantitative need for intelligence 
and in its peace support role with the growing importance of 
data management and the ever more demanding nature of the 
operations. This has also been accompanied by a change in 
attitude as reflected in the statements of UN staff, politicians 
and military commanders alike. The sources used here are 
primarily Anglo-American ones, and thus reflect those countries' 
political, economic and military attitudes and aspirations. The 
bias is rectified somewhat by the use of a few Nordic studies of 
intelligence and command relations. 
All the UN member states have indicated that they will 
observe UN principles in connection with peace support 
operations, even though these principles may in part be at variance 
with national doctrines and experiences, at least partly because 
national doctrines conform better to the nature of present-day conflicts 
than the UN doctrines do. The member states feel that clandestine 
operations are contrary to UN principles and are apt to undermine 
the warring parties' confidence in the UN and its operations, but 
in spite of this it may be claimed on the basis of the sources used 
here that the United States and France, at least, undertook covert 
operations in connection with peace support in Somalia and 
Bosnia. Just how extensive these operations were and what their 
objectives were cannot be deduced in any rational or 
straightforward manner, nor is it possible to say what other 
countries may have been involved. 
The main question posed in this work can be answered in 
a relatively reliable manner, even though the principal UN sources 
used in the argumentation are in the nature of talks or interviews. 
Intelligence is undeniably of significance for the direction of operations 
and for supervising the achievement of their goals and the observation 
of agreements. It could be claimed that without intelligence the 
reports produced for the UN on peace support missions would 
not be based on any systematically analysed data. This observation 
can in tact be generalized further. 
The first subquestion can also be answered quite well. 
Experiences suggest that the interaction between operational 
command and intelligence is approaching that which is assumed 
to exist in theory. It can also be maintained that the closeness of 
156 
this interaction is related to how demanding the operation is. 
This finding is again generalizable. 
The second subquestion can likewise be answered well. 
Intelligence is almost without exception organized better, more 
clearly and with a higher capacity in operations not led by the 
UN, and the results are also reliable in these cases. These 
observations are generalizable with the following reservations. 
(1) The information available on the organization of intelligence 
and its products in the context of a particular operation is 
frequently based on only one or two sources, so that the results 
are little more than indicative of a trend and partially 
generalizable. (2) Evaluation of the principles of action, duties 
and equipment of the intelligence troops is based on the 
combining of scattering pieces of information and technical details, 
and their actual performance capacity has been arrived at entirely 
by deduction. The differences between the peacekeeping doctrines 
of Great Britain, France and the United States are stated reliably 
as far as intelligence is concerned, however, and the lines of 
development perceivable in the peace support roles of these 
countries' armed forces are argued reliably. Thus the trends and 
requirements are clear in these respects. Similarly UN policy and 
the needs for development are argued in a reliable manner, 
although not necessarily in the official manner. 
Assessment of the source material 
The scientific journals (RUSI, INSS and UNIDIR) provide a good 
basis for research of this kind, in that their reports are 
comprehensive in terms of sources and consistent in their 
findings. On the other hand, the US Army Command and General 
Staff College reports are of variable quality. Those submitted as 
Master's theses are good, but the interim reports often rely on 
very limited source data and their usefulness is thus restricted to 
a narrow, specialized field. The quality requirements insisted on 
here,were a comprehensive range of sources, proper references 
and verifiability. The most useful sources of this kind were the 
reports of Smith, Snider, Stuteville and Raevsky. In employing 
press sources particular attention was paid to their verification, 
in which respect the numerical data given in them proved 
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particularly unreliable, partly due to differences in the methods 
used for calculating flight statistics, for example. Otherwise such 
articles were useful sources of technical data on the 
communication and weapons systems used in particular 
operations. The scientific material can be criticized largely for 
the manner in which the choice of sources reflects the affiliation 
of the author or the purposes for which the investigation was 
carried out. It was conspicuously rare for an author to note that 
his sources contradicted each other on some point or that they 
went against his own views. Apart from the official UN sources, 
the source material was usually fairly comprehensive. The 
principal problem with UN sources are that they remain silent 
on the question of intelligence activities and their connection 
with command functions and that written intelligence documents 
tend to be classified as confidential or secret, which hampers 
their availability and their use in a work intended for publication. 
Efforts were made to obviate these problems by using speeches 
by UN officials and interviews with such people as primary 
sources. 
6.2 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE 
AND COMMAND 
It can be claimed on the basis of this research that the present 
manner of taking decisions on and within peace support 
operations has not proved capable of responding to the demands 
posed by the narrowing of the decision-making window on 
account of changes in the operating environment. As the operations 
become more demanding and entail greater risks, interaction between 
command and intelligence functions has increased and has approached 
a level dictated by military expediency. 
Political decisions have been complicated by an 
unwillingness to take risks or to set clear-cut aims, while military 
decisions are hampered by unfamiliarity with the independent 
creation of strategic and political plans of action and a reluctance 
to venture into that sphere. These problems have become 
exacerbated at the operational level, in the commanding of 
operations. It may also be maintained on the strength of the present 
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findings that there is no appreciable difference between warfare and 
peace support in the interaction between command and intelligence 
functions. One factor which does affect this interaction, especially 
in a peace support context, is the multinational nature of the 
operation and the consequences of this, such as national 
differences in command and intelligence practices. Successful 
interaction within an operation depends on the creation of 
consistent command practices, either through training or by 
forming the core of the operational headquarters from 
representatives of one nation or organization who are used to 
working together. The results suggest that the UN should retain 
its role as the umbrella organization for peace support action, 
but that it is not believed to be capable of mounting more 
demanding operations than this. 
Experiences indicate that it is precisely from the UN Security 
Council that a mandate is sought to intervene in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states, and that decisions regarding such 
applications and the monitoring of their implementation are 
matters that require intelligence activities. The interaction between 
command and intelligence functions is seen here to proceed in 
the manner shown in Figure 15, which is an adaptation of Orr's 
model for the command structure of an operation. This application 
of the model allows explanations to be given for the manner in 
which the actors engaged in intelligence and command activities 
on behalf of UN Headquarters are located with respect to each 
other and the directions in which information travels, but it does 
not reveal the largely unofficial and ineffective nature of this 
interaction at the UN Headquarters level, or the fact that it has 
been impossible to rely implicitly on its functionality. 
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Figure 15. An application of Orr's operational command model to the location 
of actors participating in the interactions between command and intelligence 
functions with respect to each other when the decisions are taken at UN 
Headquarters. National intelligence support received from UN member states 
is depicted with a broken line. 
Participation in peace support missions has developed during 
the 1990's into a means whereby member states can pursue and 
defend their national interests, so that the operations themselves 
have come to reflect the political traditions of these states and 
their security and defence policy agendas. Peace support missions 
have become a very important task for the armed forces 
concerned, as is reflected both in the updating of the relevant 
directives and in the concentration of military co-operation on 
questions of crisis management. It is evident from this research 
that following an intervention or peace support mission a 
participating major power has frequently become involved in 
the conflict itself, with its own distinct interests and agenda. The 
degree to which a country has participated actively in affairs has 
often varied greatly, as exemplified by the passive role adopted 
by the United States after disengaging from the arms boycott of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was transformed into an active role 
upon the signing of the Dayton agreement. 
National decisions regarding participation in operations have 
been governed not only by national interests but also by conditions 
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laid down in advance by their political leadership. The tightness 
of these conditions has reflected the nation's experiences of 
multinational operations and wars and its traditions of leading 
international coalitions, and national strategic intelligence has 
been required to assess the fulfilment of such conditions and 
further developments in the situation. Interaction between command 
and intelligence functions at the strategic level has taken place in 
accordance with national legislation and principles and existing 
administrative structures. To generalize somewhat, it can be claimed 
that interaction has been organized better within individual states 
than in the UN. Orr's model is unable to explain the unofficial 
national methods of exerting influence on the interaction between 
command and intelligence functions or the volume of information 
transmitted in connection with this. 
It is clear from this work that political decision-makers have 
been unwilling to delegate decisions regarding the use of force to 
the military commanders in charge of operations, even though in 
situations where no progress has been achieved by diplomatic 
means and the peacekeeping forces have been subject to increasing 
attacks, the emphasis has inevitably shifted towards the military 
commanders. The UN "dual-key" command system, for instance, 
has proved highly inefficient, even dangerous on occasions, where 
extremely demanding peace support operations are concerned, 
whereas it has been easier to maintain control over the problems 
in "lead nation" operations in which one state has assumed 
control and the military command is in the hands of personnel of 
a single nationality. 
It should be possible through experience to recognize from 
the situation descriptions the moment when the military 
commander should be allowed to decide on the use of force, and 
intelligence should be capable of producing short-term situation 
assessments and of providing decision-makers with reliable 
information on which to act in such an eventuality. It is the 
intensity of the conflict that determines whether decision-making 
should be weighted towards the political or the military 
leadership, but as the intensity increases decisions have to be 
made more quickly at all levels of command. Also, as the 
command process gains in intensity, intelligence becomes 
subjected to rigorous demands in terms of delivery times. 
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The basis for subordinating military activity to political 
direction should be laid down at the stage of choosing the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Force 
Commander (FC), and these choices should be made in such a 
way as to avoid personality clashes in the course of the operation. 
Experience suggests that it is especially important for the force commander 
to receive support both from national intelligence and in terms of UN 
political and military information. The command structure of IFOR, 
for example, was supported by both national intelligence services 
and the joint NATO service. Military expediency in the interaction 
between command and intelligence functions is emphasized in 
accordance with the military traditions of the lead nation, especially 
in demanding operations. In Haiti, for example, the operation 
observed United States practices and procedures. In less 
demanding operations, on the other hand, the need for conformity 
has so far been less pronounced. UN documents have been drawn 
up for individual operations to define the interaction between 
command functions and military information, but national 
directives have taken precedence over these in some cases, both in 
practical situations and in personnel attitudes. 
As a consequence of the Partnership for Peace programme 
and the notion of CJTF, we are in the process of gaining a coalition 
pool of forces formed and trained in peacetime and ready for 
action at short notice that can be tailored to meet the needs of 
individual situations. Experiences with IFOR lead one to believe 
that the command and intelligence functions of a multinational 
force representing different branches of the armed services can 
well be combined and organized within the CJTF model, the 
obvious strength of which is that the foundations of both 
command and intelligence functions and their interaction have 
been laid down and practised beforehand, from which it follows 
that the intelligence architecture will also have been planned and 
rehearsed in advance. It will now be possible to develop this 
model further in a pragmatic sense as a result of experiences in 
the former Yugoslavia. 
Demanding peace support operations have been moving all the 
time towards assuming the nature of a show of force, and of its use if 
necessary, and this has laid further emphasis on the closeness and 
importance of the interaction between command functions and 
intelligence. The closeness of this interaction can be appreciated 
162 
through the nature of the activity, the extent of the preparations 
made for it and the costly nature of the equipment required for it. 
Appropriate use of airborne and naval weapons systems for peace 
support purposes has called for careful planning, which in turn has 
been reliant on high-precision minimum-delay intelligence. The use of 
naval and air power has almost without exception been justified 
in terms of national doctrines and regulations that meet the 
requirements of military expediency, but the technical elements 
of the command and intelligence architectures employed in UN 
operations have not been capable in all respects of providing the 
rapid exchange of data, encrypting of sensitive information or 
adoption of alternative means of communication that the situation 
might require. It is precisely for these reasons that it has been 
necessary to adopt the framework of the data transmission system 
from one major power and link all the troops to this. The design 
and implementation of the data transmission architecture has 
been at the core of interaction between command and intelligence 
functions in recent UN operations. 
6.3 INTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN PEACE 
SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
The fundamentals and process of intelligence 
It became clear from this research that military intelligence is 
accepted as a part of peace support and its control, as is manifested in 
both the national doctrines and experiences gained from the 
operations themselves. One boundary condition for this 
acceptance at the moment is the observation of impartiality, as 
laid down in the UN principles of action, consent and avoidance 
of the use of force. The most significance change relative to the 
UN principles is the relaxing of the notion of consent, which no 
longer carries the importance that it used to. Intelligence 
arrangements in the case of more demanding operations have 
tended rather to observe the principle of military expediency, 
and it is significant that the major powers have not felt this 
expediency in the organization of intelligence to be in any way 
at variance with the impartiality of the UN, although the smaller 
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nations have been more cautious in this respect. For the member 
states, preservation of the principle of impartiality has meant 
that the intelligence acquired should be used for fulfilling the 
mandate and not in order to interfere in the affairs of the country 
concerned or to serve one's own national interests. In practice 
impartiality has been preserved in intelligence activities through 
a policy of openness or by prohibiting intelligence activities for 
fear of accusations of spying. On the other hand, the lack of 
intelligence activities to back up discharge of the mandate has 
been felt to undermine the credibility of the operation and the 
UN as a whole. A need has been recognized in the UN for 
carrying out intelligence work and supporting the decisions that 
have to be made with intelligence data, and the present unofficial 
position of intelligence has encouraged efforts to continue making 
use of unofficial connections in order to meet the information 
needs of the upper leadership within the UN and the commanders 
of its operations. The basing of decisions on unofficial information 
has led to some questioning of the reliability of the UN 
organization and has engendered a power struggle over the 
control of data sources by politicizing information, a form of 
"information warfare". 
It is often difficult to categorize intelligence as strategic, 
operational or tactical, and the same item of information can 
sometimes be of significance at all three levels. The events of the 
Sarajevo Market Place were individual incidents at the tactical 
level, but their consequences were strategic matters as far as the 
conflict as a whole was concerned. Again, it may be observed on 
the basis of this work that evaluation of the significance of individual 
items of information and the distribution of these calls for advanced 
professional skills in order to make the essential information available at 
the moment when a decision has to be made. It is also looked on as 
calling for short-delay transmission of information in both 
directions throughout the intelligence organization. 
It is reasonable to claim that a new code of intelligence 
practice has to be created for each operation, and that intelligence 
practices within operations have either been steered in the direction of 
national models or else they have automatically assumed such a form. 
When steering the development of such practices, it has been 
possible to reconcile national differences and integrate all the 
forces to work towards a single goal, whereas if the intelligence 
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practices have emerged of their own accord the member states 
have been represented within them, even though under some 
other name or without permission. The major powers' national 
intelligence systems, constructed under the exigencies of war, 
have been modified to conform with the commanders' 
information needs and with the demands and scales imposed by 
the situation and the presence of a multinational force. There is 
nothing wrong with this adaptation as such, as it makes it possible 
to tailor both the troops and the principles, processes and modes 
of action involved in the command and intelligence functions to 
the nature of the operation. The most important single thing that 
has to be rendered compatible throughout an operation's 
intelligence practices and the intelligence process has been shown 
to be the distribution of the resulting information. It is nevertheless 
clear from this paper that the distribution and accessibility of 
information has been influenced by national considerations. Attempts 
have been made to solve these distribution problems by means 
of bilateral agreements, for instance, one concrete example of 
which would be the sharing of intelligence between NATO and 
Russia within the SFOR operation. 
Also, targeting and damage assessment have emerged as 
important new aspects of intelligence in connection with peace 
support operations. At one time this was largely a matter of 
analysing the impact of ammunition fired by the parties to the 
conflict, but now targeting has become a natural part of 
intelligence and the command process, as it is impossible to 
envisage any air strike, cruise missile attack or concentration of 
artillery fire without accurate target data and an analysis of the 
foreseeable damage. The Haiti operation followed US regulations 
in this respect, whereupon targeting became an integral part of 
the intelligence activities, as is common in demanding operations. 
Where the intelligence process in those operations not 
commanded by the UN itself has broadly followed by the model 
prescribed by the theory, the process implemented by the UN 
has been more restricted. The observations compiled here suggest 
that ,intelligence processes developed for war conditions have 
not yielded the expected results. Under present-day operating 
conditions, which are complex and involve mutual interaction, the 
traditional linear cause-and-effect situation assessment process does 
not function as such in a peace support context. The terrain and 
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physical conditions always have the same effects, of course, but 
their significance for an army at war is quite different from what 
it is for a paramilitary group gathering its food out of the fields 
and villages. It has not been possible to base evaluations of the 
performance capacity of the parties to a conflict on the numbers 
of tanks they possess, the specifications of these tanks and the 
training received by the personnel, for the parties concerned 
have sometime used their weapons in ways that are contrary to 
all military reason. 
The US intelligence process, for instance, is constantly being 
developed on the basis of experiences gained, and it is evident 
that an effort has to be made to depart from the traditional 
process that delimits variables such as the terrain, the enemy and 
one's own troops and concentrates on certain of these variables. 
Things and factors that are relevant to peace support should not 
be excluded simply because they are not accepted elements of 
military expediency, and it is not simply a matter of drawing up 
new checklists but of training new analysts and leaders. Responses 
that have seemed appropriate in the circumstances have included 
non-linear thinking, examination of local behavioural models or 
modes of action, and broadening of the range of factors, both 
quantitative and qualitative, that have to be taken into account. 
The quality and reliability of the information is of particular 
importance in peace support operations, whereas the significance 
of quantity or volume has declined. The first task of the 
intelligence process in an operation has been defined as being to 
determine the critical weapons systems, troops and individuals 
which can be monitored in order to trace increases or decreases 
in activity, after which the production of situation assessments 
and analyses to support decision-making can be arranged in 
such a manner as to meet the commander's requirements. When 
operating at the heart of the conflict, it has to be remembered, of 
course, that military intelligence is competing with the media to 
produce an impression of the situation, and this situation can be 
turned to one's advantage only through an efficient publicity 
campaign, as was done in the Haiti operation. 
Von Clausewitz' cynical attitude towards intelligence 
activities would seem justified in the light of recent peace support 
operations, too. One of the problems to have emerged in 
connection with the intelligence process is the difficulty of finding 
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comparative data and of gaining the time in which to make 
comparisons. The present research indicates that even an 
intelligence organization that has developed its practices into a 
well rehearsed routine cannot continuously produce the necessary 
amounts of information within the time schedule required. Even 
so, the factors and information needs that influence the 
commander's directing of the operation have altered only to a 
marginal degree; the greatest change has been brought about by 
technological developments - involving the amount of information 
available and the speed with which it can be transmitted. If we 
imagine that the relative speed of data transmission were the 
same now as in von Clausewitz' day, we could very well ask 
how the time required for making comparisons has altered as the 
systems have developed. Even the most skilled and 
knowledgeable of analysts could not assess the reliability of an 
item of information without taking a certain length of time over 
it, according to the amount of work involved. One obvious danger 
that was alluded to above was that of jumping over certain 
stages in the intelligence process, leading to a decline in the 
quality and reliability of the products. 
Organization of intelligence work 
Intelligence activities in UN-led operations are implemented in 
a very lightweight manner with respect to their organization, 
products and methods. The states that have supported strategic 
intelligence at UN Headquarters and supplied the Information 
and Research Cell (I&RC) with intelligence and the necessary 
intelligence officers have for the most part been located in the 
West. The I&RC has mainly acquired its information from 
national sources belonging to member states, the headquarters 
situations centre and public sources. Its principal duty, of course, 
is to acquire information for issuing early warnings of possible 
flashpoints, but it also distributes ready-made products applying 
to individual incidents and weekly summaries directly for the 
use of the Secretary General and the under-secretaries. Also, 
apart from communicating early warnings to the Security Council 
via the Secretary General, it also supplies other UN organizations 
with intelligence data unofficially. Although the activities of the 
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I&RC have developed greatly over the last decade, there is still 
room for improvement, which should take place in accordance 
with the political views of member states and their willingness 
to observe Article 51 of the UN Charter and to share their strategic 
intelligence with the UN. So far only a very limited willingness 
to participate in this manner has been forthcoming. The present 
research allows us to claim that the major powers have arranged 
their national intelligence services to support peace support 
operations, and that this trend became more obvious towards 
the end of the last decade, but efforts have been made to arrange 
this support in accordance with existing command relations and 
structures. Certain UN member states have defined intelligence 
with respect to potential areas of conflict in their surroundings 
as part of the duties of their armed forces, and have in this way 
assured themselves of possessing the necessary background 
information on which to decide whether to participate in a 
peacekeeping operation, and indeed whether such an operation 
should be initiated. It has been shown here that initial information of 
this kind occupies a decisive position asfar as the success of an operation 
is concerned. The failure of the Somalian operation, for instance, 
began from the point at which the intelligence centre responsible 
for the area classified it as being low on the scale of inherent 
interest. This meant that the intelligence centre began its own 
work there only after the operation was under way, rather than 
supplying information to assist in its planning. It would 
nevertheless be reasonable to claim that national strategic 
intelligence services have succeeded in backing up peace support 
operations far more effectively than has UN strategic intelligence. 
A further finding here was that increasing use is being made of 
a network of national intelligence centres of UN member states to 
provide backing for intelligence work and command functions in peace 
support operations. The majority of this support has come from 
intelligence centres in the United States and other NATO 
countries, and experience indicates that these have produced not 
only the basic information required for the operations but also 
minimum-delay situational data for situation assessment 
purposes and variable information in support of decision-making. 
The short-delay facility owes its origins to connections with 
national information and data transmission systems and the 
liaison officers sent out in support of operations. The basic material 
supplied in this way has included background information on 
the history of the area, its culture, the geopolitical situation and 
maximally detailed data on armed forces maintained in the area. 
The variable information has typically included interpretations 
of IMINT images and analyses of data produced by sensor systems 
such as SIGINT. One of the most important variable items in 
both UN-led operations and those led by others has concerned 
the definition of indicators leading to early warnings. 
Meanwhile, the national intelligence centres have 
participated in the targeting process. Some of the data, however, 
have been produced in response to requests for information, the 
extent, amount and accuracy of the data provided being 
determined according to the interests and laws of the country 
supplying the data. Before the information is handed over it is in 
any case modified in accordance with the intelligence practices 
of the country concerned. Following an early warning issued by 
strategic intelligence, additional information is required on such 
matters as the interpretation of the mandate and the deployment 
of the troops engaged in the peace support mission. Increasing 
amounts of support in the form of strategic intelligence are needed 
at the planning and preparation stages of an operation, and the 
research suggests that the dependence of the UN on national 
systems has begun to decline only upon deployment of the troops, 
partly because the UN has not had sufficient intelligence capacity 
on which to base the planning of the operation and its command 
functions at the early stage. On the other hand, experiences with 
"lead-nation" operations suggest that at least the United States 
and NATO are capable of providing intelligence support for 
command functions at the planning and preparation stages. 
Intelligence at the deployment stage of an operation has 
tended to concentrate on the security of the peace support troops 
(OPSEC, force protection), particularly in connection with 
movements of troops from countries that have been under terrorist 
threats, e.g. Great Britain. This security has been created largely 
by national intelligence methods, although with the support of 
UN Security and possibly the security services of the host country. 
Force protection is in accordance with the doctrines of the leading 
nations and they have not been prepared to compromise on this. In the 
course of the operation itself, operational intelligence has enabled 
the commander to maintain control of the situation and be active 
169 
in taking the necessary decisions, and both the comments of 
commanders and the doctrines themselves look on mastery of 
the theories and doctrines of warfare as laying the foundation for 
an understanding of the significance of intelligence and control 
over the combat situation. Intelligence is required to associate 
detailed items of information with the whole and locate them 
correctly in the situational assessment. Decisions can then be 
supported by the necessary situation descriptions and evaluations 
of the force's own scope for action. The data are adapted into the 
appropriate form and communicated to the commander and the 
political administrator (SRSG). Operational-level intelligence has 
usually succeeded fairly well in discharging the duties expected of it. 
Construction and maintenance of the intelligence systems is 
usually planned and implemented by the intelligence centre of 
the operational command, although when there is a change of 
command, as in IFOR, the key headquarters personnel have 
overlapped for some time, with the remainder of the headquarters 
acting jointly in the area from which the operation has set out. In 
demanding operations, groups of liaison officers seconded from 
national or regional intelligence centres (NIST, JISE or NIC) have 
been attached to the intelligence department at the command 
headquarters, while multinational operations have ensured the 
co-ordination of functions by setting up separate offices for 
individual functions, e.g. electronic warfare. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive description of the arrangement of intelligence 
services has been obtained for the Haiti operation, a report which 
clearly indicates that the operation's intelligence arrangements were 
made in accordance with the usual command relations and in the 
manner established for the regional force. Intelligence activities for 
the operation were the result of years of practice, and the system 
was functioning at full capacity when preparations were still 
being made for the operation itself. Intelligence support for the 
"warrior" in this operation worked with extremely short delay 
times and amply fulfilled the information needs. 
The results indicate that the most challenging stage in an 
operation is when the conflict escalates and the original mandate evolves 
into a mixed mandate. This means that the operation may come to 
include the commanding of troops engaged in an air operation 
or an air and ground operation or the arranging of joint action 
with such troops. This leads to a progression from general 
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intelligence to targeting intelligence intended to support the 
planning and preparation of air and ground operations within 
the framework of the mandate. As operations have expanded, 
this planning and preparation stage has come to last several 
weeks. 
Sometimes operations have entailed more than one mandate, 
i.e. in practice more than one type of operation, and the present 
findings suggest that second-level operations do not necessarily 
come under chapter VI or VII, nor can they always be classified 
according to the Watson Institute, Wider Peacekeeping or UN 
typologies, but rather each operation must be interpreted from 
its own starting-point. Intelligence that is implemented openly 
and without violence is not dependent on the chapter under 
which the operation belongs. It can also be maintained that the 
possibility for immediate retaliation with force has always been 
part of the nature of air operations, and that this use of force 
must be based on targeting intelligence and general intelligence. 
Post-conflict intelligence has always included operational-level 
elements, but the majority of the surveillance has taken place 
from aircraft, using electronic equipment that have been under 
strategic level command and control. 
The information requirements of a tactical level commander 
are normally specified on the basis of the strategic and operational 
requirements. When issuing commands regarding information 
requirements, attention has to be paid to the limitations imposed 
by the UN principles and the mandate, in order to retain the 
troops' scope for action. The primary task of intelligence at the 
planning and deployment stages in an operation is to implement 
the intelligence practices laid down for it, create the intelligence 
system and begin gathering information. 
It became clear in this work that the most essential difference 
between operational and tactical intelligence arises from the fact 
that the latter has been expected to identify in the field any 
initiation of activities that are contrary to agreements or in other 
ways pose a threat to the operation and to be able to name the 
guilty party. It must be possible to provide the tactical commander 
with an incident report at short notice and to make an assessment 
of possible future developments in the situation on this basis. It 
is at the tactical level that the information gained at higher levels 
becomes more concrete and gains in precision. The commander 
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needs to know the ethnic composition of the population in the 
area, the leaders of the groups and the cultural differences that 
exist between the groups. He must know the starting-points for 
the conflict at the local level and whether he is able to influence 
these, and how the nearby areas, or UN activities in general, can 
affect fluctuations in the situation. 
Training in intelligence work has been an absolutely essential 
factor in the success of this activity, and the present findings leave 
no doubt that the only people who can be chosen as intelligence 
officers are those who have practical experience of the work and of 
the geographical area concerned. They must be thoroughly familiar 
with headquarters routines, possess a high working morale, be 
capable of co-operating with others and have a good understanding 
of the differences between the parties to the conflict. Intelligence 
officers working at the tactical level should also have a good 
knowledge of the languages of the area. Officers are expected to be 
able to adapt to the framework of a peacekeeping operation and to 
be able to appreciate the significance of particular items of 
information at the different levels of command. The findings 
suggest that more attention in the choice of intelligence personnel 
should be paid to the possession of a common cultural background 
and similar ways of operating. The more demanding an operation 
becomes, the more significant the role of a well-trained and 
immediately available intelligence leadership becomes. The 
intelligence departments of the operational headquarters should 
be set up and trained before the deployment of troops in the area. 
Experiences suggest that the time available for this ranges from a 
few weeks to a matter of months. The training of peacekeeping 
battalions has been altered in recent times to place more emphasis 
on intelligence and security alongside traditional peace support, 
and the standard tasks have included drawing up and maintaining 
a situationally adapted intelligence plan. Experiences have also 
suggested that it is necessary to create an intelligence system even in 
operations where the situation is stable. 
Intelligence methods and architectures 
The information necessary for carrying out intelligence tasks 
in operations led by the UN can be roughly divided into that 
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obtainable from UN military sources and civilian sources, from 
the parties to the conflict and from open sources (OSINT), 
including statistical and analysed data quoted in the media, 
academic sources and registers. This latter open source 
information has been used principally to describe the backgrounds 
and points of departure for operations. Some of the open sources 
have been under national control, but it has been possible to 
purchase their services. In the case of other operations not led 
directly by the UN the role of national intelligence sources and 
security organizations functioning in the area has been very 
much greater. 
Essential information on local conditions, the political 
situation and persons active in the area has been obtained from 
news agencies and the press, and other initial data and experiences 
of operations have been available in dissertations submitted to 
military academies and the journals published by these 
institutions. The resources of the scientific community have also 
been utilized for providing initial information and in the 
construction of long-term analyses. The main problem 
experienced with the use of public sources of information has 
been their immense volume, so that a large amount of time has 
had to be spent on extracting the data. NGO's have also proved 
to be reliable sources of information, especially if one bears in 
mind the actual purpose of their activity and remembers to 
support them in return with information from one's own 
intelligence section. Collaboration with other parallel or 
subordinate intelligence organizations is usually arranged both 
on the basis of existing command relations and by forming 
separate co-ordination bodies and holding joint meetings. UN 
operations have involved a greater element of unofficial collaboration 
than operations led by others. In the latter instances joint activities 
are normally organized by creating a joint intelligence centre 
(JIC), seconding groups of liaison officers to subordinate 
headquarters and forming multinational intelligence forces. 
Strategic-level intelligence in connection with peace support 
operations has been carried out by HUMINT, IMINT SIGINT, 
OSINT, CI and TI methods, recourse being had at the beginning 
of the operation to all the methods that are already functioning 
in the area. Activities are then intensified as the demands of the 
operation grow, especially if this is in the interests of the states 
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who own the systems. Experiences suggest that the use of HUMINT 
and Cl methods for strategic intelligence purposes tends to increase 
steadily within demanding operations, these two types of intelligence 
activity being ones that readily complement each other. IMINT 
methods have been used to support the planning of operations, 
the surveillance of treaty infringements and command functions 
during the operation proper. As more information technology is 
employed in intelligence architectures, it has become possible to transmit 
IMINT results to all levels of command with the minimum of delay. 
Images generated by IMINT were used in the Haiti operation to 
support both the tactical commander in selecting landing places 
for the helicopters and the intelligence centres in targeting. 
STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL MEANS 
HUMINT • Special forces • Military observers • Battalions • Surveillance, 
• Special forces • Military patrolling, 
observers inspections 
• Special forces  
SIGINT • Aircraft • Aircraft • Ground stations • Intercept, 
• Ground stations • Unmanned aerial (mobile) measurements, 
(HF) vehicles direction finding 
• Ground stations 
RADINT • nil • nil • Ground stations • Surveillance, 
(mobile) direction finding  
IMINT • Satellites • Aircraft • Nil • Photographing 
• Aircraft • Unmanned aerial of sites, large 
vehicles area surveillance 
OSINT • Intelligence • Intelligence units • Intelligence • Media, intennet 
units • Intelligence sections 
• Intelligence centres 
centres 
CI • Counterintellige • Counterintelligenc • Counterintellige • Patrolling, 
nce troops e troops nce troops inspections, 
interrogations 
TI • Research • National • nil • Research of 
institutes organizations military 
• National technology 
organizations 
Table 6. Distribution of intelligence categories among the levels of command. 
The majority of the categories of intelligence were employed 
at the operational level, activities being commenced in the form 
of CI prior to the actual deployment phase, while other categories 
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were taken up as deployment began and continued until the 
follow-up phase. As operations have become more demanding, 
the numbers of intelligence systems used and their performance 
capacities have been increased. The operational-level intelligence 
systems for the Haiti, IFOR and SFOR operations were designed 
with the requirements of an armed intervention in mind, whereas 
in other operations the systems were developed as required by 
the situation and the mandate. The present observations suggest 
that development of the intelligence systems has usually been left too 
late, at the cost of human lives and endangering the success of the 
mission. 
HUMINT in broad terms, including field HUMINT teams, 
has continued to be the principal means of gathering intelligence 
for peace support operations, especially at the tactical level, 
although there is now a tendency to set aside the traditional 
division into strategic, operational and tactical levels in the 
organization of these activities. Experiments have been made with 
centralized management of HUMINT resources, and this has proved 
successful and effective in Haiti and in the IFOR/SFOR operations. In 
this context CI troops have also been included as a part of 
HUMINT. No great methodological advances have been made 
in the actual means of acquiring information, but the availability 
of new technical devices has speeded up the transmission of 
incident reports, e.g. in that photos taken with a digital camera 
can be distributed to all those requiring them at all levels of 
command within a few hours of the event by means of the C4I 
architecture. 
Military observers have been used in their traditional role at 
the operational and tactical levels, but unlike special troops, they 
are not used for targeting purposes. The role of military observers 
as the "eyes and ears" of the commander can be said at least to 
have worked well in traditional operations, and some success 
has been had in second-level operations as well, but as they are 
unarmed, their use in demanding operations and for missions of 
a combat reconnaissance kind has proved too risky. 
Special forces have been used at all levels of command, but 
mostly at the operational and tactical levels. The more demanding 
an operation is estimated to be, the closer to the traditional use of 
special forces their role has come. The use of special forces in 
isolated, sparsely populated areas yielded good results in Somalia, 
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Haiti and Bosnia, the main problem being the small numbers of 
such troops available relative to the numbers of missions and 
their extent. A second problem lies in the simultaneous use of 
such forces for the delivery of humanitarian aid and for the 
identification of targets, covert action and the detaining of war 
criminals, leading to a duality of function which has been apt to 
turn the attitudes of the local people against the special troops 
and cast doubts on the impartiality of the whole operation. 
Efforts have been made to use SIGINT and EW to acquire 
early warnings of crisis flashpoints and to take prompt action at 
both the operational and tactical level. The results achieved with 
such action have varied greatly according to the level of 
technology in the host country. The methods employed for 
SIGINT and EW purposes have included the use of aircraft, 
unmanned airborne vehicles and ground stations, and information 
has been acquired by listening in on radio communications, 
measuring and identifying signals and locating the sources of 
radio broadcasts. This has proved to be the fastest intelligence 
technique of all, but the accuracy of its results has varied greatly. 
Only ground stations have been used at the tactical level, but 
these have not matched aircraft-mounted systems in terms of 
performance. A new technique at the strategic and operational 
levels is the use of unmanned airborne vehicles, for either SIGINT 
or IMINT according to the loads that they can carry. This 
intelligence device has proved extremely useful on account of 
the difficulty of detection, its cost efficiency and its high 
intelligence capacity. Unmanned airborne vehicle systems have 
been used to transmit surveillance pictures to both sides of the 
Atlantic simultaneously. 
Tactical-level regional intelligence networks have been 
formed on the strength of the observation points belonging to 
the battalions responsible for the area and the patrolling and 
supervision work undertaken by them (HUMINT). Networks of 
this kind are useful for forming detailed pictures of the situation 
for transmission to the operational level more or less as they are. 
The patrolling normally takes place by vehicle, on foot or from 
helicopters. This form of intelligence work has drifted towards 
combat reconnaissance as the operations have become more 
demanding, and in this connection preparations have been made 
for using air fire observers for target indication duties. Information 
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obtained from the battalions' intelligence teams has been 
corroborated by technical methods. 
The other "novel" aspect of peace support operations in 
addition to the use of unmanned airborne vehicles has been the 
increased use of counter-intelligence (Cl) methods as the major powers 
have begun to assume active roles in operations, partly in response to 
the incidence of terrorism and crime. Counter-intelligence in 
effect takes the same forms as HUMINT, so that it is natural that 
these two categories of activity should have moved closer 
together. The main emphasis in counter-intelligence has been on 
the deployment phase of an operation, but if the peace support 
troops have come under any particular threat in the course of the 
operation - implying changes in the level of consent - counter-
intelligence has been stepped up once again. The role of these 
groups in the acquisition of information has been accentuated at 
times when restrictions have been placed on the movements of 
the battalion's own troops. Use has been made at the tactical 
level of surveillance and flight trajectory radar systems (RADINT) 
located at ground stations in order to monitor local agreements 
such as arms embargoes, and they have proved capable of 
determining the deployment of firing positions by both parties 
to the conflict, the principles of their artillery activity and the 
main target areas. By combining radar findings with visual 
observations and crater analyses it has proved possible to identify the 
aggressor in individual incidents. 
It is seen here that intelligence in connection with air operations 
has become a function of its own that makes use of all available 
intelligence systems, both national ones and those belonging to the 
peace support operation. The justifications for such operations are 
produced by technical and strategic (IMINT and SIGINT) 
intelligence methods, the resulting information being filled out 
with that brought back by each flight that is undertaken. Tactical 
air photography is used to produce additional information on 
targets, and electronic warfare weapons systems and command 
and control warfare methods are employed to incapacitate the 
air defences. The assumption regarding intelligence in connection 
with air operations is that "every means available" will be used 
to ensure that the mission is successful. Naval operations are 
now coming into the same category in this respect. 
It became evident in the course of this research that the 
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principal factor lying behind efficient, extensive intelligence is 
the ability of the peace support mission to organize a 
comprehensive, smoothly functioning advanced technological 
architecture that is able to integrate intelligence into all levels of 
command so that the division into strategic or tactical intelligence 
is irrelevant as far as the user is concerned. Counter-examples 
like Somalia or UNPROFOR demonstrate that in the absence of a 
comprehensive architecture, or given an architecture that fails to 
function successfully as far as the operation is concerned, 
intelligence is unable to meet the information requirements laid 
down for command purposes. The principles for creating the C4I 
architecture were borrowed from the United States' armed forces, 
as is natural since the United States is the only UN member that 
has a global communications system that is in operational use, 
has been validated and covers all branches of the armed services. 
This system has been utilized to the utmost extent in demanding 
operations such as Haiti and IFOR, but it should be remembered 
that even ready-made systems have had to be adapted and 
developed in order to overcome technical interfaces, and that the 
making of these changes has taken time, so that formation of the 
architecture should be programmed for the beginning of the 
planning phase of an operation. In the case of the Haiti operation 
the intelligence architecture had been tested and rehearsed for 
several years before it was ready for use. 
When an operation is being led by the UN and the United States 
simply provides certain services, problems customarily arise, the reasons 
for which have usually concerned the security of data, technical 
compatibility difficulties or differences in the principles governing use. 
The architecture of the Somalian operation, for instance, was 
relatively simple, but data security and differences of opinion 
regarding the principles for its use led to insurmountable 
problems. Major difficulties are to be expected in the future, too, 
regarding the formation of an intelligence architecture in 
operations led by the UN, if only because the UN has no ready-
to-use basic network to which the troops engaged in the operation 
and UN Headquarters can both be linked. The majority of the 
core communications network will continue to be purchased 
from commercial sources in the future as well, although some 
may well come from telecommunications operators in the 
countries that are parties to the conflict. The information systems 
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used in UN-led missions have provided little more than office 
services and have not permitted the transmission of data over a 
separate, secure network. 
6.4 FINAL EVALUATION 
All nations have learned to take public opinion as shaped by the 
information media into account when deciding upon whether to 
participate in operations, an aspect that has gained greatest 
prominence in the United States and Great Britain. The major 
difference between the United States, France and Great Britain 
in their command and intelligence arrangements and the 
interaction between these lies in the fact that where the United 
States has centralized decision-making and data management 
and even made a conscious attempt at micro-level control, Great 
Britain and France have attempted to delegate leadership to 
those who are best able to do the job. Meanwhile, all three have 
characteristically striven towards a military expediency that conforms 
to their own national traditions. At the same time, national military 
traditions have been enriched as a consequence of the experiences 
gained in peace support operations, as manifested by updatings 
of both technical combat directives and military doctrines. 
Without going into the background to the Haiti operation or 
the reasons for it, it may be said that preparations and the 
operation itself were implemented primarily on the basis of 
military expediency. The present research has shown that 
intelligence in connection with the operation took place in 
accordance with the protocol that applied to the Atlantic Joint 
Task Force at the time (AJTTP), and the fact that lessons had been 
learned from the Somalian operation regarding the preparatory 
stages is a demonstration of the US forces' ability to make rapid 
changes in their ways of working. The British doctrine of "wider 
peacekeeping" proved to be well suited to the situation in the 
former Yugoslavia when applied by the British commanders in 
the form of "robust peacekeeping", which observed UN principles 
but accepted a reduction in consent at the tactical level if 
completion of the task so required. Thus the use of force and threats 
in that direction may be said to have gained acceptance as a part of peace 
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support provided that the reaction comes at once and is correctly 
targeted. 
An appreciation of the culture of the parties to the conflict 
and an ability to predict their actions accordingly proved to be of 
considerable value in Operation Deliberate Force. When the UN 
troops used their firepower against one of the parties, the Bosnia 
Serbs did not fire back but rather respected this demonstration of 
force after the weakness that the UN had shown up to that time. 
This is a good example of the need for a good knowledge of the 
local culture, even though one cannot generalize from such a 
reaction. The parties to the conflict set out to hamper UN 
intelligence for understandable reasons, as they hoped in this 
way to restrict or prevent intelligence activities in areas that were 
critical for them. The causes partly lie in the UN's own failures, 
in that there was a substantial danger that information would be 
leaked to the opposite side. The UN has nevertheless achieved 
good results in situations where intelligence has been shared 
equally with both parties or encrypting has been used successfully 
to prevent any leaks. It is necessary to earn the confidence of 
both sides in order to carry out intelligence activities in a peace 
support operation safely and by open methods in the framework 
of the UN mandate. One should not run the risk of prejudicing the 
integrity of the whole operation or the trust shown in it for the sake of a 
single intelligence mission. 
Great Britain may be said to have remained faithful to its 
own peacekeeping doctrine in the former Yugoslavia, in that in 
accordance with their directives, all the troops produced 
intelligence and the commanders took responsibility for the 
smooth functioning of the intelligence organization. Perhaps the 
greatest difference between the British and US peacekeeping 
doctrines lies in the fact that the Americans regard an operation 
as having become a case of peace enforcement as soon as force 
has been used, even in self-defence. The US approach to peace 
support operations has proved slower to adapt to local conditions 
and to the type of operation involved than that of the British. 
Research into intelligence activities carried out at the US Army 
Command and General Staff College nevertheless provides some 
indications that intelligence arrangements may sometimes be 
adapted to the doctrine of another state or organization, e.g. in 
the case of Command and Control Warfare (C2W). In this respect 
it may be said that greater diversity is being introduced into control 
over the military aspects of crisis management. This observation is 
supported by experiences with UN operations, in that willingness 
to bring the armed forces into action has increased rapidly as the 
conflict has gained in intensity. Indeed, this tendency is to be 
seen from the very beginning in the case of air operations. 
Finally, however, it should be emphasized once again that 
the findings of the present research are at variance with the 
official UN view of intelligence and its implementation. In practice, 
virtually all the refinements that belong to modern intelligence systems 
have been used in operations since 1990. The UN command system 
has admitted that there is a need for the gathering of intelligence 
and the commanders of the operations have insisted on receiving 
information of this kind to support their decisions and command 
functions. 
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